Parshat Vayak-hel 5765 - Special Features

THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JEWISH LAW
Rabbi Emanuel Quint, Dean

Lesson # 274 (part seven) • Labor Law

Teachers, Other Religious Functionaries, and Artisans
Should a teacher who teaches Torah to schoolchildren resign his employment, it is a loss to all of the community; there is no higher calling than to teach Torah to children; they represent the future of the Jewish people. Even those children who will go on to universities, colleges, and professional schools cannot possibly be good Jews without a good Torah education. There is never an end to the study of Torah, and thus most communities and homes have study sessions for persons of all ages and on different levels of learning. The study of Torah is equal to the performance of all the other commandments in the Torah. It is not uncommon to see three or even four generations studying Torah together, such as a child, his father, his grandfather, and his great-grandfather.

Almost every community organization has a plethora of classes given on all levels, very often to senior citizens who did not have or take the opportunity to study when they were younger. The teacher referred to herein is a Torah teacher of youngsters. Very often in some communities where there were no schools, sometimes because the Christian authorities did not permit such schools, parents hired teachers to teach their children on an individual basis.

If a teacher resigns his position to teach his student, it causes irreparable damage. The teacher is not permitted to resign in the midst of the term for which he was hired unless he can provide a substitute of at least the same caliber.

The term may not be for a period of time but may be for a project such as to teach a student a certain book or the Torah or Talmud.

Teachers must follow the custom of the community regarding hours of employment, not to have other jobs, or to stay up late at night, or to fast or to overeat or to drink intoxicants, so that he will not be unable to teach. If he does engage in such practices to the detriment of his teaching, he may be fired.

A scribe, similarly; may not resign his position to write a Torah since the substitute scribe of necessity will have a different writing and there would thus be two types of writing in the Torah. The laws that apply to teachers generally also apply to artisans and other professionals.

Community religious functionaries, such as rabbis, cantors, sextons, kosher meat slaughterers, and the like, remain in their positions at the expiration of the term of their original agreement and continue to serve under the same terms as were originally agreed upon unless modified when the agreement is renewed for a further term. If only a few new terms were agreed upon and modified, it is assumed that all of the former terms are abrogated. This applies even if there were no negotiations between the community and the religious functionary.

Miscellaneous laws
We continue with the labor laws in halacha. Here are a few more examples concerning religious functionaries in a community:
A rabbi resided in a community and answered the rabbinic questions of the people in the community without any wages paid to him. After a few years the community and rabbi agree that he is to be the rabbi and paid certain wages. It was held that the wages are not to be paid retroactively; it is presumed that the rabbi waived any payment for past services. This may not apply to other professions; a rabbi is not to be paid for services as such, and any arrangement for wages is for time lost from other work that he could be doing. But regarding other professions there is no impediment to the professional receiving compensation. Thus, if he performs prior to the agreement to hire, he is in a position of one who goes onto another's property without authorization and improves the property; he is to be paid for his services or the amount of the improvement, whichever is lower.

A few cases dealing with some of the community religious functionaries and others mentioned in this section are the following:
The codes cite the following 13th-century case: Reuven, a weaver, was commissioned by Shimon to weave a garment for Shimon with wool supplied by Shimon. Reuven discovered that the wool was inferior and wanted to resign the commission unless he was paid more money for working with inferior wool. Shimon needed the garment and agreed to pay the overage. It was held that Shimon did not have to pay the increase in wages that he agreed to pay under duress, absent proof by expert testimony that the work was more difficult because of the inferior wool.

In another 13th-century case, Reuven commissioned Shimon to manufacture some object. The agreement was oral and no formal agreement was entered into nor was a kinyan performed. Shimon manufactured the object and Reuven refused to accept it, although it was an object that would become valueless unless used at that time. It was held that Reuven must pay for the object although there had not been a formal agreement. As soon as the artisan commences to manufacture the object, there is a binding agreement between the parties.

The father hires a teacher for his son. The son becomes ill and he cannot take his lessons. If the son is prone to this illness, the employer should have advised the teacher before he agreed to teach the son, but if it is unusual for the son to be sick, the father is excused from paying the teacher for the period commencing when the son becomes sick. Even if it is usual for the son to be sick, if the teacher was a member of the community and knew this, then the son getting sick falls under the protection of force majeure. But if the son was usually sick and the teacher did not know this and the son died, the father must pay the teacher for the full period for which the teacher was retained.

A mother, without consulting her husband, hired a teacher for their son. When the husband heard about it he did not object; the father is liable to the teacher for the teacher's wages from the day that the teacher commenced teaching the son, even if the father did not hear of it until some time later. But if the father, upon hearing that the mother had hired the teacher, objects thereto, then neither the mother nor the father is liable for the teacher's wages. But Beth Din can compel the father to pay the teacher if the father can afford it. The same applies if instead of the mother a third party hired the teacher for the son of a friend; if the father, hearing it, did not protest, he is liable.