This lesson deals with another type of thing that has no physical substance. A pledge to charity or to a religious group is not a physical thing. The money that is given to fulfill the pledge is physical, but the pledge is not. However, the halachah recognizes that a pledge to charity may not be governed by the laws of a promise of a gift or sale of a nonphysical thing between individuals. Thus while a certain pledge of a gift or a promise to sell to an individual may not be effective since the promise is a transfer of a nonphysical thing, such transfer may be valid as a gift to a charity or to a religious group. This assumes that there has not been any kinyan performed to make the pledge or promise binding on the obligor or promisor. Although the halachah speaks of gifts or pledges for a sacred purpose, such as to the Beit HaMikdash in Jerusalem, may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, and pledges to the poor, I have designated all such pledges and gifts as pledges to charity. In addition to being a thing not physical, the pledge may also be of a thing not yet in existence. For example, Reuven, by a vow, pledges that the fruit that will grow on his trees two years hence is donated to charity A. It is axiomatic that a Jew must fulfill the vows that he utters. It is stated in D’varim 23:24. "That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do."

This means that whatever one utters with his lips, concerning a sacrifice, a vow, or anything similar, one must fulfill. I have designated all, pledges in the context of vows, even though technically they may not be vows since most persons would want their pledges to be respected as if they were vows. Related to this question is the time when the donor becomes responsible to fulfill his pledge regarding a thing not yet in existence or not yet in his ownership. Is it from the time that he thinks about making the pledge and decides in his heart to do so, or is it from the time that he actually utters the words with his lips? Since so much of the question of pledges depends upon man's relationship with his Maker, his thoughts of making a gift to charity may make it binding upon him. When the Beit HaMikdash was in existence, if a person thought that he would offer a sacrifice to God, the thought was enough to obligate him to offer the sacrifice. There are positions both ways as to whether at the present time a pledge to charity within one's mind, without having been orally uttered, is equivalent to a pledge to the Beit HaMikdash. I have taken the position of Rabbi Moses Isserles, that it is. There is authority that if one states: "I hereby pledge that I give my watch to Charity A", then the pledge is binding. This authority holds that this is true even if the person pledges something not yet in existence. Such as by stating: "I pledge to charity A the fruit that will grow on my tree two years hence". The reason is that a person's pledge to charity is legally binding and may be sued upon by the charity. Therefore, if a person who is on his deathbed makes a gift to charity of something not yet in existence, such as the fruit that his tree will bear two years hence, the pledge is binding. It is binding although the pledge is a non- physical thing and the thing that he pledges is not yet in existence.

A person may pledge to a charity all of the income of a lease that will be entered concerning property that he owns. It is similar to his having transferred the tree to the charity for its fruit, which is a valid transfer. This is not a transfer of a thing not yet in existence since thc tree is in existence. There is authority that disagrees with the foregoing and holds that the law as stated above is not correct in two respects:

(1) A vow is binding if the vow states that the person making it, takes it upon himself to fulfill the vow, that it is a personal obligation and not a gift; then he has the obligation to do the thing that he utters. In the above case he made a pledge that stated that he makes a gift of something not yet in existence. There is no obligation on him to fulfill it. Since the gift is for a thing not yet in existence, it need not be honored. The vow would have been binding if he stated, "I hereby take it upon myself (or I hereby vow) that I will give the fruit that will grow on my tree two years hence to charity."

(2) Even if it is stated in the context of a vow that he obligates himself to do something, it is not binding after he dies. But if he is on his deathbed and the gift is to deliver to Charity A, a thing not yet in existence, as soon as he dies the pledge to deliver the gift is terminated. Thus if he is still alive when the tree bears the fruit he pledged, he must fulfill the pledge and the fruit of that year belongs to charity. According to this second view, the donor's pledge would have been binding had he stated that he hereby gives the tree to the charity for its fruit. Since the tree is transferred while the donor is alive, the fruit will be given to the charity even after the death of the donor.

A creditor pledges the money owed to him to a charity. Since the debt is not a physical thing he cannot give it to charity. However, if he states, "I hereby pledge to give the money to charity when I collect it", it is binding. The donor in the former case made a current gift.

He stated "I hereby give to charity the money due to me from Shimon the borrower". To be personally responsible he must state. "I hereby undertake to deliver (or to give) to charity the money that I will collect from Shimon the borrower". Since this is an undertaking to do something in the future, it is binding on the donor, even according to the second authority in the text. Similarly, if a person states that when I purchase this object it will belong to charity, it is not binding. However, if he states that when he purchases the thing he will give it to charity, it is binding.

If a person purchases real estate with the intent to donate it to charity, he must fulfill his nonarticulated pledge. When he makes or thinks the pledge he is already the owner of the real estate. It is therefore both in existence and in his possession, and the problem of pledging a thing not in existence or not in possession does not apply.

The subject matter of this lesson is more fully presented in Volume VI Chapters 212 of "A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law" by E. Quint, published by Jason Aronson, Inc. and on sale at local Judaica bookstores.
Questions to quint@inter.net.il

[The Parshat Tazri'a Homepage]
[The TORAH tidbits Homepage] [How to use TORAH tidbits]
[About The OU/NCSY Israel Center] [About TORAH tidbits]
[www.ou.org]