{"id":12386,"date":"2009-01-22T04:38:00","date_gmt":"2009-01-22T04:38:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_bava_kama_26a32b\/"},"modified":"2015-10-30T03:27:48","modified_gmt":"2015-10-30T08:27:48","slug":"masechet_bava_kama_26a32b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_bava_kama_26a32b\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Bava Kamma 26a-32b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

Bava Kamma 26a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Up until this point, the discussion in Masechet<\/a> Bava Kamma<\/a><\/em> has focused on the level of responsibility that a person has when damage is caused by his property. The Mishnah<\/a> on our daf<\/em>\u00a0discusses what someone’s responsibilities are when he does the damage himself. It is not all that surprising to find that a person will be held liable to an even higher degree when he is the one who blinded another or broke his things. The Mishnah teaches that unlike an ox where we distinguish between a shor tam<\/em> – one that has shown no violent tendencies – whose owner must pay for just half of the damages and a shor mu’ad<\/em> – a violent animal – whose owner must make full restitution, adam mu’ad le-olam<\/em> – a person is always fully responsible for the consequences of his actions. This is true whether the damage was done on purpose or by accident; whether the man was awake or asleep when he did the destructive action.<\/p>\n

According to the Talmud Yerushalmi<\/a><\/em> (and echoed in the rulings of the poskim<\/a><\/em>), a person will only be held responsible for injury or damage that he did while asleep if he placed himself in a position where he might break things when he lay down to sleep (e.g. he lay down right next to another person or next to a breakable object). If, however, when he went to sleep nothing else was near him, he cannot be held responsible for damage done to someone who came and lay down next to him while he was already asleep.<\/p>\n

Given the fact that a person is ordinarily held responsible even for things that took place against his will (ones<\/em>), this ruling demands some explanation.
\nTosafot<\/a> believe that this proves that there are some cases of ones<\/em> that a person will not be held responsible for. If it was totally out of his control we cannot put the responsibility on him.
\nThe Ramban<\/a> argues that in cases like this one, the person who put himself in a position to be injured would be considered a poshe’ah<\/em> – a negligent person – and the responsibility would, therefore, be entirely his own.<\/p>\n

The Meiri<\/a> adds that it follows according to the Mishnah that a person will be held responsible whether drunk or sober.<\/p>\n

\n

Bava Kamma 27a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The third perek<\/em>\u00a0of Masechet<\/a> Bava Kamma<\/a><\/em> deals with cases of a person who causes damage to another, focusing on two main issues –<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. A person who creates an obstacle in a public place<\/li>\n
  2. Two people who cause injury to one another.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The first issue is connected with the idea of a bor<\/em> – a hole dug in the public thoroughfare – that causes damage. It leads to clarification of the level of responsibility that a person has when he creates such an obstacle, whether all such cases will be considered a bor<\/em> and whether someone who suffered an accident will be held responsible for damage that it causes to others.<\/p>\n

    The first Mishnah<\/a> in the perek<\/em> discusses a case where a person places a kad<\/em> (a type of vessel) in the public thoroughfare. According to the Mishnah, if someone trips on it and breaks it he will not be held liable for the damage, but if he was injured then the owner of the vessel (now referred to as a havit<\/em>) will be responsible.<\/p>\n

    Aside from the legal issues that appear in this Mishnah, the Gemara<\/a> is disturbed by the terminology that is used, specifically, why did the Mishnah open discussing a case of a kad<\/em> and conclude by talking about the owner of a havit<\/em>? Rav Papa<\/a> concludes that a kad<\/em> and a havit<\/em> are used interchangeably by the Mishnah, as they mean the same thing.<\/p>\n

    Both a kad<\/em> and a havit<\/em> were large earthen vessels that were used to store liquids like wine and oil (although occasionally other things were stored in them). While our Mishnah uses the words interchangeably, in places where distinctions were made a kad<\/em> referred to a smaller vessel and a havit<\/em> referred to a larger one.<\/p>\n

    \n

    Bava Kamma 28a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Our Gemara<\/a> quotes a baraita<\/a><\/em> that teaches that if a person makes his vineyard hefker<\/em> \u2013 he declares it ownerless \u2013 and the next morning he goes and harvests it, he will be obligated to leave the tithes that go to the poor (peret, olalot, shik’hah<\/em> and pe’ah<\/em>) but is free from the obligation of ma’aser<\/em> (tithes to the Levi<\/a><\/em>).<\/p>\n

    Generally speaking, only a farmer who harvests his own field is obligated in all of the tithes that are commanded in the Torah<\/a>. A field that is truly hefker<\/em> \u2013 it has no owner \u2013 will not need to have tithes taken from it by the person who comes to harvest it. In our case, however, it is clear that this vineyard was not truly hefker<\/em>, which is why the Sages distinguished between some of the tithes \u2013 those distributed to the poor \u2013 that \u00a0still need to be brought and others that are no longer obligatory.<\/p>\n

    Most of the commentaries explain the difference between tithes based on the Gemara (Bava Kamma<\/a> 94a) that points to the repeated use of the word ta’azov<\/em> \u2013 “leave behind” \u2013 specifically in those tithes that are to be left for the poor. The Gemara concludes from here that whenever there is some possibility that these tithes should be distributed, we are obligated to do so. The Rambam<\/a> offers a different source for this ruling. According to him, we find the word sadchah<\/em> \u2013 “your field” \u2013 only in reference to tithes for the poor. From this he concludes that whenever someone is harvesting his field \u2013 even if it was taken from hefker<\/em> \u2013 he is still obligated in these tithes. With regard to the tithes for the priests and the Levites, since the term sadchah<\/em> does not appear, the exemption of hefker<\/em> will apply.<\/p>\n

    The various tithes to the poor discussed here are:<\/p>\n