In the last lesson we continued with examples in the area of real estate, dealing with the doctrine of Dina D’Malchuta Dina, abiding with the laws of the land. Some more examples: Reuven built a house with the windows facing the street. Sometimes later Shimon wishes to build a house across the street so that his windows will face the windows of Reuven’s house, which is prohibited in halacha. It is prohibited as being an intrusion of privacy and blocks light and air. R. Levi ben Chaviv held that under the laws of that land (as well as under the halacha) it was prohibited and under Dina D’Malchuta Dina he prohibited Shimon from building his house (R. Levi ben Chaviv; Spain; 1488-1545, Maharlbach, response 44). In a similar case, Reuven bought a house from a Gentile and enlarged his house by adding a second floor and balconies and his Gentile neighbor did not object. Then the Gentile sold his house to Simon, who now wants to enlarge his house by adding a second floor and building balconies, which would block the light from the balconies of Reuven. While what Shimon wanted to do was permissible under the laws of the land they were in violation of halacha. R. Moses Trani held that Dina D’Malchuta Dina would prevail in favor of Shimon who had the same rights that the Gentile had before he sold his house to Shimon. (R. Moses Trani; Israel, Turkey; 1563-1639; Mabit response 25) A similar case came before R. Meir b. Baruch, who held that there is no presumption for windows under the laws of the land and thus Dina D’Malchuta Reuven purchased a house from Shimon. The government then seized the house from Reuven because Shimon had not paid his taxes on the house. Reuven sues Shimon to recover the purchase price. Shimon pleads that Reuven should have conducted a title search to see if there were any taxes due, and received permission from the taxing authorities before he bought the house, something not required under halacha. R. haKohen held that Dina D’Malchuta Dina applied and Reuven was remiss in not following the procedures of the land (R. Solomon b. Abraham haKohen; Greece; 1520-1601; Maharschach, part 2, response 81). Reuven sold his real estate to an officer of the government in what was an apparently forced type of sale; the officer sold the real estate to Shimon. Reuven wanted the Beth Din to compel Shimon to restore the real estate to Reuven, and Reuven would pay Shimon what Shimon had paid. R. Tzahalon held that since Shimon purchased the real estate under the laws of the land, Dina D’Malchuta Dina applies and Shimon does not have to restore the real estate to Reuven (R. Yom Tov Tzahalon; Israel; 1559-1630; Maharitz, response 35). Reuven sold a field to Shimon for $100. Ordinarily the deed would be written by the Beth Din, but this deed was written and signed in the Gentile secular courts. Reuven died before Shimon took possession of the field. Shimon sues to obtain the field from the heirs of Reuven. The heirs claim that the deed to Shimon is not valid since it was written and signed in the secular court rather than in the Beth Din. The Beth Din suggested a compromise, that Shimon reconvey the field to the heirs of Reuven upon the heirs paying to Shimon $110, which they did. Once the heirs obtained the deed to the field they instituted a lawsuit against Shimon in a second Beth Din to recover the $10 that they said constituted interest and which is illegal. The second Beth Din held that the sale to Shimon was legal under Dina D’Malchuta Dina and thus the resale by Shimon to the heirs of Reuven was also legal and the heirs owned the real estate and Shimon kept the $10. In Yemen the pasha made a redistribution of the land, taking from some of the Arabs and giving it to others. The Jews wanted to know if they cold buy a lulav for Succot from the current owners of the land since the old owners lost their land by decree of the pasha. R. Tzalach held that under Dina D’Malchuta Dina, the pasha could do as he pleased with the land. Furthermore, the old owners probably gave up hope of recovering the land and this coupled with the sale of the lulav, which is a change in ownership is enough to permit the Jew to purchase his lulav from the Arabs. (R. Yichya Tzlach; Yemen; 18th century; Pe’ulat Tzadik, part 2. response 98.) The king executed Reuven for treason and seized his real estate. The real estate was given to one of the king’s officers. The officer sold the real estate to Shimon, and Reuven’s heirs sued Shimon to recover the real estate claiming that Shimon had no right to buy the real estate from the officer and that Reuven’s heirs had priority in the purchase. R. Sasson held that Reuven was executed under the laws of the land and Dina D’Malchuta Dina applies in disposing of the assets of Reuven and thus the officer had good title to the real estate and Shimon was within his rights to purchase the real estate from the officer. (R. Aaron Sasson; Turkey; 1550-1626; Torah Emet, response 147.) From the foregoing lessons it can be seen that the doctrine of Dina D’Malchuta Dina, abiding by the laws of the land definitely apply to real estate transactions since the land belongs to the sovereign who permits citizens to exercise control of individual parcels. The subject matter of this lesson is more fully discussed in volume IX chapter 369 of A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law by E. Quint. Copies of all volumes can be purchased via email: orders@gefenpublishing.com and via website: www.israelbooks.com and at local Judaica bookstores. Questions to quint@inter.net.il [The Parshat Ki
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