The last chapters of the Book of Bamidbar delineate the first conquests of the land, culminating with the division of the Land and the commitment of the Reuvenites and Gadites to join in their brethren all the nation’s wars. These episodes revolve around two elements: the responsibilities of the tribal chiefs, and the importance of keeping one’s promise. It is for this reason, says Ibn Ezra, that the Torah introduces this section with the laws of vows, which are first addressed to the tribal chiefs:

And Moshe spoke to the tribal heads of the Children of Israel, saying: “This is the word that Hashem has commanded: If a man makes a vow to Hashem, or swears an oath to prohibit himself, he must not violate (LO YACHEL) his word. According to all that comes forth from his mouth shall he do” (Bamidbar 30:2-3).

The Torah then proceeds to teach that a father has the authority to annul his daughter’s vows (between the ages of 11 to 12 ½), and that a husband has the authority to annul his wife’s vows. This annulling is called hafarah. If unannulled, of course, a woman’s vow is binding on her as a man’s is on him. The Torah then concludes:

These are the statutes that Hashem commanded Moshe, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth in her father’s house (verse 17).

It is noteworthy that these laws begin with Moshe’s teaching, rather than with the usual formula:

And Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying (Shemot 13:1, and elsewhere).

It is only via Moshe’s teaching that we know that the laws of vows came from Hashem:

This is the word that Hashem has commanded… These are the statutes with Hashem commanded Moshe…(30:2,17).

It is further noteworthy that Moshe makes a point of directing his words to the tribal heads. Rashi and Ibn Ezra assume that Moshe subsequently teaches these laws to the rest of the people. Ramban, on the other hand, thinks it would be better to withhold from the people the fact that vows can be annulled, so they will not come to take vows lightly. Here again, the people’s awareness depends entirely on the Torah leaders.

But perhaps most amazing is the law of hatarat nedarim, release from vows. Although at first glance it seems that the only individuals authorized to nullify vows are a father or a husband, the Torah Sheb’al Peh (Oral Tradition) teaches that a scholar has a similar authority. An expert in the laws of vows – or, three laymen who are familiar with these laws – can, under certain conditions, release anyone from his vows or oaths. It is customary to perform hatarat nedarim on the eve of Rosh Hashana.

In fact, the authority of the scholar seems to be even greater than that of a father or husband. Whereas the hafarah of the father or husband annuls the vow from that moment on, the hatarah of the scholar nullifies the vows from its inception, as if it had never been made (Rabbeinu Nissim, c. 1310-1375, commentary to Nedarim 77b). Still, the scholar may not use the method of hafarah, but only hatarah.

When a person utters a vow, it is usually in a state of anger or agitation. When that feeling passes, the person might regret his words, and upon consultation, the scholar can invalidate the vow. This is hatarah.

The source of hatarat nedarim is in the Oral Tradition; its basis in the Torah is hard to find. As the mishnah (Chagigah 1:8) states:

“The release from vows flies in the air, and does not have anything on which to base it” –

nothing, that is, but the reliable tradition of our Sages. Once again, an essential principle of the laws of vows is based solely and solidly upon our Torah scholars.

Nevertheless, it is possible that there is a slight allusion to hatarat nedarim in our verses. The Torah states, regarding all verbal commitments:

He must not violate (LO YACHEL) his word (30:3).

The word YACHEL derives from the root CH-L-L (kkj), meaning to profane, “ to render mundane”. It is for this reason that Rashi (quoting Sifri on this verse) explains:

“he shall not make his words mundane (chullin)” –

once a person’s vow takes effect, his words create a new reality, and he may no longer treat the world as before.

On the basis of this verse, the Talmud (Chagigah 10a) declares:

“There is a hint for hatarat nedarim from the Torah. For it is written he must not violate (LO YACHEL) his word – He may not render it mundane, but others may render it mundane for him.” [This is the correct reading of this passage, according to R. Yaakov Emden (1697-1776)].

The “others” – who can nullify his vow – refers to the scholar, or the three informed laymen.

Malbim adds a grammatical analysis of the word YACHEL. If the Torah wanted to say that under no circumstances (except for hafarah of a father or husband) can a vow be rendered void, then it would have used the passive (Nif’al) form of the verb, pronounced YEICHAL; and the verse would have meant “his word will not be profaned.” Instead, the Torah uses the causative (Hif’il) form YACHEL, highlighting that only he – the one who vowed – may not undo the vow, suggesting that “others” – the scholar or three informed laymen – can reverse it.

When a scholar permits a vow, he uses one of two approaches:

1. Charatah – “regret” - The one who vowed no longer has the same feelings that originally prompted the vow, and the scholar determines that he wishes he had never vowed in the first place.

2. Petach – “an opening” - The scholars ask: “If you had realized all the consequences of your vow, would you have vowed?” and he says he would not have done so.

In “On Repentance,” R. Yosef D. Soloveitchik (1903-1993) explains that charatah involves an emotional change, whereas petach involves an intellectual change. In charatah, the one who vowed now recoils at his original emotional state. On the other hand, in the petach approach, there is no change in emotion; the one who vowed simply did not take all the ramifications of his vow into account, and now he is informed what those ramifications are. His vow was based on a miscalculation.

Rabbi Soloveitchik further connects these two approaches to two different avenues to repentance. At times, a person is moved to repentance through “regret”: he is repulsed and aggrieved by the memory of his sins:

“We are astounded at ourselves, how could this abomination have been done?!” (from the “Tefillah Zakah” of Kol Nidrei, by Rabbi Avraham Danzig, 1748-1820).

At other times, repentance is motivated by a clearer understanding of the results of continued sin:

“For after my return I regretted, and after I realized did I strike my thigh” (Yirmiyahu 31:18).

On the threshold of a new national existence, the Jewish People must learn to fulfill their past commitments. But they must also learn that repenting – transforming the past – is also possible, and that they must rely on their Torah leaders to teach them how to do so.