{"id":12185,"date":"2008-11-06T16:14:00","date_gmt":"2008-11-06T16:14:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_kiddushin_3036\/"},"modified":"2015-10-30T02:21:41","modified_gmt":"2015-10-30T07:21:41","slug":"masechet_kiddushin_3036","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_kiddushin_3036\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Kiddushin 30a-36b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

Kiddushin 30a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Rav Safra quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chanania<\/a> as suggesting that the Torah<\/a>‘s use of ve-shinantem<\/em> as the expression used to command that parents teach their children Torah (see Devarim<\/a> 6:7<\/a>) should be understood to mean that Torah study should be divided into three parts, and a person should divide his years so that one third of the time is spent studying mikra<\/em> (the written Torah), one third studying Mishnah<\/a> (oral traditions) and one third Gemara<\/a> (underlying concepts and discussion of the Mishnah). The Gemara objects to this suggestion, arguing that a person cannot possibly know how long he will live, and will not be able to divide up his time properly. In response the Gemara concludes that a person should divide up his days, rather than his years.<\/p>\n

Rashi<\/a> understands the suggestion of dividing days to mean that the days of the week should be devoted to different areas of study. Tosafot<\/a> disagree, and rule that every day should be divided up. This appears to be the source for the Gaonic<\/a> tradition \u2013 one that appears in our prayer books to this day \u2013 that includes korbanot<\/em>, a section of readings culled from the written Torah, the Mishnah and the Gemara, whose focus is on the daily sacrifices. Traditionally, people rely on a different suggestion raised by Tosafot in the name of Rabbeinu Tam<\/a>, that the standard Babylonian Talmud includes a mixture of mikra<\/em>, Mishnah and Gemara, and its study fulfills the requirement of dividing the days between these different areas of Torah study.<\/p>\n

In his Lekutei Torah<\/em>, Rav Shneur Zalman mi-Liadi<\/a> suggests that the categories should be viewed more broadly, and that mikra<\/em> refers not only to the written Torah, but also to the midrashim<\/a><\/em> and commentaries written about it, while Mishnah refers to the halakhic<\/a><\/em> part of the Torah. This allows a person to keep a schedule of dividing Torah into three parts even as he develops intellectually and needs less time for “simpler” aspects of Torah study.<\/p>\n

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Kiddushin 31a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Who gets more credit – someone who does mitzvot<\/a><\/em> because he is obligated or someone who does mitzvot<\/em> as a volunteer?<\/p>\n

Although most people’s immediate reaction is to give more credit to the volunteer who has indicated a personal desire to perform mitzvot<\/em>, Rabbi Chanina rules gadol ha-mitzuveh ve-oseh me-me she-aino metzuveh ve-oseh<\/em> – that someone who is commanded to perform a mitzvah<\/em> and does so is greater than someone who performs the commandment without being obligated to do so. The Gemara<\/a> reports that upon hearing this teaching, Rabbi Yosef who was blind said that he would throw a party for the sages who ruled against Rabbi Yehuda<\/a> who says that blind people are not obligated to perform mitzvot<\/em>, since he wanted to receive appropriate reward for his actions.<\/p>\n

Why would this be true? Several approaches are offered by the rishonim<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n

Tosafot<\/a> explain that a person who is commanded to perform mitzvot<\/em> has a harder time doing them because his evil inclination discourages him from doing what he needs to do. A volunteer, who knows that he is not really obligated in the mitzvah<\/em> and can choose not to do it, does not have to resist his evil inclination when performing the mitzvah<\/em>. Tosafot Toch suggests simply that there is less reward for someone who performs an action that may not be God’s will, as evidenced by the fact that he was not commanded to do it.<\/p>\n

The Rambam<\/a> concludes from this Gemara that we cannot discount the actions performed by someone who was not commanded to do a mitzvah<\/em>, since the Gemara states that such a person receives less of a reward, but clearly he does receive some level of reward for doing what he did. Rabbeinu Tam<\/a> goes so far as to use this Gemara as a source for his ruling that women who are not obligated in mitzvot asei she-hazman gerama<\/em> – positive commandments that are time-related – should, nevertheless, recite a blessing upon performing them. This has become the accepted ruling on this matter, at least in the Ashkenazi community.<\/p>\n

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Kiddushin 32a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Our Gemara<\/a>, whose focus has been the mutual obligations of parents to their children and children to their parents, concludes that the obligation of morah<\/em> – awe of one’s parents (see Vayikra<\/a> 19:3<\/a>) – forbids a child from sitting in his father or mother’s place, contradicting them, etc. while kibbud<\/em> – respect (see Shemot<\/a> 20:11<\/a>) – obligates a child to feed and clothe his parents. Who must pay for this? Is the child obligated to do so, or should the funds come from the parents’ money?<\/p>\n

Rav Yehuda<\/a> rules that the child must pay; Rav Natan bar Oshaya rules that the parent must pay.<\/p>\n

The latter position is accepted by most of the rishonim<\/a><\/em> as the halacha<\/a><\/em>, that although the child must take the responsibility to make sure that the parent has what he or she needs, the child will not have to pay for it.<\/p>\n

What will the halacha<\/em> be in a situation where the child is wealthy and the parent cannot afford to pay for his or her basic needs? Here the rishonim<\/em> are clear that the child must pay whatever is necessary to support his or her parents, and that the courts will even force the child to do so, if necessary. The source of this obligation, however, is a point of dispute. Rabbeinu Tam<\/a> sees it as a basic obligation of kibbud av va-em<\/em>, arguing that the discussion in our Gemara was based on the assumption that the parent had enough money to pay for his or her needs. In the event that the parent cannot pay for those needs, the child will be obligated to do so. According to most of the rishonim<\/em>, the child will not be obligated to support the parent because of kibbud av va-em<\/em>, rather because of the child’s obligation of tzedakah<\/em> – to give charity. With regard to charity, a person is obligated to give support to those who are closest, and the courts do have the right, according to Jewish law, to force a person to give what he can afford for communal needs.<\/p>\n

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Kiddushin 33a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The passage mipnei seivah takum ve-hadarta penei zaken<\/em> commands us to stand up before an elderly person and honor the aged (see Vayikra<\/a> 19:32<\/a>). Nevertheless, the Gemara<\/a> understands that honoring the zaken<\/em> obligates us to stand before a Torah<\/a> scholar. Isi ben Yehudah<\/a> comments that the obligation to stand before the elderly applies to all old people. The Gemara records that Rabbi Yochanan<\/a> who accepts Isi’s ruling made it his business to stand before elderly non-Jews, saying kamah harpatki adu alayhu d’hani<\/em> – “how many adventures this man must have experienced!”<\/p>\n

The expression harpatka <\/em>is used in Modern Hebrew to mean “adventures.” It appears to have its source in middle Persian, perhaps from the word ahraftak<\/em> meaning “time” or “the experiences that come with time.” The Aruch<\/a><\/em> translates the word as “time” and specifically as “difficult times.” Rabbenu Yehonatan<\/a> explains that the fact that a person succeeded in surviving to an old age, living through good times and bad, is an indication that he is loved by God and that the world has a particular need for this person – thus he is deserving of honor. The Chatam Sofer<\/a><\/em> writes that the honor given to an elderly person – even to a non-Jew – stems from a source similar to that of the Torah scholar, since the life experiences of an old person are also knowledge that deserves respect.<\/p>\n

The Gemara continues, telling stories about Rava<\/a>, Abayye<\/a> and Rav Nahman<\/a>, Torah scholars all, who – according to Rashi<\/a>‘s understanding of their behaviors – chose not to offer personal honor to elderly people who were not scholars, but chose instead to send servants or messengers to assist and honor them. While Tosafot<\/a> appear to suggest that these elderly people were Jewish, most of the mefarshim<\/em> (commentators) understand that this follows Isi ben Yehuda\u2019s ruling, and that it includes non-Jewish elderly, as well. According to the Shittah Mekubetzet<\/a><\/em> the people who were being honored were chasidei umot ha-olam<\/em> – righteous gentiles.<\/p>\n

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Kiddushin 34a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishnah<\/a> (29b<\/a>) taught that women are not obligated in mitzvot asei she-hazman geramah<\/em> – positive commandments that are dependent on time. Our Gemara<\/a> asks for a source that frees women from these commandments, and presents Tefillin<\/a><\/em> as the archetype – just as women are not obligated to lay Tefillin<\/em>, similarly all mitzvot asei she-hazman geramah<\/em> are not obligatory for women.<\/p>\n

The Shittah Mekubetzet<\/a><\/em> asks why the Gemara asks for a source freeing women from mitzvot asei she-hazman geramah<\/em> rather than asking how we know that women are obligated to perform any mitzvot asei <\/em>at all. Anyone who studies the Torah<\/a> knows that it is written in the masculine, and appears to be directing its commands to men. Furthermore, the Gemara later on (35b<\/a>) feels obligated to prove that women are obligated to refrain from negative commandments (mitzvot lo ta’aseh<\/em>). The Shittah Mekubetzet<\/em> answers that we know that the Gemara has sources indicating that women are obligated in certain mitzvot asei she-hazman geramah (<\/em>e.g. the commandment to eat matzah<\/em> on Pesach<\/a><\/em>), thus it is only natural that the Gemara would seek a source for the fact that women are not obligated in other mitzvot<\/a><\/em>. He also points out that the entire question is predicated on a misunderstanding of the foundation of the Torah, since it is well known that the Torah was given to the entire Jewish People – men and women – based on the passage (Shemot 19:3<\/a>) ko tomar le-bet Yaakov ve-taged li-bnei Yisrael<\/em>, which is understood by the Sages to mean that Moshe was obligated to teach the Torah to the women (Bet Yaakov<\/em>) as well as the men (Bnei Yisrael<\/em>).<\/p>\n

It is interesting to note that the 20th<\/sup> century movement of formal Torah schooling for women that was the brainchild of Sarah Schenirer<\/a>, who recognized that in the modern age in order to ensure that women kept mitzvot<\/em> it was essential that girls join their brothers in the study of Torah, was called Bet Yaakov<\/a><\/em> based on this midrash<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Kiddushin 35a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishnah<\/a> (29a<\/a>) taught that women are obligated to refrain from all mitzvot lo ta’aseh<\/em> – negative commandments – with the exception of three –<\/p>\n