[P>] and [S>] indicate start of a parsha p’tucha
or s’tuma respectively.
This is THE sedra for which these notations were
made.
This is not an ideal situation; commen- taries consider this to be one of the
mitzvot that is a "concession to the base inclinations of a man" in the heat
of battle. Nonetheless, these mitzvot are part of a reality of Jewish Life (in
different times, perhaps) and they do tell us (even today) something about the
difference between armies of the world and the Jewish army. We are not
supposed to behave like other people - even in the "heat of battle". This passage is the source of the firstborn's inheritance. Ramban counts two mitzvot here - the positive command to give the firstborn a double portion and the prohibition of not giving it to him. Rambam and the Chinuch include the rules of the firstborn as part of the laws of inheritance from Parshat Pinchas and not separately here. This is just one of many examples of different countings among the Sages who attempted to identify the traditional 613 mitzvot. SDT The Vilna Gaon sees a hint to the double portion of the B'chor in the letters of the word B'CHOR: BET-KAF- RESH. Each letter is double the letter before it - BET is double ALEF, KAF is double YUD, REISH is double KUF. (No other letters are like that.) [S>21:18] The "rebellious son" is warned by his parents to mend his ways. If he continues to defy them, violates certain mitzvot, engages in a specific sequence of actions, and if he is of a specific age and at a particular stage of physical development, and his parents are healthy, normal, and deemed to be on equal levels of character, then, and only then, would it be possible to execute him as a "Ben Sorer U'moreh". Although it is (almost) impossible to reach that ultimate point - and sources indicate that there never actually was a case of "the rebellious son" - this portion of the Torah serves as a stern warning to wayward children AND their parents! Some mitzvot seem to be intended primarily as deterent and Mussar.
The hanging of the body after execution (in some cases, not all) serves as a deterrent for others and is part of the atonement process for the soul of the guilty party. Using "Kal VaChomer", we are taught that burial, in general, and "as soon as is feasible", in particular, is the proper procedure for the dead [537,A231 21:23]. Note that although the Torah here speaks only of the executed "felon", the mitzva from the Torah includes burial of all Jewish dead. This is not a Rabbinic deduction, extension, or legislation - it is part of Torah Law - the Oral Law. [S>22:1] One is required to return identifiable lost objects to their rightful owners [538,A204 22:1], even if doing so is difficult. One cannot ignore this responsibility [539,L269 22:3] even if it is easier to just leave the object alone. Technically, the laws of LOST & FOUND apply to possessions of fellow Jews. However, with the potential for Kiddush HaShem and its opposite, depending upon what one does, it is important to go out of one's way to return a lost item to a non-Jew as well. This too is part of halacha, not just a nice thing to do. [S>22:4] Nor may one ignore a fellow's beast of burden that has collapsed under its load [540,L270 22:4]. One is required to help his fellow load his animals [541,A203 22:4]. Sefer HaChinuch points out that this mitzva-pair apply to other animals, not just donkey, and they apply to people as well. If you see a fellow human over-loaded with what he/she is carrying (or trying to carry), it is a mitzva to help out. The Chinuch actually considers this a KAL VACHO- MER from the command regarding animals. [S>22:5] Men and women may not interchange apparel [542,543; L39,40 22:5] nor do certain things that are specific to the opposite sex. Targum Yonatan on this pasuk defines male apparel as the mitzvot of Talit and T’filin. Since these mitzvot are WORN, and not just performed, he considers them specific male mitzvot that women may not fulfill. Many other authorities disagree and consider women to be exempt from these two mitzvot, but not forbidden to them. The view of Targum Yonatan, even if not considered the definitive p’sak on the issue, is probably responsible for the Jewish facts of life - namely, that although many women accept upon themselves OTHER time-related posi- tive mitzvot from which they are officially exempt, this is not the common case with Talit and T’filin. [P>22:6] When one happens upon a (kosher) bird's nest (in the wild), it is forbidden to take the mother bird alone or with her eggs/chicks [544,L306 22:6], but one may (must? this is the subject of a dispute with a decidedly kabalistic flavor on the side that suggests it is an imperative) take the eggs/chicks if one first sends the mother bird away [545,A148 22:7]. This is an enigmatic mitzva that defies logic. It is shrouded in mysticism, more so than most mitzvot. Although our Sages attribute kindness to animals as the reason (or part of the reason) for some mitzvot - e.g. not muzzling an animal that is working with food, helping to unload a beast of burden, not plowing with an ox and a donkey together - they (our Sages) warn us against attempting to attribute kindness and mercy to this mitzva of SHILU’ACH HAKEN. If not muzzling an animal is an act of kindness, then it should apply to kosher and non-kosher animals alike. And it does. But Shilu’ach HaKen does not apply to non-kosher birds. Nor to kosher birds owned by a person. That alone (there are other factors) says that there is more to this mitzva than meets the eye. If you catch animals in the wild for a zoo, can you take an eagle mother and her chicks together? It isn’t forbidden by Shilu’ach HaKen, but does that mean it’s permitted? Maybe it is forbidden because of Cruelty to Animals. Can you take eggs away from an ostrich’s nest after chsing away the mother bird? [544,545] does not apply, therefore it might be permitted. And it might be forbidden. We cannot tell because we don’t know the whole story with this mitzva-pair.
Oral law defines these mitzvot as more inclusive than just one's roof. Rabbinic law, "taking the Torah's lead", extends "safety & health" rules further into many areas. E.g. Primary smoking aside (a strong case can be made to consider this health/life threatening practice a Torah prohibition), it should be obvious that smoking in the proximity of others violates the essence of mitzva #547. Regarding this mitzva, Rambam says that a person may not tell others: "Don't tell me what to do; if I want to risk my health or life, it's my busi- ness". This statement can make a person liable to the punishment of MAKAT MARDUT. This is something to keep in mind when you decide to "talk to" your favorite smoker. One may not plant mixed grains in a vineyard [548,L216 22:9], nor may one eat the resulting products [549,L193 22:9]. Note: Sometimes, one may benefit from the result of a forbidden mixture. E.g. a mule may be used, even if produced in violation of the prohibition of cross- breeding. As opposed to this mitzva of "Kil'ai Kerem", which is forbidden across the board. Note that MAAKEH and KIL’AI KEREM share one parsha, as opposed to the way things have been broken up so far in the sedra. Remember that PAR- SHIYOT are passed down to us through the generations as Halacha L’Moshe MiSinai. Sometimes we under- stand the parsha-breaks and some- times they can confuse us. [S>22:10] Plowing with ox and donkey together is forbidden, as is the tying together of any non-compatible animals (or humans) for any purpose [550,L218 22:10]. Rambam holds that the Torah prohibits any combination of a kosher and non- kosher animal, based on the fact that the Torah's example is one of each. Rambam says that combinations of two kosher or two non-kosher animals is forbidden by Rabbinic law. Many authorities challenge Rambam's distinc- tion and say that it is all Torah law. Do not wear Shaatnez (garments of wool and linen together) [551,L42 22:11] ...put tzitzit on all four-cornered garments that you wear. As a mitzva, tzitzit was counted previously (in the end of Sh’lach), but its juxtaposition to Shaatnez here is an example of a positive mitzva that overrides a negative; a linen garment may have woolen tzitzit attached - this applies only when all aspects of tzitzit are observed, i.e. T'cheilet. That’s the theory, at least. Rambam bans wearing Shaatnez in Tzitzit, lest one fall asleep or forget to remove the garment at night, when one is exempt from Tzitzit and would therefore be in violation of Shaatnez, without the ASEI (positive command) to override the prohibition. This is an example of a rabbinic prohibition of something the Torah permits. There is another factor here that works against the ASEI pushing aside the LO TAASEI rule. There is a concept called: EFSHAR L’KAYEIM SH’NEIHEM. This means that when it is possible to fulfill the positive and not violate the negative, then the positive does NOT override the prohibition. Since a 4-cornered linen garment can have tzitzit of linen strings, it is possible to fulfill the mitzva of tzitzit without wearing Shaatnez. The exception to this is the string dyed T’cheilet, which must be made of wool. Therefore, with T’cheilet the ASEI would override the prohibition, because it is not possible to fulfill both. Nonetheless, Rambam’s objection still stands. One more point: Maybe we should be forbidden to wear 4-cornered garments of linen to avoid the “problem” of putting that wool thread of T’cheilet? The answer is NO. That’s the point of the override rule. [S>22:13] It is a mitzva to marry according to Jewish Law and for the husband to write a K'TUBA for his wife with various promises and assurances [552,A213 22:13]. If a man had falsely accused his (betrothed) wife of infidelity, he may not divorce her (unless she so desires) [553,554; A219,L359 22:19]. Penalties are also paid to the girl's family for the insult. [S>22:20] If the betrothed maiden did, in fact, willfully, intentionally have relations with another man, and there are kosher witnesses and properly ad- ministered warning, and all the other rules of evidence. then she is an adul- teress and is executed (stoning) by Beit Din. [S>22:22] If a man and married woman has relations, knowing full-well the married status of the woman), and neither was forced, then they are both subject to the death penalty for adultery. (The prohibition is counted from Commandment #7 of the Aseret HaDibrot.) [S>22:23] The same applies if the woman is “just” betrothed (this is more than the notion of engagement in our time). The specific incident of stoning is generalized to the mitzva upon the court to carry out the punishment of "stoning" when required [555, A220 22:24]. [S>22:25] Both consenting parties to a forbidden relationship are culpable. However, if it is possible to consider the woman an unwilling partner, then she must not be punished. We must not punish anyone who might not be responsible for their action [556,L294 22:26]. This is the source of one of Pirkei Avot's principles: Give everyone the benefit of the doubt. This does not mean that the person always deserves the benefit of the doubt. Maybe they actually sinned. The answer, it will have to be left to G-d to punish them; we are obligated to explain the situation as in this example - certainly the girl screamed but there was no one to save her. [S>22:28] A man who forces himself on an unmarried maiden must pay a fine to her father. If the girl wants to be married to the man, he must marry her and never initiate divorce (she, of course, may insist that she wants nothing to do with him and then the court will force him to divorce her). [557,558; A218,L358 22:29]. [S>23:1] A man may not marry his father's former wife (even after his death). [S>23:2] Castrated men (it depends on how their situation happened) have marriage restrictions [559,L360 23:2] [S>23:3] A "mamzer" has marriage restrictions [560,L354 23:3]. Mamzer is defined as the result of a union that is prohibited by the Torah, with a death penalty. This includes incestuous and adulterous relationships. A mamzer may marry a mamzeret or a female convert to Judaism. [S>23:4] Amonite and Moabite males may not marry into the "Congregation of G-d" [561,L53 23:4], because of the cruel, inhospitable behavior of those two nations towards Israel. And, says the Torah, because they hired Bil’am to “bless” us. Nor may we ever offer those two nations peace as an alternative to war, as is required of other enemies [562,L56 23:7]. Note that the Torah is giving a reason for a mitzva, something that it rarely does. However, it is precisely the reason that allowed our Sages to declare Ruth the Moabite able to marry into the Jewish Nation. (It was the Moavite men who displayed that very offensive behavior, not the women.)
[S>23:10] A military camp must be kept spiritually and physically clean. Sanitary facilities must be provided outside the camp and soldiers must be equipped with appropriate tools for maintaining proper sanitation [566, 567;A192,193 23:13,14]. An offshoot of this mitzva: entry to the Temple Mount (which has the halachic status of the Levite camp - reference here is to the area where the Beit HaMikdash and its courtyard DID NOT occupy) by people with certain types of ritual impurity is forbidden [565,L78 23:11]. Conceptually, we must realize that G-d's presence among us is affected by our moral behavior. Thus, these mitzvot have ramifications to Jewish society as a whole, and not merely in a military setting. [S>23:16] A slave who has escaped his master and run to us for protection, may not be returned. Nor may we abuse a slave who seeks haven in E. Yisrael [568,569;L254,255 23:16,17]. [S>23:18] Prostitution is forbidden [570,L355 23:18] and its revenues may not be used for sacred matters [571, L100 23:19]. (Some sources consider sex between unmarried partners part of mitzva #570.)
[S>23:20] Although interest on personal loans may not be taken from a Jew, it
is acceptable (and correct) to lend to non-Jews with interest
[572,573;L236,A198 23:20,21]. This is so because society in general accepts
the reasonableness of charging moderate interest on loans. Since a non-Jew can
charge a Jew interest, the Torah gives us permission to take interest from
them. Usury, loan sharking, would be recognized as a "universal" wrong-doing;
the ban against any interest at all is a special spiritual requirement of the
Jew. It is advisable to refrain from making promises, but once made, a person must keep them [575,A94 23:24]. (Hatarat N'darim provides an "out" for certain ill-advised promises.)
[S>23:26] Workers mustn't reduce their efficiency by eating on the job [578, L267 23:26]. We see a beautiful balance in the area of Torah Law as it relates to boss- worker relations. On the one hand, the worker is allowed to eat from that which he picks. On the other hand, he cannot do this while he is actually working, as this would reduce his efficiency, thereby short-changing his boss. On the other hand, the boss must provide breaks during the day, when the worker is allowed to eat. On the other hand, the worker may not take any of the fruits home with him, without permission. Talmudic law adds to this list for both sides. Boss may not take advantage of worker, and worker may not take advantage of their boss. [S>24:1] If a married couple wants to end their marriage, it must be done with a proper "get" [579,A222 24:1]. If a divorcee has remarried, and is subsequently widowed or divorced, she cannot remarry her first husband [580, L356 24:4].
Shishi - Sixth Aliya - 6 p'sukim - 24:5-13
One may not take vessels used for preparing food as a security against a loan
[583,L242 24:6]. We must be sensitive to the needs of the borrower. [S>24:10] We must not be overly forceful in the taking of a security from a poor person who has borrowed from us [585,L239 24:10]. We must not withhold that which has already been taken from him; if he needs it, we must return it to him [586,587; L240,A199 24:12,13]. Notice the positive-prohibition pair of mitzvot that we have seen quite often in the Torah.
[S>24:16] Close relatives may not testify against (or for) one another in criminal cases [589,L287 24:16]. There is also the implication here that a person will not be punished for deeds of his parents or children. [S>24:17] One must not pervert justice even on behalf of an orphan [590,L280 24:17]. Securities for a loan must not be taken from a widow [591, L241 24:17]. Our experience in Egypt is to be remembered as the motive for many of these "sensitizing" mitzvot.
[S>24:19] That which is forgotten in the fields after harvesting must be left
for the poor; one should not return for it himself [592,593;A122,L214 24:19].
[S>25:1] The punishment of makot (whipping) is to be administered by the courts to those found guilty of sins punishable thusly, but care must be exercised not to exceed the required number of lashes [594, 595; A224, L300 25:2,3].
Do not muzzle an animal when it is working with food [596,L219 25:4]. [S>25:11] If person "A" is pursuing "B" to kill him, we must save B's life even if it means killing A [600,A247 25:12]. We cannot show mercy to the pursuer (A) [601,L293 25:12]. If it is possible to stop "A" without killing him, we must do so - to kill him in this case would be an act of murder. [S>25:13] (Not only may one not use false measures, but) mere possession of false dry or liquid measures or weights is forbidden [602,L272 25:13]. Honest weights and measures is one of the pillars of society; G-d despises those who cheat in business. [P>24:10] The final portion of the sedra is Zachor. We are commanded to remember what Amalek did to us on our way out of Egypt [603,A189 25:17]. The Jewish People as a whole are commanded to destroy the remnant of Amalek from this world [604,A188 25:18]. We must never forget what Amalek did [605,L59 25:19]. Techni- cally, these mitzvot apply to the specific Amalek nation. The idea, however, must be extended to the Amalek-types that have plagued us throughout Jewish history. These final 3 p'sukim of the sedra are reread for the Maftir. (They also make up Parshat Zachor. Baal Korei and congregation should have in mind the mitzva to remember Amalek. Even though the Sages fixed a time for this mitzva, it is essentially an untimed mitzva.
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