THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JEWISH LAW 
Rabbi Emanuel Quint, Dean

Lesson # 296 (part four) • Dina D’Malchuta Dina
Abiding by the Laws of the Land

In addition to what appears in the previous lesson, according to most authorities, there is also the requirement that the law must (1) fulfill a governmental function and/or (2) be of some benefit to the government.

(1) Some matters that are obviously governmental functions and benefit the country at large and thereby the government, are armed forces, police, fire, post office, traffic enforcement, water and sewer supply, highway construction and maintenance, educational institutions, communication systems, airports, sanitation, public health, welfare, coinage and currency regulation, export and import controls, zoning, and eminent domain.

2. As stated by R. Abraham b. David (Provence, 1120-1198, Ravad response 226) there must be benefit to the ruler, otherwise Dina D’Malchuta Dina does not apply. Some are obviously of benefit to the government, such as taxes and control of land. Others are of less benefit to the government such as regulating how real estate is transferred from individual to individual, and commercial litigation, but even these are of benefit to the government since people will have their differences resolved and be more sympathetic to obeying the laws of the land. It is with this concept that Dina has been expanded by the vast reservoir or Talmudic commentaries, codes and responsa literature.

There are authorities who hold that the government is interested in maintaining tranquility in the country, and thus almost any laws made by a government qualifies under the Dina doctrine.

There is a passage in the Talmud (Baba Kama 113b) that forms the basis of such expanded use of benefit to the government of the Dina doctrine.

“Samuel said that the law of the land must be adhered to. Rabba said that this can be seen from the fact that the governmental authorities fell palm-trees without the consent of the owners and use the lumber for bridges and the Jews of the community use the bridges by crossing over them. When Abaye objected to this proof by saying perhaps the lumber was abandoned by the owners… if the government’s laws did not have the force of law, why would the owners of the lumber abandon their rights?”

Rambam (Maimonides, R. Moses b. Maimon, Spain, Egypt 1135-1204; Laws of Robbery and Lost Property 1:12) writes: “The same rule [that if one does not pay his taxes he is a transgressor] applies to situations where a king levies a tax on all citizens, or on each individual taxpayer, whether a fixed annual tax or imposes affixed amount on each field, or if he decrees if a citizen transgresses a specific law he shall forfeit all his property to the king… None of these situations is deemed robbery nor is a Jew who collects these taxes on behalf of the king presumed to be a robber, rather he is a worthy person on condition that he does not add, amend or keep anything for himself.”

Rabbi Yosef Karo (Author of the Shulhan Aruch, Spain, Turkey, Israel, 1488-1575, Shulhan Aruch Hoshen haMishpat 369:7) tracks the language of Maimonides.
As stated by Rabbi Moses Isserles in his Darkai Moshe commentary on Tur 369:3, “The broad concept of benefit to the king allows the king to seize money or property of one resident of the kingdom and deliver it to another resident; it also allows the king to fell trees from all the field owners and if the agent of the king instead if felling from all the owners in proportion, felled only from one owner, his act is valid. If the king becomes angry with one of his servants or subjects and confiscates his property, this is not robbery and one may buy it from the king under the Dina doctrine. There are certain standards that a Jew must follow with regard to found objects; certain objects must be restored to their owners and other objects need not be restored. According to Mordechai b. Hillel (Germany, 1240-1298, Mordechai Baba Metzia 2:257) if the king decreed that all objects must be restored, these decrees are binding on all Jews in the kingdom under the doctrine of Dina. According to the opinion that some of these laws are not really governmental functions, these decrees are binding on the theory that all Jews must act beyond the requirements of the law.

A young Jewish man was about to be drafted into the German army before World War I. He raised the question whether he should evade the draft since if he was in the army he would be violating the laws of Shabbat. R. David Hoffman held that it would cause a desecration of G-d's name if the young man would evade his duties to his country, and furthermore he must serve under the doctrine of Dina.

R. Hoffman instructed the recruit to cooperate with the authorities and then perhaps they would make it easier for him not to desecrate the Sabbath. (R. David Hoffman, Hungary, Germany; 1843-1921, Melamed Leho’il Orach Chaim, volume 1, response 42.)

R. Ovadya Yosef was asked to rule in the following situation: a husband and wife were continually fighting and the husband went to the civil courts to obtain relief against his wife and obtained a judgment. Later their case for divorce was judged by the Beth Din of their city. The husband requested that the judgment of the civil court be followed by the Beth Din as to those matters covered by that judgment. The question raised was, are the judgments of the civil courts of Israel to be afforded credence under the doctrine of Dina? R. Yosef answered in the negative, holding these courts were no better than other secular courts of the Gentiles and Dina would not apply since the government had no particular benefit from the outcome of the case. (Yabia Omer, volume 2 Hoshen haMishpat response 1.)
A note of indebtedness was executed in favor of a Jewish creditor against a Jewish borrower in the secular courts of the state and it provided for a lien on the real estate of the debtor under circumstances which were not in conformity with halacha. Was there a lien created under the theory of Dina D’Malchuta Dina since the courts are the arms of the government? R Yosef ben David held that the liens of the creditors on real estate of debtors were of no benefit since the king couldn’t care who owned the house so that Dina D’Malchuta Dina did not apply. Similarly, in a case decided by R. Benjamin b. Mattahais (Greece, first half 16th century)it was held that when the secular courts decide a case wrongly, then the Jews do not have to apply the doctrine of Dina D’MAlchuta Dina.

The subject matter of this lesson is more fully discussed in volume IX chapter 369 of A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law by E. Quint. Copies of all volumes can be purchased via email: orders@gefenpublishing.com and via website: www.israelbooks.com and at local Judaica bookstores. Questions to quint@inter.net.il