Lesson # 308 • Damaging Worthless Property There are times that a person might have in his possession objects that halacha declares must be destroyed because of the dangers that they pose. Since halacha or Beth Din order such object to be destroyed, for all intents and purposes they are valueless and must be destroyed. However, the owner of the objects is reserved the right to destroy them himself, which entails his performing a commendable act, a mitzva. Assume that Reuven without authorization from Shimon destroys Shimon’s prohibited object. Obviously Shimon has not suffered any material loss; however, he has suffered the loss of being able to perform a mitzva. As in the past, I will be discussing our famous “ox”, the same ox, who through the millenniums has so much been discussed by the sharpest and most learned minds in the world, the teachers and students of the Talmud. We begin with the law that one may not maintain a dangerous object. An owner of a dangerous ox, that is, an ox that gores and injures people, may not be maintained, but the owner must have the ox slaughtered. If there is a tree growing on Shimon’s property close to the public street and it looks like it is about to fall on pedestrians passing by; Shimon must cut the tree down. If Shimon has a wild rabid dog that threatens people he must put the dog down. If Shimon has a ladder the rungs of which are weak, possibly causing one using the ladder to fall and be injured, Shimon must fix the ladder. Should someone borrow the ladder, Shimon might forget to inform the borrower that the ladder needs repairs and borrower will injure himself climbing up the ladder. In these and in similar situations, Beth Din may indeed warn Shimon to slaughter the ox, chop down the tree, get rid of the dog, or fix the ladder, since these are dangerous and may cause injury to others. The concept of eliminating dangerous objects is derived from the Torah verse: “If you build a house, you shall make a parapet for your roof, so that you will not place blood in your house if a fallen one falls from it” (D'varim 22:8). If Shimon, the owner, fails to heed the admonition of Beth Din to remedy the situation, any other person must do so to eliminate the danger on Shimon’s property. The owner of the property is given priority in eliminating the object; it is prohibited for another person to eliminate the danger if the owner wants to do so. The owner may want to perform the meritorious act of eliminating the danger. Assume that Reuven slaughtered the dangerous ox, got rid of the rabid dog, or repaired the faulty ladder. Shimon may sue Reuven for depriving him of the mitzva. Beth Din must proceed by examining Shimon’s background in the zealousness for performing mitzvot and inconvenience and expense that Shimon would have sustained had he performed the mitzva himself. If Beth Din finds that doing mitzvot is a very significant part of Shimon’s life, then the penalty levied upon Reuven will be larger than if Shimon does not take the carrying out of mitzvot all that seriously. Reuven will also have to pay any loss incurred by Shimon if Reuven’s act caused the loss. For example, Shimon might have had the ox slaughtered according to kashrut requirements, and the meat would be available to be eaten. If Reuven killed the ox not according to the ritual of kosher slaughtering then Shimon suffers a monetary loss (i.e. the difference between the cost of kosher meat and non-kosher meat) in addition to the loss of performing a mitzva. Beth Din is also to take into account whether Shimon had been able to slaughter the ox in accordance with kashrut requirements. If he could not, then he would have had to hire a ritual slaughterer, in which case Reuven will not have to pay for the loss of the mitzva to Shimon or for the difference in price between kosher and non- kosher meat. All of the foregoing assumes that Shimon is zealous in performing mitzvot. However, if he is slovenly in performing mitzvot and is delaying slaughtering this dangerous ox, he Reuven should be praised rather than penalized for slaughtering the ox. If anything, Beth Din should penalize Shimon for possessing a dangerous instrumentality. What has been said regarding the mitzva of eliminating a dangerous situation applies to all mitzvot, even those that do not involve danger. Some examples given in the codes are: (1) Shimon has a newborn son and he is to perform the mitzva of circumcising his son on the eighth day of his birth. Reuven, without consulting Shimon circumcises Shimon’s son. Reuven must pay the penalty for depriving Shimon of the mitzva of circumcising his son. This assumes that Shimon was able and willing to circumcise his own son. (2) Shimon ritually slaughters a bird or beast and before he could perform the mitzva of covering the blood (which must be done in the case of slaughter of certain animals and all birds), Reuven covers up the blood. (3) Shimon is asked to perform the mitzva of leading the recitation of saying grace after a meal and is handed the cup of wine over which he will lead the grace. Reuven seizes the cup of wine and leads the grace. (4) In shul, Shimon is given the honor of being called to recite the blessing during the communal reading of the Torah. Reuven runs up in his place and quickly recites the blessing; there is no further opportunity to give a similar honor to Shimon on that day during the services. Throughout the centuries since Talmudic times it has been the practice to have Beth Din assess the penalty in each case. When Shimon sues Reuven in these types of cases, if Reuven pleads that Shimon told him to perform the mitzva, it will be a question for Beth Din to decide if Shimon really instructed Reuven to perform the mitzva. Nowadays there are no penalties meted out by Beth Din in these types of cases. Yet if Reuven deprives Shimon of the opportunity to perform a mitzva by rushing to perform it before Shimon can, Reuven’s conduct is reprehensible. Society can examine each case and see if this is a course of conduct on Reuven's part and Beth Din can then place Reuven under bans until he ceases such conduct. The subject matter of this lesson is more fully discussed in volume X chapter 383 of A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law by E. Quint. Copies of all volumes can be purchased via email: orders@gefenpublishing.com and via website: www.israelbooks.com and at local Judaica bookstores. Questions to quint@inter.net.il [The Parshat
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