MISC section - contents: Q My car got a deep scratch in the door when it was parked. The offender drove on without leaving a note. Because it was expensive to fix, we decided to leave it. Some time later, a similar damage occurred, but this time, the damager left a note and is willing to pay to have it fixed, if he is obligated. Once the door is removed to be fixed, there is little difference in price between fixing one scratch or two. Can I make the second person pay for damage which is significant in its own right but, given the fact that the door was already scratched, did not change very much? A We want to commend you and the person who made the accident for wanting to do the right thing without regard to coming out monetarily ahead. May many follow in your footsteps (but drive more carefully than he). (The question ignores any involvement of insurance companies, and the answer follows suit.) There are two alternative approaches to compensating for causing damages that might be appropriate. One is to pay for the property's depreciation in value that was incurred as a result of the damage. The other is to see to it that the damage is rectified. At times, the former is more expensive and at times the latter is. The question of which of these the damager is responsible for is likely at the heart of a dispute between the Rambam and Ra'avad (To'ein V'nitan 5:2), whether when one asks for payment for rectifiable damages to a field, the claim relates to money or to the field. The Shach (CM 95:18) and Chazon Ish (Bava Kama 6:3) imply that the Ra'avad (who seems to posit that the payment is for monetary loss, not to rectify the situa- tion) agrees that when the normal course of action is to fix the damaged object, then the payment is geared to that need. Yet it appears that according to both approaches on the fundamental issue you are not entitled to demand full payment to fix the door. That is because the second damager is not responsible for previous damages you incurred but just for those that he did. Regarding depreciation of the car's (re-sale) value, there is probably little difference between a car with one scratch and a car with two scratches on the door. The possibility that the same, second scratch would have made a bigger difference in the price had it been the car's only blemish is not relevant. If one severely damages a luxury car and a second person subsequently "totals" it, the second person is responsible to pay only the value of a severely damaged car. From the perspective of paying to fix the car, you probably do not have a claim. The fact that you decided not to fix the door after the first scratch indicates that the damage is one that does not warrant fixing, given its relative cost and gain. In such a case, even the Rambam should agree one does not pay to have it fixed. Is it logical to require an exorbitant price to fix something of little value or improve it only slightly? Under two circum- stances, you could demand the second damager to pay to fix the scratch he made: 1) If the average person would pay to have the car fixed and for personal reasons, you decided not to fix it the first time. If so, you can now decide to fix it, but you can only charge for the added price of the second scratch. 2) If the added damage from the second accident is that which causes the car to be in such a state that the average person would fix it despite the expense. If so, the second person would have to pay the whole price of fixing the scratch he made, not half. Again, we compare the situation before and after the accident in question and make the damager make up the difference. (Of course, you could not charge him for any added charge for fixing the first scratch.) Responsibly figuring out the car's depreciation and whether fixing it is warranted requires an experienced appraiser. Hiring one is probably expensive enough to make a compromise that all can live with the best option for two honest people. Ask the Rabbi Q&A is part of Hemdat Yamim, the weekly parsha
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version). Please leave the subject blank. Ask the Vebbe Rebbe is partially
funded by the Jewish Agency for Israel R' Yechiel Michel went into his study and leafed through this volume and that, striving to find a way to permit the woman to use her food. R' Yechiel Michel's grandson finally entered and said, "Grandfather, we're all waiting to begin. If you can't find a way to permit the food, why don't you tell the woman that it's forbidden?" "What are you saying, my son?" R' Yechiel Michel exclaimed. "How can I sit at the table with my whole family and enjoy the seder when the poor woman will be in distress and her whole festival will have been ruined?" Again he began searching through the sources. After some time he
came out of his study, went over to the woman, and told her, "It is permitted".
Only then did he sit down to conduct the seder service. Rabbi Solovetichik ztz"l, explained the difference between the two: A nadvo rucho reacts in an intellectual, rational way. Many in Bnei Yisrael analyzed their ability to donate based on the needs of the Mishkan and contributed a commensurate amount. Their approach was perfectly acceptable and legitimate. The nesa'o libo, however, reacted on a more instinctive level. They were overcome with the desire to build a Mishkan as an expression of their attachment to Hashem. Such people acted well above what was required of them. The difference between the intellectual and emotional approach to the performance of a mitzvah can be applied to almost all of the Torah's mitzvot. Notably, in the Mitzvah of giving charity. Man can readily accept and understand rationally the need for giving charity. When, however, one gives charity from an emotional need and desire to do so, it becomes etched in his mind and no intellectual or rational reason will deter him. When one acts on such an impulse, it is characterized as an act of chesed. There is another Mitzvah which demonstrates the difference between the nadvo rucho and the nesa'o libo - the mitzvah of Yishuv Eretz Yisrael - living in Eretz Yisrael. It is perfectly legitimate and under certain circum- stances necessary to approach aliyah to Eretz Yisrael as a nadvo rucho. Practical, economic, rational consider- ations should be part of the process. But ultimately, the nesao libo is the one who will make aliyah. One who has an emotional, existential attachment to Israel to the extent that it becomes etched in his mind so that he is constantly aware of the desire and necessity of performing this mitzvah, is the one who will actually make aliyah and no rational or intellectual decision will deter him. Rabbi Benyamin Walfish, Jerusalem The tremendous detail offered in the text and the repetition of items remind us of a bride and groom anticipating every detail of their new home, their "Miniature Sanctuary". The details prompt us to consider the value of every facet of the Mishkan and of every contribution. They reminds us, perhaps, that often those who work behind the scenes, even in the most mundane areas, gain equal merit to those whose service to G-d is more overtly precious and public. The Torah ends the account of the Mishkan's construction with the vessels that represent its true essence and which reflect Man's deepest deliberations. There is the Aron, the Holy Ark containing G-d's teaching, then the Shulchan, the Table symbolizing the struggle for one's daily bread, and finally the Menorah, which represents our duty to spread the light of Torah in the world. Moshe erects the Tabernacle step by step until, as the Book of
Shemot closes, he "completed the work [and] the Glory of Hashem filled the
Mishkan… before the eyes of all the Children of Israel". Happy are they who saw
their own han- diwork restore to an enslaved people the lost glory of their
forefathers. Blessed are they who in their personal merit created a holy vehicle
and resting-place for the Shechina. [The Parshat Vayaqhel-P'kudei Homepage]
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