Lesson # 351 (part one) •Jurisdiction of a Beit Din In the three-tiered hierarchy of the Jewish court system, the court which occupies the lowest level is known as the Beit Din. Unlike the Great Sanhedrin which consists of 71 judges, and each Lesser Sanhedrin which consists of 23 judges, the Beit Din is a small local court consisting of three judges. The Talmud derives the requirement for three judges from the Torah verse dealing with the Beit Din “The cause of both parties shall come before the judge; whom the judge shall condemn” (Sh'mot 22:7-8). From the repetition of the word “judge” rather than the use of a pronoun), the inference is drawn that at least two judges are required. However, since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, another judge is added making a total of three judges. The Talmud derives its holding that a court may not consist of an even number of judges from the verse “to incline after a majority to wrest judgment” (Sh'mot 23:2) This indicates that a court must always contain the possibility of a majority vote in the event of a difference of opinion among the judges. There were many Beit Dins sitting throughout the nation, while some of the large cities had several such courts. This court is the one which people ordinarily frequent to resolve their legal problems. Since the Great Sanhedrin deals only with matters affecting the entire nation, and the Lesser Sanhedrin’s authority is limited only to capital cases, the Beit Din is given jurisdiction over the remaining areas of the legal system to provide a mechanism for the resolution of everyday disputes. The variety of jurisdictional powers which are granted to the Beit Din are enumerated in the first three Mishnayot of T. Sanhedrin. Similar to the Great Sanhedrin, but on a local level, the Beit Din performs judicial, nonjudicial, and administrative functions. The Mishna, therefore, initiates its discussion with the judicial functions of the Beit Din and, in so doing, begins with the most common types of disputes, those involving monetary cases. The Mishna states “Monetary cases [are judged] by three”; however, as explained in the Talmud, the term monetary cases is a restrictive one, limiting itself to cases involving admissions and loans. Rashi, in analyzing the terms “admissions” and “loans”, offers two different interpretations. The first is that “admissions” refers to causes of action where the plaintiff produces two witnesses who swear that the defendant admitted in their presence that he owes money to the plaintiff. By contrast, “loans” involves causes of action where two witnesses testify that they saw the plaintiff lend money to the defendant. In his second interpretation, Rashi explains that admissions may also be understood as causes of action where the defendant admits owing part of the money which the plaintiff claims; and the loans are cause of action where the defendant denies any money to the plaintiff. Rashi expresses his preference for the first interpretation. In the compendiums and codes, Alfasi (the Rif, 1013-1103) simply states that cases in which a money judgment is sought are judged by three judges; Rambam (1135- 1204) declares that case of admissions and indebtedness and transactions involving loans are judged by three laymen; and Asheri (1250-1327) concludes that commercial actions are judged by three laymen. Almost all of the cases over which the Beit Din has jurisdiction pursuant to its judicial functions deal with money matters, since that is the medium through which the court’s judgment is executed. Yet these cases are not lumped together; rather they are separated into categories, of which commercial matters is the first. The second category set fort in the Mishna which enumerates the jurisdiction of the Beit Din encompasses personal and property damage. Cases in this category involve damage caused by both people and animals. If damage is caused to someone’s property by a person or by an animal owned by a person, the case is heard by the Beit Din. There are interesting differences, however, in the remedial powers of the Beit Din in these two types of situations. When a person causes the damage, the Beit Din is authorized to award the full amount of the damages sustained. However, damage caused by an animal is divided into three categories. The first is damages caused by an animal “with its tooth.” This refers to cases where the animal eats someone else’s produce which it encounters in its wanderings into someone’s private property. The law imputes a benefit to the animal in these circumstances, and therefore the owner of the animal must pay full damages. The second category is that of damages caused by an animal “with its foot.” This refers to cases where the animal in its wanderings enters onto someone else’s private property and tramples growing crops or breaks chattel. In this situation, damage is likely to occur; accordingly, the owner of the animal must pay the full amount of the damage which the animal caused. The third category of damage caused by an animal is damage caused “with its horn.” This refers to an animal goring, kicking, or attacking a person or another animal. The first two (or, according to another opinion, the first three) times that the animal causes damage in this manner, the animal is considered “innocuous” and the owner need pay only half of the damage. After these initial two (or three) attacks, the animal is deemed “forewarned” and if one’s forewarned animal subsequently causes this type of damage, the owner must pay full damages. In this third category (damage caused by an animal “with its horn" there is a difference of opinion in the Talmud whether the one-half payment represents indemnity or penalty. One view is that the one-half payment constitutes an indemnity. Right- fully, the owner should have been required to pay the full indemnity. However, the law, having compassion on him because of the difficulties entailed in caring for an animal, reduced the indemnification to one-half. The prevailing view, by contrast, is that the owner is not liable to pay anything the first two (or three) times by way of damages. Such payments are in the nature of punitive damages. The law, by imposing a penalty on such an owner and requiring him to pay one-half damages, will compel the owner to be careful with his animals. The subject matter of this lesson is more fully discussed in volume 1 chapter 1 of Jewish Jurisprudence by Emanuel Quint & Neil Hecht. Copies of both volumes can be purchased at local Judaica bookstores. Questions to quint@inter.net.il [The Parshat B'reishit Homepage]
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