{"id":10943,"date":"2007-08-02T20:36:01","date_gmt":"2007-08-02T20:36:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/production.ou.org\/life\/other\/masechet_yevamot_9298\/"},"modified":"2015-10-27T06:49:05","modified_gmt":"2015-10-27T11:49:05","slug":"masechet_yevamot_9298","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ou.org\/life\/torah\/masechet_yevamot_9298\/","title":{"rendered":"Masechet Yevamot 92a-98b"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Coming Week’s Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz<\/em><\/p>\n

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.<\/em><\/p>\n

This month\u2019s Steinsaltz Daf Yomi is sponsored by Dr. and Mrs. Alan Harris, The Lewy Family Foundation, and Marilyn and Edward Kaplan<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Yevamot 92a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

According to most opinions in the Gemara<\/a>, if a man and a woman are prohibited from marrying one another because they are issurei ervah<\/em> (forbidden because of an incestuous relationship) for which they would be liable to receive a death penalty, then Jewish law will not recognize their marriage, and any children that they may have together will be considered mamzerim<\/a><\/em>. If, however, the prohibition is only a lav<\/em> \u2013 a simple prohibition for which the transgressor is punished by receiving lashes \u2013 then halakha<\/a><\/em> will recognize the marriage (of course, the courts will obligate them to divorce), and the children will not be stigmatized as mamzerim<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The case of yevamah<\/a><\/em> may be an exception, however.<\/p>\n

The Gemara brings the opinion of Rav Yehuda<\/a> in the name of Rav<\/a> who teaches that the passage (Devarim<\/a> 25:5<\/a>) forbidding a yevamah<\/em> from marrying a man from outside the family should be understood to mean that any attempt on her part to get married will be rejected by the Jewish courts. Shmuel<\/a> disagrees, and requires her to receive a divorce from her husband.<\/p>\n

According to Rav, why should the case of yevamah<\/em> differ from all other such cases in the Torah<\/a>?<\/p>\n

The Maharik<\/a> explains that yevamah<\/em> is a unique halakhah<\/em>, in which the connection between the widow and the yavam<\/em> is so strong that it actually allows the couple to marry, even though she is the yavam’s<\/em> brother’s wife \u2013 an issur ervah<\/em> \u2013 that ordinarily would make them forbidden to one another, even after the first husband’s death. If the relationship between the yavam<\/em> and yevamah<\/em> is even stronger than an issur ervah<\/em>, and we know that marriage with an issur ervah<\/em> cannot take place according to the halakha<\/em>, it is a kal va-home<\/em>r<\/a> (an a fortiori<\/em> inference) to conclude that marriage cannot take place in the face of this relationship.<\/p>\n

The Maharik’s argument notwithstanding, both the Rambam<\/a> (Hilkhot Ishut<\/em> 4:14) and the Shulchan Arukh<\/a><\/em> (Even ha-Ezer<\/em> 44:7) rule like Shmuel that she will need a divorce.<\/p>\n

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Yevamot 93a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the basic questions that comes up regarding issues of ownership in Jewish law is whether or not adam makneh davar she-lo ba la-olam<\/em> \u2013 whether a person can buy or sell an object that is not in existence right now. Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak<\/a> believes that according to Rabbi Akiva<\/a> a person has the ability to do so, and lists tanna’im<\/a><\/em> and amora’im<\/a><\/em> who follow that approach.<\/p>\n

The simplest way to understand this approach is to say that we view an object that is expected (e.g. fruits that have not yet appeared on the tree; a purchase that has not yet been completed) to be seen as already in existence from a legal standpoint. Thus, the seller can then transact business with it, either by stipulating that the sale go into effect immediately, or that it take place at some later date. In bringing examples, the Gemara<\/a> offers both types of cases. Rav’s<\/a> case has the seller saying “I am selling this field, and when the purchase is complete, it will belong to you from now.” Rav Huna’s<\/a> case is when the seller says “I am selling you the dates on this tree.” It is clear that the sale will not be complete until the fruit actually appears, which is why Rav Huna allows the seller to back out of the deal \u2013 until the fruits appear.<\/p>\n

Another case that appears in the Gemara is that of Rabbi Yannai<\/a>, who had a tenant on his land who paid him by delivering fruit every Friday. One Friday the tenant did not arrive at the usual time, and Rabbi Yannai \u2013 relying on the fact that the fruit would be delivered \u2013 chose to separate tithes from other fruit that he had in his house so that he would be able to eat the fruit from his tenant on Shabbat<\/a><\/em>. When he turned to his teacher, Rabbi Chiya<\/a> to ask about this, Rabbi Chiya agreed that his behavior was correct. The proof from this story is that neither Rabbi Yannai nor Rabbi Chiya appear to be concerned with the fact that the fruit had not been delivered. Their concern was whether or not tithes could be taken when the fruit was not all together.<\/p>\n

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Yevamot 94a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishnah<\/a> (92a<\/a>) closed with the ruling that a woman who was told that her husband had died, and accepted betrothal from another man \u2013 but never consummated the marriage \u2013 will not be considered a divorcee (i.e. she will still be permitted to a kohen<\/a><\/em>), even if her second husband gave her a get<\/em> (a writ of divorce). Rabbi Elazar ben Matya<\/a> derives this from the passage (Vayikra<\/a> 21:7<\/a>) that a woman who has received a divorce “from her husband” is forbidden to a kohen<\/em>. In our case, however, the second man was never truly her husband \u2013 as she was already married \u2013 so the divorce has no significance whatsoever.<\/p>\n

In our Gemara<\/a>, Rav Yehuda<\/a> quoting Rav<\/a> critiques Rabbi Elazar ben Matya’s teaching. He says that Rabbi Elazar ben Matya “could have found a pearl and instead came up with a pottery shard (something worthless).” Rather than learning from that passage that a meaningless get<\/em> has no significance, he could have derived that even someone who is only divorced “from her husband” cannot marry a kohen<\/em>. The intention here is a rule called rei’ah ha-get<\/em>, “the smell of a divorce” where a woman who receives an invalid divorce \u2013 e.g. when her husband writes a get<\/em> that states that she is divorced from him but cannot marry anyone else \u2013 will still be forbidden to a kohen<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In his commentary to the Ri”f<\/a>, the Ri Almandri writes that Rabbi Elazar ben Matya’s original teaching is referred to as a “pottery shard” because it is unnecessary, as it is obvious that someone who is not married cannot give a meaningful divorce. The Arukh la-Ner<\/a><\/em> takes another approach, pointing out that according to the Rambam<\/a> the concept of rei’ah ha-get<\/em> that prohibits a woman from marrying a kohen<\/em> is Rabbinic in origin. Apparently the Rambam understands that by using this passage to teach the rule of the Mishnah, Rabbi Elazar ben Matya shows that he rejects the possibility that rei’ah ha-get<\/em> can be derived from it as a Biblical prohibition.<\/p>\n

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Yevamot 95a-b<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Mishnayot<\/a> in this perek <\/em>work with the assumption that a woman who remarries with the permission of a Jewish court, only to discover that the witness was mistaken and her first husband is still alive, cannot return to her original husband, and must get a divorce from both husbands (see, for example, the first Mishnah on daf <\/em>87b<\/a>). In the Mishnah on daf<\/em> 94b<\/a>, however, Rabbi Yossi<\/a> offers an alternative approach, saying “whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself.” This enigmatic statement is explained on our daf<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Rabbi Yossi understood that according to the Tanna<\/a> Kamma\u00a0<\/em>\u2013<\/p>\n