MISC section - contents: [1] From the virtual desk of the OU VEBBE REBBE Q: I heard in a shiur given by a talmid chacham the following surprising ruling. Someone bought milk and found it to be spoiled. He decided it was not worth the bother to go to the store to return it. Soon thereafter his son announced he was going to the store, and the father asked him to return the milk. The ruling was that he was forbidden to demand a refund or replacement because he was already mochel (relinquish) this right. Is that really so? A: It is not for us to determine if the talmid chacham was right or wrong, all the more so because we do not know the exact case and all his reasoning. We will gladly share our understanding of the topic, which can shed light only on some of the various possible scenarios. The main issue here is that of mechila b’lev (mental relinquishing of rights). In contrast to most financial dealings, mechila does not require a kinyan (act of finalization) (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 12:8). Thus, oral mechila, even in the absence of the person who is obligated, is binding and the mochel can no longer demand payment. The Ketzot Hachoshen (ad loc.:1) cites the Maharshal who says that the mechila can even be accomplished mentally. One proof is from the gemara (Ketubot 102) regarding a widow who did not request payment of her ketuba for 25 years. She can no longer demand it because of the assumption she was mochelet. Since there is no indication she would verbalize this mechila, we see that mechila b’lev works. The Ketzot is bothered by the fact that there is a broad rule that matters of the heart are not binding. He accepts the following distinction of the Maharit (II, CM 45). When there is a presumption throughout society of mechila (e.g., regarding the ketuba) it does not need to be verbalized. However, mechila which an individual may have contemplated where others might not have, is not binding in and of itself. We suggest the following practical rationale for this distinction (see also Sha’ar Mishpat 68:1). In many areas of life one regularly vacillates before arriving at a not obvious decision. He might have been “sure” at one point but decided later the opposite. It is unfair to bind someone to a decision unless he was aware that after a given point, he will be unable to change his mind. Regarding most monetary matters, only a kinyan indicates finality. Regarding mechila, speech is sufficient, but thought is not. If a person is in a situation where almost all arrive at the same final decision and he makes no contrary indication, we can assume that he too was fully mochel. There are significant opinions on both sides of the question of mechila b’lev (see Pitchei Choshen, Halva’ah 12:(11)). Our feeling is that the stronger position is that it is not binding. We should note that even according to the Maharshal, the level of finality in one’s mental mechila must be strong. If one thought to himself, “I’m too tired to go now so I guess I’ll forgo the money”, it is meaningless. One can probably train himself to not consider something a final decision until he truly plans to stick by it. It is questionable whether one who planned not to return milk because of the trouble involved had any reason to unequivocally turn that into a final decision. An action which indicates mechila can also be binding. For example, if the milk were still edible and one put some in his coffee, that would be an indication he was mochel his right to return it (Rambam, Mechira 15:3). A final factor to consider is that even if mechila b’lev is binding, it might have been a mechila b’ta’ut (based on a false premise). Specifically, had the buyer known that his son was going to the store, he might not have been mochel. In general, ta’ut neutralizes mechila and even kinyanim (Rama, CM 241:2). However, this is the case only when the unknown situation existed at the time of the mechila (see Ketubot 97a). For example, if the son decided to go to the store after his father was mochel, it would not be ta’ut. Ask the Rabbi Q&A is part of Hemdat Yamim, the weekly parsha sheet published by Eretz Hemdah. You can read this section or the entire Hemdat Yamim at www.ou.org or www.eretzhemdah.org. And/or you can receive Hemdat Yamim by email weekly, by sending an email to info@eretzhemdah.org with the message: Subscribe/English (for the English version) or Subscribe/Hebrew (for the hebrew version). Please leave the subject blank. Ask the Vebbe Rebbe is partially funded by the Jewish Agency for Israel [2] Candle by Day [3] CHIZUK and IDUD (for Olim & not-yet-Olim respectively) If, however, a person is too far away from Jerusalem and cannot bring his produce to the Bet HaMikdash, he may exchange the produce for cash and then purchase food with that money in Jerusalem. As the Torah states: "And if the way is too long for you… because the place (hamakom) is too far away from you…" (Devarim 14:24) Rabbi Yaakov Kranz, the Dubner Maggid, notes that the Torah seems to be repeating itself: "the way is too long... because the place (hamakom) is too far." Aren't these the same thing? He explains that hamakom refers not to the physical place, but to God. (For example, God is referred to as HaMakom in the wish given a mourner, "HaMakom y'nachem...") Why is the way too long? Because we are too far away from HaMakom, from God. When we are far from Him, even a small effort is too difficult for us. The Halakha allows a person to redeem the produce for cash even in close proximity as long as he hasn't yet entered the gates of Jerusalem. A person can live next door to the Beit HaMikdash and yet be far away, while another can live even far away and yet be close to HaMakom - close to God. TORAH THOUGHTS as contributed by Aloh Naaleh members for publication in the Orthodox Union's 'Torah Insights', a weekly Torah publication on Parshat HaShavu’a [4] A Touch of Wisdom, A Touch of Wit "The fact is," said one of the Jews, "that the Tana'im who lived at his time knew him better than all the generations which came later, and they believed him worthy of the death penalty." "The Tana'im, too," answered the missionary, "could make a mistake. Proof of this is that R' Akiva believed that Bar Kochba was the Mashiach." The Jews did not know what to answer. At that point, R' Chaim looked up and asked the missionary: "Why do you say that R' Akiva was wrong and that Bar Kochba was indeed not the Mashiach?" "That's obvious," the missionary replied, "because Bar Kochba was killed." "Indeed?" said R' Chaim, "You too agree, then, that a Mashiach that is killed is not a Mashiach." Shmuel Himelstein has written a wonderful series for ArtScroll: Words of Wisdom, Words of Wit; A Touch of Wisdom, A Touch of Wit; and "Wisdom and Wit" — available at your local Jewish bookstore (or should be). [5] Parsha Points to Ponder - R'EI THESE ARE THE ANSWERS 1) The Chafetz Chayim explains that the Torah has just completed describing the laws of MA'ASER and SHMITA which demand that people cannot benefit from a large percentage of their crops. A person might choose to deal in money instead, but then the Torah talks about loans being canceled by SHMITA. At this point, a person could become exasperated and not know how to earn a living. The Torah then states EFES - by keeping these laws you will be blessed and there won't be poverty as a result of their observance. 2) Rav Moshe Feinstein teaches that the emphasis on the hand demands from us that we always have money prepared to give to poor people without hesitation. 3) The Meshech Chochma answers that, on Shavuot, the poor people are scattered in the fields to gather leket, shikcha, and pei'ah so it refers to them as being IN YOUR MIDST but not IN YOUR GATES like on Sukkot when the poor people are in the cities. Parsha Points to Ponder is prepared by Rabbi Dov Lipman, who teaches at Reishit Yerushalayim, Tiferet, and Machon Maayan in Beit Shemesh and RBS and is the author of "DISCOVER: Answers for Teenagers (and adults) to Questions about the Jewish Faith", soon to be re-published by Feldheim ppp@israelcenter.co.il [6] Portion for the Portion by Rakel Berenbaum Ibn Ezra says that when we experience a death we might not understand it, and may question Hashem, and be so upset that we want to harm ourselves, but we must remember that Hashem is our father. Just like young children do not always understand what their father does to them, deep down they know that their father loves them and means it for the best. The same here, we may not understand this terrible loss of death, but we must remember that Hashem loves us and means it for our best. There is no point in losing our- selves in excessive mourning practices. The Ramban says that since we believe that it is only our physical bodies that are terminated when we die but our souls continue to survive, that is why we are prohibited from excessive mourning practices. This is only a temporary condition. He does point out that the Torah doesn't prohibit crying over the loss of life because that is a normal and healthy reaction when people are separated from their loved ones by death. The Avnei Nezer uses the Ramban's explanation to explain an interpretation of the words in the verse "LO TITGOD'DU" - "LO LAASOT AGUDOT AGUDOT" (Yevamot 13), "Don't make different factions. This is a play on words that doesn't seem to have any relevance to the discussion here about excessive mourning practices. He says it does make sense if we are thinking about the souls - because all souls are one. Any fights, factions and divisions would only be because of the physical bodies which are different. May we try to find comfort for our national mourning in these seven weeks of consolation. HOT "BALD" PEANUTS [7] Torah from Nature [8] Micro Ulpan [9] G'matriya Matches SHMOR V'SHAMATA ET KOL H'DVARIM HA'EILA ASHER ANOCHI M'TZAVCHA LMAAN YITAV L'CHA U'L'VANECHA ACHARECHA AD OLAM KI TAASEH HATOV V'HAYASHAR B'EINEI HASHEM ELOKECHA: (Dvraim 12:28) LO T'VASHEL (763) = ISSUR BISHUL V'ACHILA V'HANAA (764) Baal Haturim [10] Divrei Menachem That term is addressed to the collective. The verse continues, however, in the singular form, "Uvata " - 'And you shall come there'. What is it, then, that we should seek together so that each one of us arrives at his or her spiritual destination? Are we first to seek that place where Hashem's Presence may most strongly be felt, so that having found it we might better imbue His spirit? Or do we first search out G-d and having done so then turn our faces to Yerushalayim and Shilo? This is not an academic discussion. For we might think that since the rabbis tell us that the Sh'china rests among any gathering of ten men, the place is not significant. Yet David HaMelech taught us that it is the singular individual who ascends with a group to Yerushalayim who ultimately becomes socially sensitive and dedicated to G-d (Psalm 122). David HaMelech introduces that process with the anticipation of going up to "Bet HaShem" - the House of G-d. Clearly, then, the search is for both HaShem and His House at one and the same time. [The Parshat R'ei Homepage]
|
