{"id":11694,"date":"2008-04-17T20:13:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-17T20:13:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_nazir_2935\/"},"modified":"2015-10-28T11:46:44","modified_gmt":"2015-10-28T16:46:44","slug":"masechet_nazir_2935","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_nazir_2935\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Nazir 29a-35b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

This month\u2019s Steinsaltz Daf Yomi is sponsored by Dr. and Mrs. Alan Harris, The Lewy Family Foundation, and Marilyn and Edward Kaplan<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Nazir 29a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Is there any situation in which someone can declare another person to be a nazir<\/a><\/em>?<\/p>\n

The Mishnah<\/a> (28b) teaches that a father (and only a father, not a mother) can make his son a nazir<\/em>. The source for this law is a point of disagreement between Rabbi Yochanan<\/a>, who simply says halacha<\/a> hee be-nazir<\/em> – there is an oral tradition regarding the laws of nezirut<\/em> that permits this, and Reish Lakish<\/a>, who says kedei le- chancho be-mitzvot<\/a><\/em> – that it is permitted so that the father can educate his son with regard to the commandments.<\/p>\n

It appears that the concept of kedei le-chancho be-mitzvot<\/em> is a rabbinic commandment upon a father to teach his child and help prepare him to fulfill mitzvot<\/em> when he becomes an adult. According to this, the father in our Mishnah is preparing his son to keep the mitzvah<\/em> of nezirut<\/em>, should he choose to accept nezirut<\/em> upon himself when he grows up. This approach presents several problems that are hinted to by the rishonim<\/a><\/em> and spelled out by the Sefat Emet<\/a><\/em>. From several statements in the Gemara<\/a> it is clear that people were not encouraged to become nezirim<\/em> and that a nazir<\/em> was considered in some way to be a sinner. If so, how can we consider it obligatory upon a father to prepare his son for nezirut<\/em>?<\/p>\n

The Sefat Emet<\/em> responds to this question by pointing out that the Gemara does acknowledge that nezirut<\/em> is considered positive under certain circumstances (namely, when it is done for the sake of heaven) and in such a case, it would certainly be considered a mitzvah<\/em>. In a situation where a father recognizes that his son needs to be more careful than the average person, he may feel it appropriate to prepare him for nezirut<\/em> in its positive sense.<\/p>\n

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Nazir 30a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishna<\/a> on our daf <\/em>teaches about a case where ha-ish megale’ach al <\/em>nezirut<\/em><\/a> aviv<\/em> \u2013 a son can shave (i.e. cut off his hair following nezirut<\/em>) based on his father’s nezirut<\/em>.<\/p>\n

According to the Tanna<\/a> Kamma<\/em>, the case referred to by the Mishnah is one in which the father was a nazir<\/em> and set aside money for his end-of-nezirut<\/em> sacrifices without specifying which they were for, but he died before completing his nezirut<\/em>. Should his son say “I accept upon myself nezirut<\/em> and will use his money for my sacrifices,” he is allowed to do so. Rabbi Yossi<\/a> argues that in such a case, the money cannot be used by the son and must go instead toward voluntary sacrifices. He suggests that the case of ha-ish megale’ach al nezirut aviv<\/em> is one in which a father and son are nezirim<\/em> together, and the father sets aside money to pay for the sacrifices that he needs to bring upon completing his nezirut<\/em> without specifying which korbanot<\/a><\/em> they are for. In such a case, if he dies before the period of nezirut<\/em> is over, his son can make use of the sacrifices for himself.<\/p>\n

The explanation for this appears to be that in the first case, according to Rabbi Yossi, there is no connection whatsoever between the nezirut<\/em> of the father and that of his son, since the son’s nezirut<\/em> begins only after the father’s has ended. In the second case, however, the fact that father and son are experiencing nezirut<\/em> together allows the son to make use of his father’s money.<\/p>\n

There is an alternative reading to this Mishnah which offers a very different approach to the case of ha-ish megale’ach al nezirut aviv<\/em>. According to the alternative reading, all agree that in a case where the son accepts nezirut<\/em> in the wake of his father’s death, the son can use his father’s money for the sacrifices; the argument is in the case in which the father and son are nezirim<\/em> at the same time. The explanation according to this reading is that when the father and son are nezirim<\/em> at the same time, the son has an independent obligation and cannot use his father’s money. When he accepts nezirut<\/em> and states that it will be based on his father’s obligation, he has the right to do so.<\/p>\n

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Nazir 31a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The first Mishnah<\/a> in the fifth perek <\/em>of Masechet<\/a> Nazir<\/a><\/em> deals with mistakes made when declaring something to be a sacrifice. The example brought – about which Bet Shammai<\/a> and Bet Hillel<\/a> disagree – is a case in which a man declares shor shachor she-yetze mi-beti rishon, harei hu hekdesh <\/em>– that he is prepared to sacrifice “the black ox that comes out of my house first.” If a white ox comes out first, Bet Hillel believes that it becomes hekdesh<\/em> (holy), while Bet Hillel rules that it does not.<\/p>\n

This disagreement leads the Gemara<\/a> to discuss the advantages and disadvantages connected with white animals and black animals. Rav Hisda<\/a> teaches that “black among white is a deficiency,” and at the same time that “white among black is a deficiency.”<\/p>\n

These statements are understood by the commentaries as follows: According to the Me’iri<\/a>, “black among white is a deficiency” refers to a situation in which there is a row of white animals, and black ones appear among them. In such a case, the black animals lower the value of the group, and a potential buyer may choose to look elsewhere to purchase his animals. The case of “white among black is a deficiency” refers to a white spot on a black animal. If an animal is from a particular breed that is ordinarily black, rather than pointing to a mixed breed, a white spot may very well indicate an injury or some other deficiency in the animal. Sometimes such a spot can show that the animal suffered a serious blow to that particular part of the body that caused the hair roots to lose their natural pigment. Even if there are no other physical manifestations of this blow, it is possible that the animal also suffered internal damage.<\/p>\n

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Nazir 32a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

From the perspective of the Mishnah<\/a>, the sacrifices that are brought at the end of nezirut<\/a> <\/em>are so critical to the nezirut<\/em> itself that if a person accepts nezirut<\/em> and then discovers that the animal he had intended to bring as a korban<\/a><\/em> has been stolen, he is not a nazir<\/em>. This is only the case, however, if the theft had already taken place when he accepted nezirut<\/em>. If he accepts nezirut<\/em> and the animal is stolen thereafter, his nezirut<\/em> does take effect, since this is considered nolad<\/em> – a situation that developed after the vow of nezirut<\/em> was made – and ein pot’hin be-nolad<\/em> (we do not undo a vow based on an event that takes place after the vow was taken).<\/p>\n

The Rambam<\/a> teaches that in the case where the animal had been stolen before nezirut<\/em> was accepted, there is no need to have the vow annulled by a rabbi, since it turns out to have been made in error from the start. Thus, even in the case where the animal was stolen later, the Mishnah is simply saying that the vow was valid, but leaves open the possibility that the man can approach a rabbi and appeal to have his nezirut<\/em> annulled on other grounds.<\/p>\n

The Mishnah points to a disturbing – and interesting – case in which the tanna<\/a><\/em> Nahum ha-Madi<\/a> erred with regard to this halacha<\/a><\/em>. After the second Temple<\/a> was destroyed, nezirim<\/em> who arrived in Jerusalem<\/a> with the intention of bringing their sacrifices discovered that they would be unable to do so, thus creating a situation in which they would never be able to complete their nezirut<\/em>. Nahum ha-Madi asked these nezirim<\/em> whether they would have accepted nezirut<\/em> had they known that the Temple would be destroyed and that they would be unable to bring their sacrifices. Upon hearing their answer that they would not have accepted nezirut<\/em>, Nahum ha-Madi released them from their nezirut<\/em>. Upon hearing of his ruling, the Sages proclaimed that this would only work for those people who accepted nezirut<\/em> after the destruction had taken place. If they had accepted nezirut<\/em> while the mikdash<\/a><\/em> was still standing, the situation would be considered nolad<\/em> and they could not have their vows removed so easily.<\/p>\n

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Nazir 33a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishna<\/a> (32b) tells of a group of people walking together who spy a figure walking towards them:<\/p>\n