The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/p>\n
This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/p>\n
This month\u2019s Steinsaltz Daf Yomi is sponsored by Dr. and Mrs. Alan Harris, the Lewy Family Foundation, and Marilyn and Edward Kaplan<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Nedarim 14a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Our Gemara<\/a> examines the case of someone who is noder ba-Torah<\/em> \u2013 he makes a vow in the name of the Torah<\/a> \u2013 which is not considered to be a vow. If, however, his vow is made on “what is written in the Torah,” then his vow is accepted as a legitimate one.<\/p>\n The Ra’avad<\/a> accepts this Gemara at face value and understands that the discussion is about a neder<\/em> that is expressed in language that forbids something \u201cthe way the Torah is forbidden.\u201d \u00a0Most commentaries (the Rosh<\/a> and the Ran<\/a>, for example) argue that the discussion in this case is really about\u00a0shevuot<\/i>\u00a0(oaths) rather than nedarim<\/em> (vows). Their argument is that the Torah is not forbidden, so such a vow would make no sense. What we have here is an example of someone who is saying “I swear by the Torah” or “I swear by what is written in the Torah.”<\/p>\n In a case where a person makes his vow or takes his oath by saying “in the Torah and what is written in it” the Gemara teaches that there is still room to distinguish between a situation where a person is understood to be referring to the physical scroll itself, and where he is referring to the azkarot<\/em> \u2013 the names of God \u2013 that are written in it.<\/p>\n Here, too, the Ra’avad understands that the person is making a vow in which he compares an object to the names of God that are written in the Torah. Just like the ink is turned into something that is holy \u2013 and forbidden \u2013 by the act of writing, similarly the object that I am forbidding by means of my vow will become prohibited to me.<\/p>\n Most of the other rishonim<\/a><\/em> disagree, arguing that all of the words written in the Torah are considered to have kedushah<\/em> \u2013 holiness \u2013 attached to them, and there is no need to specify that it is the azkarot<\/em> that are being referred to in the vow. Furthermore, the Rashba<\/a> points out that once written upon, the parchment that makes up the scroll of the Torah is kadosh<\/em>, as well.<\/p>\n Although the Rashba does suggest that the Ra’avad’s intention may be that the parchment does not have inherent kedushah<\/em>, rather that its holiness only derives from the words written on it, the approach of the rishonim<\/em> in general is to understand that our Gemara is discussing a shevuah<\/em> \u2013 an oath \u2013 and that the reference to azkarot<\/em> means that the person is swearing in God’s name, which would certainly create a legitimate oath that must be kept.<\/p>\n Nedarim 15a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n We have already noted the basic difference between a neder<\/em> \u2013 a vow \u2013 and a shevu’ah<\/em> \u2013 an oath \u2013 that is commented on by the Gemara<\/a>. While a neder<\/em> acts on an object (e.g. a person declares that meat is forbidden to him), a shevu’ah<\/em> acts on the person (e.g. he accepts upon himself a prohibition that will keep him from eating meat).<\/p>\n When examining the case of the Mishnah<\/a> (14b<\/a>) where someone who takes a neder<\/em> that he will not sleep is understood to be obligated by this pronouncement, the Gemara objects that “sleep” is not an object, and it can only become forbidden by means of a shevu’ah<\/em> (which will create a prohibition on the person keeping him from sleeping). In response, the Gemara offers the possibility of taking a neder<\/em> forbidding one’s eyes from closing with sleep. In this case, since the neder<\/em> is made on a specific object (his eyes) the neder<\/em> will take effect.<\/p>\n Still the Gemara points out another difficulty with a vow against sleeping. If the person did not state a specific amount of time that he will not sleep, we know that Rabbi Yohanan<\/a> teaches with regard to shevu’ot<\/em> that a person who takes an oath not to sleep for three days is understood to have taken a false shevu’ah<\/em> \u2013 since it is impossible to go without sleep for 72 hours. Therefore, rather than forcing him to attempt the impossible we punish him immediately (for having made a false shevu’ah<\/em>) and allow him to sleep whenever he wants. Thus the Gemara is forced to offer an alternative case of neder<\/em>, where the person in fact did limit the amount of time that he would keep his eyes from sleeping.<\/p>\n In theory it is possible for a person to go without sleep for a period of three days if he is constantly prodded and woken by others whenever he begins to doze off. Nevertheless, withholding sleep from someone for that length of time will likely cause long-term physical and psychological damage, which the Talmudic Sages could not condone.<\/p>\n Nedarim 16a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n In continuing our discussion of the differences between a neder<\/em> (vow) and a shevu’ah<\/em> (an oath), the Mishnah<\/a> teaches that nedarim<\/em> can take effect on mitzvot<\/a><\/em> while shevuot<\/em> cannot. The example given by the Gemara<\/a> is that a person who forbids on himself a sukkah<\/a><\/em>, a lulav<\/a><\/em> or tefillin<\/a><\/em> will be obligated to fulfill his neder<\/em> even if he can no longer perform these commandments. If he takes an oath that he will not perform these mitzvot<\/em>, however, he is still obligated to do them, since ein nishba’im la’avor al ha-mitzvot<\/em> \u2013 a person cannot take an oath to abrogate a mitzvah<\/em>.<\/p>\n The explanation offered by Abayye<\/a> as to why a person can take a neder<\/em> not to do mitzvot<\/em>, even as he cannot make a shevu’ah<\/em> not to do them, fits in with the ideas that we have already learned with regard to these laws. Abayye teaches that the neder<\/em> \u2013 which works \u2013 has the man saying “the pleasure derived from sitting in the sukkah<\/em> is forbidden to me,” while the shevu\u2019ah<\/em> \u2013 which does not work \u2013 has him saying “I swear that I will derive no pleasure from the sukkah<\/em>.” Since the Torah<\/a> commands every man to sit in a sukkah<\/em>, the oath that a man takes to refrain from doing \u2013 which aims to create a prohibition on the person \u2013 contradicts the Torah’s command. This stands in contrast with the person who creates a prohibition on the object \u2013 the sukkah<\/em> \u2013 which is not an object of mitzvah<\/em> in and of itself.<\/p>\n The Talmud Yerushalmi<\/a><\/em> suggests that the difference stems from the foundations of nedarim<\/em> in the world of kodashim<\/em> (holy things). As we have learned, nedarim<\/em> are ordinarily expressed in language where the person compares the object of the vow to a holy object \u2013 e.g. this meat should be to me like a sacrifice. Just as a sacrifice is forbidden, so this meat becomes forbidden by means of the neder<\/em>. In our case, since kodashim<\/em> can take effect on any object \u2013 even on objects of a mitzvah<\/em> \u2013 similarly nedarim<\/em> have the power to do so.<\/p>\n Nedarim 17a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Another difference between nedarim<\/em> (vows) and shevuot<\/em>\u00a0(oaths) is whether you can make two nedarim<\/em> or two shevuot\u00a0<\/em>on the same thing. The Mishnah<\/a> on our daf <\/em>teaches that this cannot be done in the case of shevuot<\/em>, but it can take place in the case of nedarim<\/em>. The example presented by the Mishnah is a person who says “if I eat I will become a nazir<\/a><\/em>” and then repeats the same statement a second time. In such a case, once the person eats he is obligated in nezirut<\/em> twice.<\/p>\n There are two approaches to this rule about neder<\/em>.<\/p>\n Tosafot<\/a>, the Ran<\/a> and others argue that it is only in the case of nazir<\/em> that a neder<\/em> will take effect twice. In other cases, once a person has declared an object to be forbidden it cannot become “more forbidden” by the person’s statement. According to this approach, the unique status of nezirut<\/em> stems from a gezerat ha-katuv<\/em> \u2013 a passage in the Torah<\/a> \u2013 nazir le-hazir<\/em>, which is understood by the Gemara<\/a> to teach this law. Furthermore, nazir<\/em> is unique in that the two obligations of nezirut<\/em> will take effect one after another, unlike ordinary cases of neder<\/em> where the prohibition would need to affect the object twice in the same way.<\/p>\n The Ritva<\/a> and Rabbi Avraham min ha-Har<\/a> follow the Rambam<\/a> in arguing that the Mishnah means that all cases of neder<\/em> have this rule. Therefore, if a person states two times that a given object is forbidden to him as a neder<\/em> \u2013 and then eats it \u2013 he will be liable for two sets of punishment for breaking his word. This works because of the parallel between neder<\/em> and korban<\/em> (sacrifices), which we have noted in the past. Just as a person can obligate himself to bring repeated sacrifices similarly when he says “this object is to me like a korban<\/em>” it will take effect more than once. The Ritva<\/a> explains that the Mishnah chose the example of nezirut<\/em> not because of its unique status, but because the source for this law \u2013 the repetition of the words nazir le-hazir<\/em> \u2013 appears in that specific case.<\/p>\n Nedarim 18a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n When discussing nedarim<\/em> (vows), how clear does a statement need to be in order for a person to become obligated in it? What if the statement that is made can be interpreted in more than one way?<\/p>\n Although our Mishnah<\/a> rules that stam nedarim le-hahmir<\/em> \u2013 that we will be stringent with regard to the interpretation of vows \u2013 the Gemara<\/a> quotes a Mishnah that states sfeik nezirut le-hakel<\/em>, seemingly indicating that regarding the laws of a nazir<\/em> we will tend towards leniency. Since we have learned that nezirut<\/em> is a type of neder<\/em>, how are we to understand this contradiction?<\/p>\n Rabbi Zeira<\/a> responds by presenting a baraita<\/a><\/em> that shows a disagreement between tanna’im<\/a><\/em> in situations of doubt, and argues that our Mishnah and the Mishnah about the nazir<\/em> have two different authors. What if a person sanctifies all of his domestic and wild animals \u2013 does this include a koy<\/em> or not? The Tanna Kamma <\/em>rules that it does (i.e. he interprets the statement to include unclear situations), but Rabbi Eliezer<\/a> rules that it does not.<\/p>\n Identifying the koy<\/em> is a difficult task. Even though it is mentioned many times in the Mishnah<\/u> and Talmudic literature, that is not because it is a common animal, rather because its status between a wild and domesticated animal allows it to be a test case for many halakhot<\/a><\/em>. The disagreement as to its identification began in the time of the Mishnah, when some of the Sages argued that it is the offspring of a deer or similar animal with a goat. Others claim that it is a unique type of animal \u2013 an Ayal ha-bar<\/em>.<\/p>\n The Ayal ha-bar<\/em> can be identified with the ovis musimon<\/a><\/em>, which, according to many, is the forerunner of domesticated cattle. It is distinguished by its short hair and grey color, and it lives in mountainous regions, where it is a nimble climber \u2013 today mainly in uninhabited areas in Europe. It is likely that the clear similarities between a koy<\/em> and a sheep, together with its being a wild animal, led to the Sages\u2019 confusion about its classification.<\/p>\n Its name \u2013 koy<\/em> \u2013 and even the pronunciation of the name, are themselves the subject of disagreement.<\/p>\n Nedarim 19a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n As a tangent to a different discussion the Gemara<\/a> brings a baraita<\/a><\/em> that quotes Yossi ben Yo’ezer<\/a> as ruling that an el kamtzah<\/em> is kosher.<\/p>\n An el kamtzah <\/em>is a type oflocust. The word kamtzah<\/em> in Aramaic means locust, and the expression el kamtzah<\/em> \u2013 a “ram locust” \u2013 probably refers to the fact that this particular type of locust had a head and antennae that appeared similar to ram’s horns (in many languages we find that beetles and insects are called by names of larger animals, e.g. the Hebrew word for a lady bug is parat Moshe Rabbenu<\/em> \u2013 Moses’ cow).<\/p>\n The Torah<\/a> lists a number of locusts that are tahor<\/em> \u2013 they are kosher and permissible to eat (see Vayikra<\/a><\/em> 11:21-22<\/a>). Since the Torah not only offers bodily indications of kashrut<\/em>, but also gives the names of the locusts that are kosher, the Sages insisted that locusts could only be identified as kosher if there were additional signs that they fell into a kosher category. In many cases there was also an existing tradition with regard to their status. From its description in the Talmud, it appears that the el kamtzah<\/em> had a different appearance than other kosher locusts, which is why there was a specific need for testimony that would establish its kashrut<\/em>.<\/p>\n Yossi ben Yo’ezer ish Tzreda was the first head of the pairs of scholars who are mentioned at the beginning of Masechet<\/a> Avot<\/a><\/em>, a student of Antigonos ish Sokho<\/a>. At that time, scholars were not given titles and were simply called by their names. According to the Talmud, Yossi ben Yo’ezer, who was a kohen<\/a><\/em>, lived during the period when the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem was made up of Hellenists<\/a>. He was put to death by his nephew Alkiyos, who was an evil kohen<\/em>, and died a martyr’s death.<\/p>\n He was known as the hasid she-bakehunah<\/em> \u2013 the righteous among the priests \u2013 because he was particularly strict about issues of ritual purity. It was he who instituted the Rabbinic ordinance declaring the lands of the Diaspora to be considered ritually defiled. Although he was known for his strict positions in this area of halakhah<\/a><\/em>, in other fields he was known to be lenient \u2013 so much so that he is sometimes referred to Yossi sharya<\/em> \u2013 “Yossi, the one who permits.”<\/p>\n Nedarim 20a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Our Gemara<\/a> begins by discussing the difficulties caused by taking nedarim<\/em> (vows) lightly and segues to a discussion of other things that must be taken seriously. Several of the issues discussed have to do with appropriate behavior when men interact with women, including a discussion of propriety during marital intercourse.<\/p>\n The Gemara teaches:<\/p>\n Rabbi Yohanan ben Dahabai said: The Ministering Angels told me four things: People are born lame because their parents “overturned their table” [i.e., practiced unnatural cohabitation]; dumb, because they kiss “that place”; deaf, because they converse during relations; blind, because they gaze at “that place”.<\/p>\n Rabbi Yohanan ben Dahabai’s views notwithstanding, the Gemara quotes Rabbi Yohanan<\/a> who teaches that the abovementioned cases are a da’at yahid<\/em> \u2013 they only are the view of Rabbi Yohanan ben Dahabai, but the Sages rule that the halakhah<\/a><\/em> does not follow Rabbi Yohanan ben Dahabai, rather a man may do whatever he pleases with his wife during sexual relations.<\/p>\n The Gemara continues by quoting Ameimar, who said: Who are the ‘Ministering Angels’? The Rabbis. For if we understand it literally, why did Rabbi Yohanan say that the halakhah<\/em> does not follow Rabbi Yochanan ben Dahabai, given that the angels know more about the formation of the fetus than do we? And why are they designated ‘Ministering Angels’? \u2014 Because they are as distinguished as they.<\/p>\n According to some opinions, Talmud scholars are considered as distinguished as angels because they wore unique clothing that made them stand out from the rest of the people. Such clothing was popular amongst the scholars of Bavel, but was not worn in Israel. According to Rashi<\/a>, the scholars were distinguished in that they wore a tallit<\/a><\/em> with tzitzit<\/a><\/em> at all times. This clothing was the clothing of the angels, as is clear from the book of Daniel<\/a>, where the angel is referred to as ha-ish lavush ha-badim<\/em> \u2013 the man wearing the cloth (see Daniel 12:7<\/a>).<\/p>\n
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