Q My digital camera enables me to make a picture that puts A's head on B's body. I did that at a family wedding with permission from all of the subjects of the "split" pictures to share with family members in an electronic wedding album. Included was a picture of a 23 year-old male's head on his 17 year-old sister's body. Their father (a relative) has suggested that under Jewish law it is improper to include these photos. He says that the sacredness of the human body is a basic value in Judaism, based on the B'reishit 1 comment that G-d created humans in His image, and that deliberately distorting the body in such a manner deviates from that value. 1) Is he really right? 2) Does his opinion matter, considering that the pictures are mine, and they were taken with consent? A As far as strict halacha
(Jewish law) is concerned, we are not aware of a specific ruling which would
forbid the type of split pictures you describe. On the other hand, we must
understand what halacha is. The Torah discusses and hints and the Rabbis
over the ages have derived many values, which are manifested in thousands of
specific, binding commandments and regulations. Once there is a specific
regulation, the matter takes on a life of its own, and we apply halachic
rules, which are semi-independent of the original value. Certain cases,
especially subjective ones, are not included in a specific regulation but
may still offend a certain value. While treatment of such cases has somewhat
more flexibility, it is inaccurate to say that Judaism has no objection to
them. Rather, the pros and cons of the situation need to be weighed, and the
matter may be viewed differently by different beholders and in different
contexts. Your case is such an example. You would surely agree that it is disgraceful to display such "split" pictures of a deceased person at his funeral. Your relative would presumably not object to using such pictures in the frivolity of a Purim party. Context is crucial. A wedding album is a borderline case, as things wedding-related have a formal side, but people are encouraged to do "wild and crazy" things to increase the sense of excitement (Ketubot 17a). It is most appropriate to consider the tastes of the bride and groom (without dragging them into a family squabble). Regarding your relative's involvement in his children's affair, there is limited precedent for his right to raise a moral protest. The gemara (Bava Kamma 86b) discusses one who disgraced a sleeping person who subsequently died without becoming aware of his disgrace and suffer damage from the affair. The gemara leaves it as an unsolved question whether the family can demand payment for the vicarious disgrace to them. This likely implies that before the fact, relatives have a right to prevent the act from being done (see Bava Batra 22b). There are many distinctions that can separate your case from that of the gemara, but it is important to see that the father's feelings have some grounds in Jewish ethics and should be taken into account. If this question would come to
a religious court for adjudication, there could be some fascinating twists
and complicated issues to hammer out. However, neither side of this
hopefully friendly disagreement on this subjective, borderline matter has
moral grounds to turn it into a quarrel. Neither your desire to include the
picture nor his objection appear to be of cardinal importance (as family
relationships are). You must reach a meeting of the minds on the matter of
"split" bodies. The leaders of the community once wished to pass a regulation that would only allow the poor of Vilna to beg in the city, and would exclude the poor of other areas from doing so. The leaders thus convened a meeting and invited the Gaon. After the Gaon had heard the proposed regulation, he told the leaders, "Didn't I say that I was only to be called when you are discussing a new regulation?" "Yes, Rebbe", they replied, "this is a new regulation." "Nothing of the sort", said the Gaon, "It's an old regulation passed by the Council of Four Lands." (The Council of Four Lands was a quasi-governmental organization which controlled the major aspects of Jewish life in Poland and Lithuania, until late in the 18th century.) The Council of Four Lands, Rabbi?" they asked. "We've gone through all the minutes of the Council and find no mention of such a regulation." "You misunderstood me", said
the Gaon. I was referring to the four lands of Sodom, Amora, Adma and
Tzevoyim. They too enacted laws forbidding the poor to beg. Why so? Ya'akov's hesitation begins in Be'er Sheva. There, many years earlier, Ya'akov's parents had ordered him to leave the country for two important reasons - to save his life and to find a wife. Now Ya'akov once again wants to leave the country, but this time for the purely personal desire to see his lost son. Is this trip justified? Ya'akov interrupts his journey until he receives confirmation that God approves of his actions. There are two types of Jews who do not yet live in the land of Israel. Some, like the youthful Ya'akov, have issues that clearly justify their living outside of the land. Others, like Ya'akov in his old age, live in the Diaspora because of a personal preference. Ya'akov teaches us to distinguish between the two reasons, and, in the latter case, to engage in self-reflection in order to determine whether the personal gain truly justifies the spiritual loss of not living in the land promised by God to our forefathers. Rabbi Avraham Norin, Golan
Heights For now, when he sends the brothers back to Ya’akov, Yosef purposefully singles out Binyamin for favored treatment: Whereas the other brothers each received one change of clothes, Binyamin received 5 changes of clothes and 300 silver coins. The Talmud indicates that the five changes of clothes allude to Mordechai, a descendant of Binyamin, who wore that number of royal raiments (Esther 8:15). But how do we justify Yosef’s overt act of favoring Binyamin financially and falling into the trap of yet again arousing his brothers’ jealousy? Citing Rabbenu Bachya, Rabbi M.
Miller explains that each of the guilty brothers was legally due to redeem
the servant Yosef for 30 pieces of silver. However, Yosef did not demand
this sum from the culpable brothers; rather he bestowed the equivalent total
amount to Binyamin (who was not involved in Yosef’s demise). Thus, the honor
awarded to the innocent Binyamin divested the brothers of their guilt. In
the same way, generations later, Mordechai’s apparel would confer upon his
brethren collective honor and salvation. It seems that when honors are
earned for endeavors that bring about brotherhood, jealousy is avoided. [The Parshat Vayigash Homepage]
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