OU Torah Insights

By Rabbi Avraham Fischer. A publication of the Orthodox Union in cooperation with the Seymour J. Abrams Orthodox Union Jerusalem World Center

Parshat Behar
May 17, 2003

As we approach the end of the book of sanctity of Vayikra, we find that the Torah turns to the subject of fair and just relations between man and man. We are taught to effect justice in commerce, not to lend money with interest, not to maltreat a fellow Jew who has sold himself into slavery, and to redeem a field that had been sold due to dire poverty. Although the book of Vayikra treats matters of great holiness, the Torah wishes to communicate that the proof of holiness is demonstrated when morality prevails over self-interest in financial matters.

Along these lines, the Torah prohibits wronging one another (ona’ah):

And if you sell anything to your fellow or buy anything from your fellow’s hand, you shall not wrong (AL TONU) one another (Vayikra 25:14)

This means that, whether there is a transaction of land or moveable property, both the buyer and seller are prohibited from defrauding or overcharging. A profit of up to one-sixth is permissible; with moveable property, if the profit is more than one-sixth the sale can be nullified, and if it is exactly one sixth, the profit is returned and the sale remains valid. Even with landed property, there is a prohibition against ona’ah, although the sale is still valid.

Since all instances of ona’ah seem to be covered by the above verse, the following verse seems superfluous:

Nor shall you wrong (V’LO TONU) one another; but you shall fear your G-d, for I am Hashem, your G-d (verse 17).

The solution to this problem is to be found in Rashi, who quotes Torat Kohanim and Bava Metzia 58b:

“Here the text prohibits wronging by means of words, not to vex his fellow, nor to offer him inappropriate advice, according to the way and the pleasure of the advisor.”

As Sforno explains, the purpose of this additional prohibition is to warn against any form of maltreatment, even when no monetary gain is involved, such as verbal abuse or misleading someone.

Earlier, the Torah warned us against oppressing the convert to Judaism (Shemot 22:20; Vayikra 19:33-34). Our Sages understood the primary meaning of those verses as verbal oppression. This suggests a reading different from that of Sforno: ona’ah, firstly, means verbal torment, and only secondarily (as we found in Vayikra 25:14) does it mean economic maltreatment. In any case both applications of ona’ah have one thing in common: pressing one’s advantage to the detriment of another.

Our Sages discuss ona’at devarim (verbal oppression) at some length in Bava Metzia 58b-59b. Among the examples given include:

  • Reminding a repentant sinner (ba’al teshuvah) of his former misdeeds.

  • Reminding a convert to Judaism “the mouth that once ate unclean foods now wishes to utter words of prayer and Torah to G-d?!”

  • Behaving like Iyov’s companions, who said that his misfortunes are due to his sins:

Is not your fear [of G-d] your confidence?… Remember, please, which innocent person ever perished? Or, where were the upright destroyed? (Iyov 4:6-7).

Torah Temimah points out that one would be guilty of ona’at devarim in these cases, even if his intention is to correct the other’s behavior. Noble intentions do not excuse hurtful speech.

Furthermore, Iyov’s companions - from a purely philosophical perspective - may have been speaking the truth: Hashem is just, and suffering may well be punishment for transgressions. However, it is painful for Iyov (or anyone who suffers) to be told this when the emotional wounds are still fresh.

Other example of ona’at devarim include:

  • Misleading another to go purchase merchandise from someone one knows does not have it.
     

  • Asking a merchant, “How much does this cost?” - thus raising false hopes of making a sale - when he has no intention of buying.

Of course, the person who says these things can always claim that he gave the advice or the admonition in good faith. This is why the verse emphasizes:

But you shall fear your G-d.

As Rashi explains:

“The One Who knows thoughts, knows of any matter that is in the power of the heart – that no one knows except the one who has the thought in his heart - of it is said, but you shall fear your G-d.”

Since these utterances depend entirely on intention, one must be honest with himself and with Hashem as to his true meaning.

Rabbi Yehudah Rosanes (1657-1727), author of the commeratary on Rambam’s “Mishneh Torah” called “Mishneh la-Melech,” asks a further question: Why does our verse add the words “for I am Hashem, your G-d” - what additional idea is being conveyed? Have we not already said that one must fear Hashem?

In order to answer this question, Rabbi Rosanes refers us to a discussion in Ta’anit 2a-2b. There, it says that one of the “keys” which Hashem does not entrust to a messenger, but rather wields Himself, is the “key of the revival of the dead.” The source for this is the verse in Yechezkel (37:13):

And you shall know that I am Hashem, as I open your graves.

Hashem alone revives the dead, and He does not do so through a messenger. Furthermore, says Rabbi Rosanes, we see in the Passover Haggadah that the words “ I am Hashem” (Shemot 12:12) - which refers to the Exodus - means “I, and no one else” will bring you forth from Egypt.

We conclude from this that, in our verse, “for I am Hashem, your G-d” means that Hashem alone exacts punishment against one who utters vexing words. He does not do so through a messenger. This, says Rabbi Rosanes, is implied in Bava Metzia 59a. There the Sages expound the verse in Amos (7:7)

…Behold, Hashem stood over a wall [made with a] plumb-line, with a plumb-line in His hand (UV’YADO ANACH).

Because ANACH (“plumb-line”) could homiletically be read as “your oppression,” we are taught:

“Rabbi Eleazar said: Every sin is punished through a messenger, except for ona’ah, as it says UV’YADO ANACH - in His hand is your oppression.”

One who utters words that are meant to be painful has misused his G-d-given capacity for language. He has sown seeds of disharmony, while pretending to be righteous and innocent. Hashem does not exact punishment for such hurtful words through His emissaries, but “handles the case” Himself, since only He - and the one who spoke them - know their true intent.

Awareness of Hashem’s involvement in every facet of our lives – both ritual and commercial, in thought as much as in deed - is the fullest expression of the Torah’s sanctity.

"Ain Torah K'Torat Eretz Yisrael!"- Torah from Aloh Na'aleh*
Parshat Behar

The Torah introduces the laws of shemitah, emphasizing that they were revealed to Mosheh at Sinai. Rashi quotes the Sifra to the effect that the laws of shemitah serve as a paradigm for all the laws of the Torah. Just as shemitah was completely formulated in all its details at Sinai, so, too, were all the other mitzvot with all their particulars given at Sinai.

But why was shemitah singled out for this purpose? Granted that the Torah wanted to make a point, still, there must be a reason for the selection of the specific mitzvah chosen to serve as the archetype. In the spirit of the Maharal's dictum: "Devarim gedolim einam bemikreh," "great things do not happen by accident," we may reformulate Rashi's famous question as simply "mah inyan shemitah," "what is special about shemitah"?

The experience of Sinai was first and foremost one of the commitment of na'aseh venishma - predicated on the people's willingness to accept the yoke of the Heavenly Kingdom. According to the Ramban, this is the very meaning of the first of the Ten Commandments - kablu malchuti, "accept My kingship." In other words, the level of Torah commitment is measured not merely in its observance, as meticulous as that may be, but also in the motivation behind that observance.

In an agricultural society subsisting from year to year on its annual produce, the laws of shemitah are certainly problematic. Far from a vacation from work, they are a test of allegiance to royal decree, to an imperial order of the greatest difficulty. It is this characteristic of shemitah that makes it the paradigmatic representation of all the manifold commandments promulgated at Sinai. It is the question of what the mitzvot really mean to a person.

In this spirit, one might formulate a question: Immigrants to Western countries often saw the abandonment of Shabbat as a condition for basic survival. Yet, there were those who stood firm and fully observed the Shabbat. It is to those few that we owe the renaissance of Orthodoxy in the Diaspora.

Is not the mitzvah of living in Israel and all its concomitant mitzvot, the contemporary equivalent of our forebears' Shabbat? Is it perhaps our modern inyan shemitah as we stand before the eternity of Sinai?

Rabbi David Ebner, Jerusalem


*D’var Torah from Aloh Na'aleh: an initiative of former North American Rabbis and laymen who successfully made Aliyah, aimed at highlighting the centrality of Israel and promoting Aliyah. They send emissaries – Rabbis, academicians, and others – on speaking-tours throughout the U.S. and Canada.

Contact information:

Tel: 972-2-566-1181 ext. 320
Fax: 972-2-566-1186
Email: aloh-naaleh@aaci.org.il


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