{"id":13154,"date":"2010-07-14T19:02:18","date_gmt":"2010-07-14T19:02:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_shevuot_19a25b\/"},"modified":"2015-09-21T07:05:51","modified_gmt":"2015-09-21T12:05:51","slug":"masechet_shevuot_19a25b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_shevuot_19a25b\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Shevuot 19a-25b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

Shevuot 19a-b:\u00a0<\/u>Masechet Shevuot<\/u><\/strong><\/em> begins to discuss oaths<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The third perek<\/em>\u00a0of Masechet<\/a><\/em> Shevuot<\/a><\/em> begins on today’s daf<\/em> and with it the Gemara<\/a> turns its attention to the main subject of the tractate \u2013 the issue of oaths \u2013 a topic discussed in a number of places in the Torah<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In the Ten Commandments (see Shemot<\/a> 20:6<\/a>) the Torah forbids taking God’s Name in vain, which is understood to be referring to the context of an oath. In Sefer<\/a><\/em> Vayikra<\/a><\/em> the Torah forbids false oaths (see Vayikra 19:12<\/a>). These types of oaths are referred to by the Sages as shevuot shav<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In Sefer Vayikra<\/em> (5:4-10<\/a>) the Torah also requires that someone who takes an oath le-hara o l’hetiv<\/em> \u2013 committing to perform a positive act or to refrain from doing something \u2013 fulfill his statement. This is referred to by the Sages as a shevu’at bituy<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Shevu’at bituy<\/em> refers to a situation where a person makes a positive or a negative statement, either regarding past events or future ones. If it was made regarding the future, it is similar to a vow, and will be treated as a false oath if he does not fulfill the statement that he made. The difference between a shevua<\/em> (oath) and a neder<\/em> (vow) lies in the fact that a shevua<\/em> is what a person accepts upon himself, while a neder<\/em> relates to the object under discussion, and in the different sacrifices that are brought if they are not fulfilled. If the shevu’at bituy<\/em> was made regarding past events, if his statement was false, he is held liable immediately – if it was done knowingly, he will receive malkot<\/em> (lashes) and if unknowingly, he will have to bring a sacrifice according to his financial standing.<\/p>\n

Shevu’at shav<\/em> is a type of false oath, when a person takes an oath that he will do something that cannot be done, or if he tries to affirm a false statement that he made by means of an oath or if he swears for no reason at all. In these situations he will be liable to receive malkot<\/em> if he did it knowingly; if unknowingly there is no punishment.<\/p>\n

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Shevuot 20a-b:- Keep the Sabbath and remember it, too<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

In the Torah<\/a> we find that it is forbidden to take a shevuat sheker<\/em> \u2013 a false oath (see Vayikra<\/a> 19:12<\/a>) \u2013 and also a shevuat shav<\/em> \u2013 a worthless oath (see Shemot<\/a> 20:6<\/a>). What is the difference between them?<\/p>\n

Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan<\/a> as teaching that a shevuat sheker<\/em> is an oath taken regarding the future that is not kept, while a shevuat shav<\/em> is a false oath about something that happened in the past. The Gemara<\/a> on today’s daf<\/em>\u00a0challenges this opinion with a baraita<\/a><\/em> that teaches that these two are the same, but explains that this means that the two were taught simultaneously \u2013 they were said at the same time in a manner that allowed the listener to realize that two similar laws were being taught and understand the nuance of difference between them..<\/p>\n

A parallel teaching that uses this same concept is the divergent readings in the Ten Commandments, where we find that there are differences between the “first tablets” in Sefer<\/a><\/em> Shemot<\/em> (chapter 20<\/a>) and the “second tablets” in Sefer<\/em> Devarim<\/a><\/em> (chapter 5<\/a>). One of those differences relates to Shabbat<\/a><\/em>, which we are commanded to “keep” (shamor<\/em>) and to “remember” (zachor<\/em>). The explanation is that these two concepts were said simultaneously (shamor ve-zachor be-dibur echad<\/em>), from where we derive laws like the fact that women are obligated in Kiddush on Shabbat<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The challenge regarding women and Shabbat<\/em> stems from the fact that Shabbat<\/em> appears to be a mitzvat asei she-hazman<\/em> grama<\/em> \u2013 a positive commandment dependent on time \u2013 a type of commandment from which women are usually exempt. The Gemara teaches that since shamor<\/em> \u2013 which refers to the negative commandments of Shabbat<\/em> \u2013 and zachor<\/em> \u2013 which refers to the positive commandments, like Kiddush \u2013 are viewed as connected since they were uttered simultaneously, they are seen as coming into effect together. For this reason, women, who are obligated in refraining from the negative commandments of Shabbat<\/em>, are required to perform the positive commandments, as well.<\/p>\n

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Shevuot 21a-b: We know that speech is significant. Is it considered an action?<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Generally speaking, as we learned in Masechet<\/a><\/em> Makkot<\/a><\/em>, punishments meted out by Jewish courts were given only when the perpetrator committed an act forbidden by the Torah<\/a>. If, however, the person neglected to perform a positive commandment, the Torah does not punish him in any way (although the Sages enacted punishments whose aim was to encourage performance of positive mitzvot<\/a><\/em>). Similarly, negative commandments that do not involve forbidden actions \u2013 referred to in the Gemara<\/a> as lav<\/em> she-ein bo ma’aseh<\/em> \u2013 are not punishable, since there was no forbidden action that was done.<\/p>\n

Where do false oaths fit in? Since an oath usually involves speech with no action, is it considered to be a lav<\/em> she-ein bo ma’aseh<\/em>, or, perhaps, the act of speaking is considered significant?<\/p>\n

On today’s daf<\/em> Rabbi Yehuda<\/a> is brought quoting Rabbi Yossi HaGalili<\/a> as teaching that there are three exceptions to the rule of no punishment for a lav<\/em> she-ein bo ma’aseh<\/em>. The three exceptions are nishba<\/em> (taking a false oath), meimar<\/em> (announcing one’s intent to switch one consecrated animal for another) u’mekalel et haveiro ba-shem<\/em> (cursing one’s fellow while invoking the name of God).<\/em><\/p>\n

It appears, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the Gemara does not consider speech to be an action, yet nevertheless, these types of speech are presented by the Torah as exceptions to the rule and malkot<\/em> (lashes) will be given to someone who transgresses them.<\/p>\n

In explaining the unique punishment of malkot<\/em> for a false oath, Rabbi Yochanan<\/a> quotes Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai<\/a> as teaching that the source is the passage in the Ten Commandments where we find that God will offer no atonement for someone who takes his name in vain (see Shemot<\/a> 20:6<\/a>). From this they infer that while there is no heavenly atonement offered, atonement can be made by means of punishment meted out by the courts.<\/p>\n

Tosafot<\/a> point out that there are other examples of speech for which punishment is given, e.g. eidim zomemim<\/em> (witnesses that are found to be testifying falsely since they were not at the scene that they describe) or motzi shem ra<\/em> (someone who falsely accuses his wife of premarital infidelity), and explain that in those cases the Torah itself clearly states the punishments associated with those statements.<\/p>\n

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Shevuot 22a-b: If someone swears not to eat, how much must he eat to break his oath?<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

According to Rabbi Akiva<\/a> in the Mishnah<\/a> (19b<\/a>), if someone takes a shevua<\/em>, an oath, saying that he will not eat, if he eats even a tiny amount he has broken his oath and he will be obligated to bring a sacrifice. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Akiva, arguing that the minimum amount that a person must eat in order to be obligated is a ke-zayit<\/em> \u2013 food the size of an olive \u2013 and we never find that someone is liable for eating less than that amount. Rabbi Akiva responds to that argument saying that we never find that someone is obligated to bring a sacrifice simply because of something that he said, yet we find that to be true in the case of a shevua<\/em>. Therefore we can conclude that the sacrifice is not brought because of what he ate so much as because he has broken his oath, and the amount that he ate is irrelevant.<\/p>\n

The dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages continues in the Gemara<\/a> on today’s daf<\/em>. Several more cases are brought where we find that someone will bring a sacrifice simply because of statements that he made. For example:<\/p>\n