{"id":11909,"date":"2008-07-17T16:28:00","date_gmt":"2008-07-17T16:28:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_gittin_713\/"},"modified":"2015-10-29T10:29:51","modified_gmt":"2015-10-29T15:29:51","slug":"masechet_gittin_713","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_gittin_713\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Gittin 7a-13b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

Gittin 7a-b<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In the context of messages sent back and forth from Israel to Bavel, the Gemara<\/a> records a discussion about certain rabbinic enactments following the destruction of the Temple<\/a> that limited the full celebration of weddings. The specific question that was raised relates to the atarot chatanim<\/em> – crowns worn by the groom, a tradition that was discontinued as a sign of mourning over the churban bet ha-mikdash<\/em>. As a source for this, Rav Huna<\/a> quotes a Mishnah<\/a> from Masechet<\/a> Sotah<\/a><\/em> (49a<\/a>) that as a result of pulmus shel Aspasyanus<\/em> \u2013 Vespasian’s war \u2013 grooms no longer wore these crowns.<\/p>\n

The pulmus shel Aspasyanus<\/em> that is referred to here is actually what is called “the Great Revolt” which ended with the destruction of the second Temple. It is called Vespasian’s war because Vespasian<\/a> was the Roman general who presided over most of the fighting beginning from 67 BCE until he was named Caesar of the Roman Empire.<\/p>\n

The atarot chatanim<\/em> under discussion were commonly worn by grooms on the occasion of their weddings at that time. The Gemara in Sotah, which is the source for this halakha<\/a>,<\/em> teaches that some wanted to replace the crowns with less elaborate symbols of celebration made of plants and flowers, but the conclusion of the Gemara is that those, too, should not be used. In Sotah, reference is made to other similar enactments, including a restriction of atarot kallot<\/em> \u2013 crowns worn by a bride to her wedding \u2013 which was established after pulmus shel<\/em> Titus<\/em>. That enactment was limited, however, only to particularly unique crowns, which were called ir shel zahav<\/em>. Other, simpler decorations remained permitted. The ir shel zahav<\/em> was a special ornament made in the shape of a city wall. Such an ornament could only be worn by women from very wealthy families. Occasionally a special version was made that was called a Yerushalayim shel zahav<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Gittin 8a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

When discussing how the halakha<\/a><\/em> differs depending on whether a get<\/em> is written in Israel or in the Diaspora, it is essential to define borders. What is considered “the land of Israel”? Our Gemara<\/a> offers two opinions with regard to this question. According to the chachamim<\/a><\/em> (see map<\/a>), the western border of Israel is a straight line drawn from Taurus Amanus \u2013 a mountain range in Syria \u2013 to Wadi El Arish in the Sinai. This includes the water off the Mediterranean coast, which includes a number of small islands.\u00a0 Rabbi Yehuda<\/a> (see map<\/a>) suggests that the western border extends much further, measuring the length of Israel from north to south and ranging westward to include the Mediterranean Sea until the Atlantic Ocean.<\/p>\n

This discussion parallels the modern international law question of our day regarding territorial water rights. Every nation claims sovereignty \u2013 full or partial \u2013 over its neighboring seas and oceans, and with regard to certain claims this area may be viewed as an actual part of the country itself. There is no set law that regulates these claims, and some countries claim that the ocean three, twelve, or even 200 nautical miles off the coast belongs to them. With regard to certain economic rights \u2013 e.g. fishing rights, the right to drill for oil \u2013 countries claim ownership over areas well into the sea. The argument between Rabbi Yehuda and the chachamim<\/em> is over the appropriate boundary line that should be drawn in the waters that neighbor the land of Israel.<\/p>\n

The specific place names that are brought as the places where Israel’s boundaries begin and end are based on passages in the Torah<\/a> (Bamidbar<\/a> chapter 34<\/a> and Sefer<\/a> Yehoshua<\/a><\/em>). From a practical standpoint of Halacha<\/em>, however, the boundaries that are important to us are those of the second Temple<\/a> period. This area is significantly smaller than those discussed by Rabbi Yehuda and the chachamim<\/em>, particularly on the northern end.<\/p>\n

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Gittin 9a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

According to our Gemara<\/a>, legal documents and contracts that are written in arka’ot shel goyim<\/em> \u2013 in non-Jewish courts \u2013 can be relied upon, with the exception of gittin<\/em> and shihrurei avadim<\/em> \u2013 divorces and documents freeing slaves from their masters.<\/p>\n

The origin of the term arka’ot<\/em> appears to be from the same Greek word that gives us the English word “archives,” meaning the place of the judge or the place of the ruling authority. In the context of the Talmud it is used to mean an official non-Jewish court, as distinguished from a traditional bet din<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n

Under ordinary circumstances, Jews were actively discouraged from making use of arka’ot shel goyim<\/em>. Rashi<\/a> explains that they are accepted as reliable with regard to contracts through the mechanism of dina d’malchuta dina<\/em> \u2013 that the law of the land is considered binding as law. Some suggest that Rashi believes that non-Jewish testimony is acceptable according to Jewish law, with the only problem being that we fear that the non-Jew may tell a lie. If, however, the non-Jewish legal system accepts someone’s testimony then it can be relied upon. According to Tosafot<\/a>, however, documents approved by a non-Jewish court are acceptable only on a rabbinic level. The Rosh<\/a> explains that this was a takanat ha-shuk<\/em> \u2013 an enactment established for the good of the marketplace. Since Jews needed to rely upon such contracts, the sages established ways to accomplish that so that business people would not suffer financial loss. The Talmud Yerushalmi<\/a><\/em> explains similarly that this allowance is made for the benefit of Jews who are borrowers and lender.<\/p>\n

These explanations are not relevant to the laws of divorces, since non-Jews play no role in Jewish divorce and therefore cannot be relied upon for testimony in that case. Rashi explains that shichrurei avadim<\/em> fall into the same category simply because the rules of gittin<\/em> and shichrurei avadim<\/em> generally parallel one another.<\/p>\n

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Gittin 10a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishnah<\/a> on our daf <\/em>discusses whether a document that had a kuti<\/em> signed as a witness would be considered to be valid. The Gemara<\/a> brings three opinions regarding the status of Kutim<\/em> \u2013<\/p>\n