MISC section - contents: Q Regarding a machloket (disagreement) on a halachic matter, do older children, at least those living at home, have to follow the decision that their father follows? A In this response, we assume that the father is following a legitimate opinion and that the family is not bound by a local ruling. We can address only a few principles and applications. The topic begins with a gemara (Pesachim 50b). The people of Beishan had the practice not to travel to market-days in Tzidon on Fridays. Their sons approached R. Yochanan, hoping to end this practice, which they found difficult. R. Yochanan said that since their fathers had already accepted the stringency, the pasuk “…do not forsake your mother’s Torah” (Mishlei 1:8) applied and they must continue the practice. The Rivash (399), Chavot Ya'ir (126) and others say that the fathers of Beishan did not have the authority to individually obligate their sons but, as a community, to create a minhag hamakom (local practice). The Chavot Ya'ir reasons that people raised in Beishan who moved elsewhere ceased to keep the minhag, whereas newcomers to Beishan without ancestors from there would be obligated. The Zichron Yosef, cited by the Pitchei Teshuva (YD 214:5) and many others, makes the following distinction. A stringency that a father accepts is binding on his son only if the son began keeping the minhag, which was the situation in Beishan. So what difference do the fathers make, if the sons were bound by their own actions? The Korban Netanel (Pesachim IV,3:5) cites an opinion that because the minhag stemmed from the fathers, it was not possible to stop the practice with hatarat nedarim (absolution of oaths). Other answers are given, as well. We have discussed cases where a father accepted stringencies that went beyond halachic requirements. Do the same rules apply to our case, where the father’s practice relates to ruling on a machloket whether something is objectively permitted or forbidden? Recent poskim discuss a parallel case that includes both types of practices, namely, a marriage between Ashkenazic and Sefardic spouses in a place where no local standard exists. (The question was rare centuries ago, because couples followed the minhagim and rulings of the place they lived; now, most cities have separate communities based on edah (ethnic subgroup)). The Tashbetz (III,179) and most recent poskim (see Yechave Da’at I, 12; Noam, vol. 23), who say that the wife takes on the practices of her husband’s edah, make little or no distinction between minhag and halachic rulings. Should the wife’s following of her husband’s practices serve as a precedent for children living at home? We cannot delve into a full explanation (see Techumin XV), but it appears that the level of interconnectedness, the potential for conflict, and the prospect of staying under one roof for many decades regarding spouses qualitatively exceed those of children. Thus, one cannot conclude that children are automatically “pulled after” their father’s practices. On the other hand, numerous sources assume that children follow their father’s lead under normal circumstances, even in the absence of a community-wide practice. For example, the MaharamShick (OC 249) says that the fact that a young adult living by his father refrains from the same things as his father is not a sign that he has accepted these practices indefinitely. Actually, one is expected to conform when possible, for leniency or stringency, even with the halachic practices of one’s unrelated host in order to avoid acrimony. On the other hand, there are times that children act differently from their father in his presence (compare Rama YD 112:15 and Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:5). Much depends on the father’s tolerance and other circumstances (see V’aleihu Lo Yibol, I, pg. 64). In summary, a father need not determine halachic
rulings for his children who are mature enough to choose their own
path. However, his approach is the assumed point of departure and
his feelings should be considered, especially in his presence. Two mitzvot associated with homicide - arei miklat (cities of refuge) and eglah arufa (a heifer whose neck is broken) - appear in Parshat Shof'tim. If we properly establish cities of refuge, we can avoid the stain to which the Torah refers: "That innocent blood be not shed in your land which Hashem your God gives you for an inheritance" (Devarim 19:10). The parallel verse in Parshat Mas'ei speaks of the Land as polluted by the innocent blood shed upon it. Two points are noteworthy. First, the verses
relating to these mitzvot emphasize the impact murder has on the
earth and on the Land. Secondly, both arei miklat and eglah arufa
are practiced only in Eretz Yisrael. Ramban (Vayikra 18:25) points
out the apparent anomaly in that the violation of certain
prohibitions relating to personal conduct and not at all dependent
on the land have a catastrophic effect on the Land itself. Included
in this category are sexual immorality, spilling of innocent blood
and idolatry. Ramban explains that already at the world's creation
Hashem placed Eretz Yisrael at the center of the inhabited earth,
even though He, of course, is King of the entire world. Hashem
separated Am Yisrael from all the nations, giving us Eretz Yisrael -
His special portion. Rabbi Shalom Kurz, Ramat Beit Shemesh This is one of the chilling G'matriyaTwins that show
up every so often. Pursue justice so that you will live and inherit
the Land... If we don't, then we will be cast out and be pariah
among the nations of the world, as this pasuk from the Tochacha of
Ki Tavo states. These two p'sukim each have a numeric value of 4441
and gives us a glimpse of the two sides of justice. WOMBAT After discussing various characteristics and responsibilities of the judges, the text diverges, as it were, by informing us of the prohibitions of planting a tree near G-d’s altar and of erecting pillars of stone for worship. Then, we are exhorted not to slaughter animals that have a blemish or “any bad thing” because, “that is an abomination of Hashem, your G-d” (cf. Devarim 16:18 – 17:1). Targum Yonatan renders the term “any bad thing” to include stolen or extorted animals. In this way, the Targum helps us to understand the juxtaposition of these varying commands. Perversion of justice, it appears, manifests itself in the guise of the beautification of holy places. That is, the leaders emphasize external features over the intrinsic spiritual values of service to Hashem. Moreover, this erosion of values fosters bad
practices such as laundered funds being used for sacred purposes –
all in the name of Heaven! It is then just another short step to
that described in the following verse: the proliferation of people,
“who serve the gods of others.” Perhaps we who choose our judges
should take note. [The Parshat Sho-f'tim Homepage]
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