And Hashem spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai, saying: Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them: When you will come to the land which I am giving you, the land shall rest, a Shabbat to Hashem (Vayikra 25:1-2)

Thus begins a detailed discussion of the laws of Shemittah, the seventh year (Sabbatical Year), when the land of Israel lies fallow. The emphasis on Mount Sinai in this introduction gives rise to Rashi’s famous question – “Why is the issue of Shemittah placed next to Mount Sinai? Weren’t all the mitzvot given at Sinai?” – as well as his equally famous answer: “Just as Shemittah was taught, with all its details, at Sinai, so were all the mitzvot taught, with all their details, at Sinai.”

But in the view of many commentaries, the question “Why mention Sinai?” is relevant not only to Shemittah. The passage from here until the end of the Book of Vayikra is divided into subsections only “in order to give Moshe pause to contemplate between topics” (Sifra 2); but Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Ramban and others consider it as one unit, one communication from Hashem. Before the Admonitions (Tochecha), which we read next week, the subjects of BEHAR (chapter 25) are:
(verses 1-7) -Shemittah
(verses 8-24) -Yovel, the fiftieth Jubilee Year
(verses 25-34) -Redemption of property due to financial hardship
(verses 35-38) -Prohibition against charging interest when helping others
(verses 39-55) -Treatment of one who sold himself into slavery to a Jew or to a non-Jew due to extreme financial hardship.

So perhaps the question should be, “Why should all these mitzvot be explicitly connected to Mount Sinai?”

It seems that, taken as a unit, the mitzvot of BEHAR are meant to epitomize the lengths to which we must be committed to the Revelation, an important lesson to absorb before the Tochecha.

Clearly, all these mitzvot deal with issues of possession: of land, of money and of slaves. However, in every case the Torah limits our degree of ownership, thereby indicating that Hashem is the true Owner.

Shemittah, Yovel and redemption all demonstrate that we do not have absolute control, even over land:
And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is Mine; for foreigners and residents are you with Me (verse 23).

Nor do we have the right to use our money usuriously, rather we must remember that the money is G-d’s.

The same is true of Hebrew slaves:
And if your brother becomes impoverished with you and is sold to you, you shall not impose on him (BO) the work of a slave. Like an employee, like a resident shall he be with you; only until the Jubilee Year shall he serve you. Then he and his children shall leave you and he shall return to his family; he shall return to his fathers’ holdings. Because My servants are they, whom I brought out from the land of Egypt. They shall not be sold like a slave is sold. You shall not dominate him with rigor, but you shall fear your G-d (verses 39-43).

A fellow-Jew might be sold into slavery only under two circumstances: (a) a thief who is unable to repay the principal is sold by the court (Shemot 21:2-6) (b)one who is reduced to extreme poverty sells himself. As Sforno (R. Ovadia ben Yaakov Sforno, c. 1470-c.1550) points out, even though he has sold himself, your rights towards him are limited. He has not surrendered himself utterly.

From this passage we learn how to treat a Hebrew slave: He is not bought and sold publicly on the block, but only privately and with respect. He may not be given work which has no purpose other than to demonstrate your mastery, nor may you require him to do demeaning work, or work in an unfamiliar profession (see Rambam, “Laws of Slaves” 1:5-7).

Treating a slave with Rigor would break him both physically and psychologically, leading him to believe that he will never be free again. Yet, as Haamek Davar (R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, 1817-1893) explains, you have a responsibility to your slave who is a fellow-Jew: to keep the hope of freedom alive in him, so do not dominate him with rigor.

What about a fellow-Jew who is not a slave? Logic might have dictated: if you may not overwork a slave, then certainly you may not do so to a free person. However, this is not the case:
You shall not impose on him (BO) the work of a slave; however, you may impose “the work of a slave” on a freeman (Sifra Behar 7).

How ironic! Rambam, (op. cit., 1:7) explains why this is the law:
The above restrictions apply only to a Hebrew slave, because his soul is brought low by the sale; but an Israelite who is not sold may be employed like a slave, because he does this work only by his will and of his own accord.

A free Israelite still retains the right to quit his job.

What all these mitzvot have in common is custody. For many other peoples, freedom equals the untrammeled right of possession. Instead, the Torah insists: what you think is yours – what you believe most thoroughly demonstrates your capacity for ownership – is not yours absolutely. Neither your land, nor your money, nor your slaves are yours, but all belongs to Hashem. Thus the passage concludes:
Because to Me are the Children of Israel servants; they are My servants, whom I brought out from the land of Egypt. I am Hashem your G-d (verse 55).

Israel attained freedom from servitude during the Exodus. The mitzvot at the end of Vayikra require Israel to acknowledge Hashem’s ultimate dominion over everything, including themselves. Thus, the freedom of the Exodus leads to the submission to Hashem delineated when Hashem spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai.

This is the pinnacle of kedusha (sanctity)in this book of kedusha. Sanctity means knowing one’s utter surrender to Hashem. It is a yoke that does not pull us downward, but rather elevates us.