Q What is the rationale for buying
Israel Bonds, when it seems to be in clear violation of the prohibition to
take interest (ribit) from a fellow Jew? The main application is in regard to the modern concept of a corporation. One of the main characteristics of the corpo- ration is that its owners have no personal liability. In other words, as large as the corporation's debt is, no one can approach even the principle shareholder and demand payment from his personal money. Rather, only the money of the amorphous entity, known as the corporation, can be taken. In other words, only those resources that its shareholders have already "put in the pot" can be touched. Several poskim, most well known among them being Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe YD II, 62-63), ruled that it is, therefore, permitted to take even fixed interest (ribbit ketzutza) from corporations, even those owned primarily by Jews. (See a list of opinions on both sides of the issue in Brit Yehuda 7:(66). Note that the leniency does not apply to paying interest to a Jewish owned corporation.) The same basic logic applies to a government, which obligates itself as an amorphous institution and does not create personal liability for its citizens. Not all poskim accept the corporation
leniency (or accept it only on the Torah level, not on the rabbinic level
(ibid.)) and, therefore, it is preferable to broaden the grounds for
leniency in regard to the Israeli government. One distinction is that the
shareholders of a corporation are clearly defined. In contrast, the
citizens and/or active inhabitants of a country are a fluid group. What is
the status of a person who moves to or from the country between the time
of the selling of the bond and its payment? Can a citizen cash in on his
share of the country's wealth before leaving it? While one could argue the
legal distinctions, the situation resembles that which the Rashba calls
"money without known owners" (see Chelkat Ya'akov YD 66). Har Tzvi (YD
126) is lenient for this basic reason on loans from a government bank. Despite the fact that we have already presented enough grounds for at least entertaining permitting unrestricted purchase of Israel Bonds, the Israeli government wisely drew up a heter iska for its various financial dealings. Without getting into all of the details of its mechanism [we have on file a series of articles on the matter from our P'ninat Mishpat section], the heter iska is a widely used document, which turns what would have been a loan into a joint investment of the two parties. While some applications of the heter iska are logically questionable, the minhag ha'olam (including of most who are otherwise "machmirim") is very lenient on the matter. In summary, there is very ample reason
to allow taking interest from Israel Bonds. Considering the great mitzva
of helping build and sustain Eretz Yisrael in Jewish hands (see Gittin 8b)
and helping in the many security and humanitarian needs of its population,
especially these days, it would be inappropriate to take a fringe
stringent opinion to disallow such a practice. If you have enjoyed these stories, look
for Shmuel Himelstein's new book, "Wisdom and Wit", at your local Jewish
bookseller. It contains an entirely new collection of stories. Ever hear the lobby of a hotel referred
to a LOBI in Hebrew? Guess what? No matter how you pronounce it and how
many other Hebrew words are in the same sentence, LOBI isn’t Hebrew. And
even if you learn the correct Hebrew word for lobby, don’t try to use it -
not many people will know what you are talking about. Lobby is M’VO’A Actually, non-Jews - who are obligated to fulfill the 7 universal laws referred to as SHEVA MITZVOT B'NEI NOACH - are also required by Torah law to establish courts of law. While the administration of justice applies equally to all peoples, the Sanhedrin's status is radically different from that of any other judicial body. Our Parsha teaches that the Sanhedrin can only hear capital cases when it is seated in its Jerusalem venue. "If any case should arise for you to decide in a matter of bloodshed…, you shall go up to the place which the Lord your God shall choose...” (17:8). The Talmud (Sanhedrin 14b) derives from this verse SHEHAMAKOM GOREM, that the PLACE of the Sanhedrin grants it the authority to try capital cases. If Sanhedrin moves from its seat of judgment, as was the case forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, capital cases can no longer be adjudicated. Such a phenomenon is found in no other court system in the world, because in all other judicial systems, judgments are rendered solely on the basis of the evidence presented. To understand this anomaly, we must
invoke the words of the prophet, "...for out of Zion shall go forth the
law and the word of God from Jerusalem" (Isaiah 2:3). A full measure of
justice can take place only in the presence of God - "...in the midst of
the judges, He gives judgment" (Psalms 82:1). Jerusalem is the source of
full revelation and it is from there that the rest of the world is
sustained. Thus, we can understand why Chazal gave preference to Torah
study in Eretz Yisrael over that in any other country (Sifre-Ekev) and why
they equated residency in Chutz La'aretz with living without a personal
God (Ketubot 100b). Through residency in Israel, we identify with the
focal point of our destiny as a people; only there are we able to reach
our full spiritual potential. And this is why immigration to Israel was
referred to throughout the ages as "aliyah" - an act of ascending. TORAH THOUGHTS as contributed by Aloh
Naaleh members for publication in the Orthodox Union's 'Torah Insights', a
weekly Torah publication on Parshat Ha'Shavuah With typical insight, however, the Chafetz Chaim asks us to consider the true measure of wisdom. Using an analogy he discusses our responses to the characterization of a person as rich, depending on the source of that description. If a pauper told us that Reuven is well-to-do, we would hardly believe him. Yet if Rothschild calls Reuven prosperous, it surely means that he has true wealth. Similarly, if Shlomo Hamelech alludes
to somebody's wisdom, we would certainly uphold that individual highly.
And if Hashem calls that person wise, would we not bestow upon him the
highest reverence? But if the absolute wisdom that is G-d's Torah states
that such a Chacham will be blinded by a bribe, it is clear that when it
comes to judging others we would do well to attenuate our subjective
definitions of wisdom. [The Parshat Sho-f'tim Homepage]
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