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Seichel and Beis HaMikdash
Chazal say that someone who has deiah it is as if the Beis HaMikdash was rebuilt in his days (Sanhedrin 92a). How are we to understand this? Why is having deiah likened to the Beis HaMikdash? We find a similarly emphatic statement in Nedarim 41a: one who has deiah has everything and one who is lacking deiah, what does he have?” The fact that Chazal are telling us that without deiah one has nothing means that we really ought to try and understand what deiah is. Regarding Betzalel (Shmos 31:3) we find that Hashem gave him three things: chochmah, tevunah, and daas. Rashi explains there that chochmah, is the raw knowledge that one is taught by others, and tevunah is what one is able to derive on one’s own from that which he was taught. The understanding he gains of what he learned by dint of his efforts to comprehend it well. Accordingly, daas is the finished product. The wisdom that is ready for practical implementation.
Rashi also says that daas is ruach hakodesh. Are these two completely different explanations? The first approach seems to pin daas as the final product of a person’s intellect, whereas the ruach ha’kodesh approach seems to be a matter of Divine inspiration that is not within the bounds of human intellect. However, it really isn’t two different approaches. Rabbeinu Yonah writes in Shaarei Teshuvah (1:10) that the Creator has blown into us a “living soul which is wise of heart and possessed of solid intellect”. The intellect, then, is the expression and manifestation of the nishmas chayim, the neshamah that Hashem bestows upon us. The neshamah is our direct connection to the Creator, because it – more than any other facet of creation – is the most direct and refined vehicle of the revelation of Godliness in the world. The ruach ha’kodesh and the seichel are really the same, because the intellect is the expression and manifestation of the neshamah which is our direct and most powerful connection to HaKadosh Baruch Hu.
There is a pasuk in Shir HaShirim (4:4) that says, “Like the tower of Dovid is your neck”, and Chazal tell us that this is an allusion to the Beis HaMikdash. And why is the Beis HaMikdash compared to a neck? Because the neck serves as the connecting bridge between the spiritual head of the body and the lower, physical part of the body. So too, the Beis Ha’Mikdash is that which connects Shamayim and Aretz as we see in the dream of Yaakov avinu. The ladder was firmly anchored in the ground but it reached all the way up to Shamayim. The lower part of the ladder is on the earth side, and the upper part of the ladder on the Heaven side. And what was in the middle? Rashi (Breishis 28:17) explains that the middle of the ladder was directly corresponding to the location of the Beis Ha’Mikdash. Because the Beis Ha’Mikdash – which is where we are able to fully serve Hashem and connect to him – is the connecting bridge between Shamayim and Aretz. Now we understand why deiah is like the Beis HaMikdash, because it is through our seichel that we come to know and connect with Hashem and thereby build the connection between Shamayim and Aretz.
(From the notes of Rav Eliezer Neihaus)
Shavua Shechal Bo When Tisha B’Av Falls on Shabbos
The Tur (Orach Chaim 551) brings varying opinions regarding the status of the week preceding Tisha B’Av when it falls on Shabbos. Although the minhag of Ashkenazim is to refrain from laundering (or wearing freshly laundered clothes) beginning from Rosh Chodesh Av, and from haircuts beginning from Shiva Asar b’Tamuz, this was adopted as a custom in addition to the basic enactment that Chazal mandated. Chazal’s enactment is only on the actual week of Tisha B’Av – this is called shavua sheh’chal bo. Regarding the halacha of that basic enactment, there is a difference of opinion regarding when Tisha B’Av falls out on Shabbos. The first opinion that the Tur brings is that when Tisha B’Av falls out on Shabbos, there is no shavua sheh’chal bo. Since, explains this opinion, the fast is postponed to Sunday, you cannot call the preceding week the week in which Tisha B’Av falls. And insofar as the following week is concerned (from Monday and on), that’s already after the fast which definitely does not have any restrictions of laundering or haircutting. However, continues the Tur, the Sefer Ha’Mitzvos says that the accepted practice when Tisha B’Av falls on Shabbos is to indeed treat the preceding week as shavua sheh’chal bo and to refrain from laundering and haircuts. The straightforward understanding of the first opinion, which is based on the words of the Ran and the Rosh, is that they do not accept this statement of the Sefer Ha’Mitzvos. They hold that when Tisha B’Av falls on Shabbos, there is no shavua sheh’chal bo; period.
Let’s try to understand what may be the underlying reasoning for this. The prohibition of not laundering or taking haircuts on the week of Tisha B’Av is an expression of aveilus, mourning. The question we can ask, though, is how do we classify this aveilus requirement: is it an independent, self-contained requirement of aveilus over the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash – distinct from the aveilus of the actual day of Tisha B’Av – or is it merely an extension, adjunct, and lead-up to the full-fledged aveilus of Tisha B’Av? It would seem that the Ran and the Rosh understood the enactment of shavua shechal bo according to the latter proposition. Namely, that the prohibitions of shavua shechal bo are not an independent unit of aveilus, rather they are just an extension of the aveilus of Tisha B’Av itself. Obviously, it is the week-unit that connects the days preceding Tisha B’Av to Tisha B’Av, and that is why those days of the same week can be infused with an extension of Tisha B’Av’s aveilus. However, if Tisha B’Av falls on Shabbos – which of course cannot have any aveilus (at least open displays of aveilus) – and is pushed off to the following Sunday, then there is nothing to connect the days of the preceding week to Tisha B’Av, and the aveilus therefore cannot be extended to them. The Sefer HaMitzvos, on the other hand, seems to hold like the other approach – that shavua sheh’chal bo is not an extension of Tisha B’Av’s aveilus; rather, it is its own, independent unit of aveilus. And its only connection to Tisha B’Av is in terms of determining which week is deemed shavua shechal bo. Accordingly, the fact that there is no aveilus on the ninth day of Av when it falls on Shabbos is immaterial. The week preceding it is still the week preceding it, and it is that week which is assigned the status of shavua sheh’chal bo.
(From the notes of Rav Yehudah Eisenstein)
Heter of a Baal Bris to Eat When Tisha B’Av Falls on Shabbos
When Tisha B’Av falls out on Shabbos and the fast is nidcheh, postponed until Sunday – and there is a bris on that day – the parents of the baby, the mohel, and the sandak are all allowed to eat (after Mincha) as they are all designated as “baalei ha’bris”(Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 559:9, and Mishnah Berurah 36). We see from this that when the fast is nidcheh, it is not as stringent. However, it is important to understand the precise parameters of this leniency. The Tur quotes the source for this halacha: such a thing actually happened once with Rabbeinu Yaavetz, and he ate after Minchah. As the source for what he did, he pointed to the Gemara in Eruvin 41a that says the following. “Said Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok, I am from the descendants of Sanah ben Binyamin. One time, Tisha B’Av fell out on Shabbos and the fast was postponed until Sunday. We started off fasting, but we did not complete the fast, because that day was our Yomtov.” In the time of the Beis HaMikdash, various families would donate wood for usage therein on a rotation basis. This was called korban eitzim. The day for the family of Sanah ben Binyamin to bring the korban eitzim was the tenth of Av, and it was thus their personal Yomtov. What we see from this statement of Rabbeinu Yaavetz is that a personal Yomtov – such as the day of bringing the korban eitzim or the baalei bris when there is a bris milah – has the power to override a postponed Tisha B’Av fast. In the later Poskim, we find leniencies for ill people, nursing mothers, and the like when Tisha B’Av falls on Shabbos and the fast is postponed to Sunday, but in the Rishonim we do not find any mention for that type of leniency as it is of a totally different category. The only thing we find is, as we said, this concept that a personal Yomtov overrides a postponed fast of Tisha B’Av, but not more than that.
(From the notes of Rav Yehudah Eisenstein)
Motzei Tisha B’Av
The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 558) bring down that, because the majority of the Beis Ha’Mikdash burned on the tenth of Av, it is appropriate to refrain from eating meat and drinking wine the day after Tisha B’Av. The Rama says that the minhag of Ashkenazim is to refrain until midday, but no longer. Although the Mishnah Brurah cites the Achronim who followed in the footsteps of the Maharshal to forbid bathing and haircuts as well, in the Biur Halachah he quotes other Poskim who point out that the fact that the Tur, Shulchan Aruch, and Rama did not make any mention of such a thing clearly indicates that they held that the only thing we refrain from on the tenth of Av is meat and wine, but bathing and haircuts are totally permissible. Of course, the question is why the differentiation? My grandfather, Rav Yosef Dov Ha’Levi Soloveitchik zt”l explained that the prohibition of eating meat and drinking wine following Tisha B’Av is akin to the halachah of an onein, someone whose close relative just died. An onein is forbidden from partaking of the meat of korbanos, and this prohibition includes the night following the burial. Only consumption of meat and wine has a connection to this, whereas bathing and haircuts has no association with this whatsoever.
(From the notes of Rav Yehudah Eisenstein)
Taanis vs. Aveilus
The Ramban holds that the prohibitions of bathing and anointing begin immediately following the seudah hamafseket despite the fact that it is still permissible to drink and eat (this shitah of the Ramban is not brought l’halachah in the Shulchan Aruch or Mishnah Berurah). Why is that? The answer is that the prohibitions of Tisha B’Av are divided into two main categories: aveilus and taanis. A fast-day is always a specific, calendar day. As such, there wouldn’t be any reason for the prohibitions of eating and drinking to begin before that day actually commences. However, insofar as the aveilus component of the day is concerned, that can begin even before the actual day starts, like the Rambam says that already from the seudah ha’mafsekes we are in a state of “meiso mutal lefanav, when the deceased is lying before him”. Another difference between aveilus and taanis is the prohibition of washing only the hands, face, and feet as well as washing with only cold water. That’s only a function of the fast-day status, because aveilus does not forbid those things.
Now, in general, the Rambam and Ramban have a difference of opinion regarding when the aveilus status commences for one who has lost a close relative. The Ramban holds that the aveilus status begins immediately, whereas the Rambam holds that it only begins following the burial. The Ramban holds that it is the relative’s death that is the obligating catalyst of aveilus, whereas the Rambam holds that it is the burial that is the obligating catalyst of aveilus.
With this in mind, we can better understand the Ramban’s statement that immediately following the seudah ha’mafsekes one may not bathe or anoint. During the seudah ha’mafsekes, we already feel the destruction of the Beis Ha’Mikdash, it is akin to one whose deceased relative has just died and is lying before him. And that, according to the Ramban, is what marks the beginning point for aveilus. Accordingly, immediately following the seudah ha’mafsekes, the aveilus prohibitions of bathing and anointing come into effect. However, there is a kashya on this understanding of the Ramban: if it is true that the Ramban holds that the aveilus status begins immediately following the seudah ha’mafsekes, then it should also be prohibited to learn Torah (because that prohibition is also a function of aveilus), but the Ramban makes no mention of that?! Furthermore, he explains the commencement of the bathing and anointing prohibitions in such a way that implies that learning Torah is still permissible. He says that the reason one may not bathe or anoint after the seudah ha’mafsekes is that the pleasure and benefit will carry on into Tisha B’Av. Tzarich iyun.
(From the notes of Rav Yehudah Eisenstein)