The Coming Week's Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.

This month’s Steinsaltz Daf Yomi is sponsored by:
Dr. and Mrs. Alan Harris
The Lewy Family Foundation
Marilyn and Edward Kaplan 

To dedicate future editions of Steinsaltz Daf Yomi, perhaps in honor of a special occasion or in memory of a loved one, click here.

Eruvin 86a-b

When deciding whether a renter needs to participate in the courtyard’s eruv, the Mishnah (85b) teaches that as long as the owner retains the right to enter the apartment to take what belongs to him, the renter is considered part of the owner’s household and does not need to contribute separately to the eruv. As an example, the Gemara points to the case of Bonyas – someone so rich that his possessions were stored in the apartments that he rented out to others.

This story leads the Gemara to discuss the respect that various sages showed to wealthy people, based on the passage in Tehillim (61:8) – “may he sit before God forever; generosity and truth will protect him” – which is understood to mean that rich people who are able to offer food and support to others deserve to be honored.

This derasha (homiletical interpretation) is explained in a number of different ways by the commentaries. Some say that the wealthy people deserve respect because their charity and generosity support the world. The Arukh suggests that the very fact that they are wealthy is an indication that they are being rewarded for their good deeds and compassion, so they are clearly deserving of honor. Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chajes explains that it would be impossible for those people who are devoted to Torah study to sit “before God” and learn were it not for the wealthy people who are involved in the practical aspects of the commandments and community needs. The Maharsha argues that “before God” in this passage means “before the sages of the generation,” and what is being suggested is that the generosity of the wealthy people allows them to sit before the Sages.

In a homiletical vein, the Maharil suggests that Rebbi and Rabbi Akiva – the Sages who honored the wealthy people – did so in order that, when the honor was reciprocated, the respect that they received would be due to their own wealth and not because of their Torah knowledge, since they did not want to derive any personal benefit from the honor that truly belongs to the Torah.

Eruvin 87a-b

There is a disagreement in the Mishnah on our daf (=page) about how to arrange for water that is channeled through a courtyard to be used on Shabbat. According to the Tanna Kamma (=first), ten-amah (=cubit) high walls must be built around it at the entrance to the courtyard and its exit in order to be allowed to draw water from it. Rabbi Yehudah rules that it is not necessary to build such walls, since the walls of the courtyard itself act as a separation between the water outside the hatzer and the water inside the hatzer.

To support his position, Rabbi Yehudah described an actual water channel that led from the town of Avel in the Lower Galilee to the city of Tzippori, where the people who lived in courtyards through which the channel flowed would draw water on Shabbat – with the support of the elders of the city. The Gemara responds to this proof by saying that, in that case, the water channel was not ten tefahim (=handbreadths) deep, nor was it four tefahim wide. Therefore it did not become a Carmelit (an area which the Rabbis prohibited carrying to/from both private and public domains – see Masechet Shabbat), from which there was no prohibition to draw water.

The halakha, in fact, makes this distinction. If the water channel is more than four tefahim wide and ten tefahim deep, it is considered a carmelit and one cannot draw water from it into a public or private domain. If it is less than four tefahim wide and ten tefahim deep, it has the status of whatever area it is in.

The specific water channel mentioned by Rabbi Yehudah flowed a few kilometers from the village of Avel to the larger city of Tzippori in order to bolster the water supply in the larger city – see the map.

Eruvin 88a-b

In a small courtyard of less than four amot (=cubits) square, the Mishnah on our daf (=page) teaches that pouring water on the ground is a problem because it will spill out into the public domain. Even though the person standing in the courtyard is not spilling directly into the reshut ha-rabim, still it is the strength of his pouring that causes the water to move from one domain to another, so he will be held liable – at this on a Rabbinic level.  The problem can be solved if an ukah – a pit – is dug deep enough that the water will collect there. Such an ukah can be placed either inside or right outside the courtyard, although if it is outside there is a requirement likmor – to cover it.

It is clear that an ukah is a pit for collecting water. The Arukh suggests that it is a pit with a particular shape, specifically dug in a circular fashion.

Rashi understands that likmor means to cover the ukah with boards. According to this opinion, such an arrangement makes the pit into a makom p’tur – a “free space” – into which the water can be poured without concern that one is transferring from one domain to another. 

According to the Meiri, this pit needs to be covered because, if it is too large or not deep enough, it will have the status of a carmelit or a reshut ha-rabim (public domain). Once it is covered it will be considered a pit in a reshut ha-yahid (private domain) or a makom p'tur, so that pouring water there will not be a problem.

Maimonides says that the reason for covering the pit is marit ayin – for appearance sake – so that it does not appear to be part of the public domain.

The Darkei Moshe says that we are concerned about having an open pit in the public domain, which is why we need to cover it.  (For more on the issue of domains, read the Introduction to Eruvin.)

Eruvin 89a-b

The Sages restricted carrying from one private domain to another, unless the owners of each established an eruv before Shabbat. In the Mishnah on our daf (=page), which opens the ninth chapter of Masechet Eruvin, three opinions are brought regarding private areas that are not used on a regular basis:

• Rabbi Meir rules that the roofs of all houses are considered a single domain, unless they are more than ten tefahim higher or lower than the roof of their neighbor.
• The Hakhamim say that each roof is a private domain unto itself.
• Rabbi Shimon says that not only roofs, but other similar areas –  such as enclosed yards, gardens, orchards, etc. – are all considered a single domain, and objects that were in them before Shabbat began can be carried freely from one to another. Things that were inside a house when Shabbat began cannot be carried into another area, however.

Up until this point, when the Gemara discussed whether someone can carry from his house to a courtyard, or from a courtyard to a mavoy (see 2a-b), the defining criteria was ownership. If the owners of all the houses in a courtyard agreed to make an eruv, only then could they carry there. In examining the position of Rabbi Meir, the Gemara appears to suggest that, unlike carrying in and out of homes, in places like roofs, gardens, etc. the Sages were less concerned with ownership and more concerned with the definition of the type of area. According to this opinion, all roofs are one domain, regardless of who the roofs belong to. Similarly, gardens, yards or orchards that neighbor one another will each be considered a single domain for carrying on Shabbat, even if they all have different owners. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Meir, objects cannot be carried from one type of area to another (i.e. from the domain of roofs to the domain of gardens). Rabbi Shimon permits even carrying between different types of areas.

Eruvin 90a-b

The opinion of the Hakhamim in the Mishnah (89a) did not allow carrying from one roof to another, and Rav (ibid) explained that a person was limited to the extent that he could only carry within a four cubit radius. Even within this limitation, it would be forbidden to carry from the end of one roof to the beginning of another, even if it was within the four-cubit limit. On our daf (=page), Rami bar Hama asks whether, according to this opinion, one can carry from the roof of a house to the roof of a neighboring akhsadra (porch), assuming that he remained within the four cubit limit.

The Gemara does not offer a response to Rami bar Hama’s question and continues by relating another question, this one raised by Rav Beivai bar Abayye. What if a house adjoined a hurba – an abandoned house? Could one carry from the roof of the house onto the roof of the hurba if he was careful to remain within the four-cubit limit?

To Rav Kahane’s objection that this was, in essence, the same question raised by Rami bar Hama, Rav Beivai explains the qualitative difference between the roof of a porch and the roof of an abandoned house. The former is not a place that people can live, while the latter is a place to live, at least on a theoretical basis.

Before explaining how the cases differ, Rav Beivai responds with an expression that is difficult to interpret – v’khi me’aher atai u’nitzai. Rashi understands it to mean “do you think that I came to make use of someone else’s question in order to argue?”

The Meiri seems to read the word me’aher slightly differently, so that it does not mean “from someone else” but “to come late.” Thus he understands the meaning to be “are you saying I came late to the Beit Midrash and that I am arguing without knowing the discussion that took place?”

Other possible versions of the Gemara led some commentaries to explain this as Rav Beivai saying about Rav Kahane, “he is arguing with me for no reason” or “he is younger than me, and yet he insists on arguing with me.”

In any case, the Gemara reaches no conclusion with regard to these questions, ending with the proverbial Teiku.

Eruvin 91a-b

In the Mishnah at the beginning of the perek (=chapter) (89a) Rabbi Shimon ruled that roofs, gardens, yards, etc. are all considered a single private domain, and therefore people can carry between them on Shabbat, regardless of who the owners are. On our daf (=page) we find that both Rav and Shmuel rule like Rabbi Shimon, although they disagree as to whether the rule applies in all cases. According to Rav, Rabbi Shimon’s ruling is applied only if the individual owners did not make an eruv into each courtyard. If, however, an eruv was made into each courtyard (but not between all of the courtyards), we fear that someone will carry from his house into the courtyard, and from there into other yards or gardens, which would be forbidden. Shmuel disagrees and rules that even when individual eruvin have been made, we can make use of Rabbi Shimon’s ruling and permit people to carry between roofs, etc.

The Gemara quotes Rabbi Yohanan as responding to the argument between Rav and Shmuel by commenting, “who whispered to you a difference between cases when an eruv has been made and when it has not?”

This odd expression is so strange that Rashi simply says that it should not be included in the Gemara. The Tosafot do, in fact, believe that it should be included in the Gemara, pointing out that similar expressions are found in Midrashei halakha like the Torat Kohanim. A number of explanations are offered as to what it might mean:

• Rabbenu Shmuel understands that Rabbi Yohanan is responding to Rav and is saying, “who whispered to you that there is a difference between cases when an eruv has been made and when it has not?”
• Rabbenu Tam explains that Rabbi Yohanan is responding to Shmuel, whose rulings in other areas seem to indicate that he would take a stringent position when interpreting Rabbi Shimon. (Incidentally, in the Jerusalem Talmud Shmuel is quoted as ruling that when eruvin have been made we do apply Rabbi Shimon’s ruling permitting people to carry from one roof to another).  Thus he is saying, “who whispered to you that in this case there is no reason to differentiate between cases when an eruv has been made and when it has not!” indicating that he is impressed that Shmuel knew to rule leniently in this case.

Eruvin 92a-b

As we saw on yesterday’s daf (=page), Rabbi Yohanan rules that we follow Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in the Mishnah (89a) even if the residents of each courtyard made their own eruv, and we are not concerned that someone will carry from his house into the courtyard, and from there into other yards or gardens. On our daf, Ravina points out another statement made by Rabbi Yohanan that seems to stand in contradiction with this one. We know that Rabbi Yohanan rules that we always follow the statement of a stam Mishnah (i.e. a Mishnah that states a halakha without any arguments involved). There is a stam Mishnah earlier in Masechet Eruvin (76b) that teaches that if there is a wall between two courtyards that is ten tefahim (=handbreadths) high and four tefahim wide, each courtyard must make a separate eruv. If there is fruit at the top of the wall, the people from either side can climb the wall and eat, but they cannot carry the food down. If, however, we are to follow Rabbi Yohanan’s understanding of Rabbi Shimon, one should be allowed to carry the food down to the courtyard.

Rav Ashi answers that the intention of the Mishnah is to forbid carrying the fruit from the top of the wall into one of the houses. Carrying it into the courtyard, however, would be permitted.

In response to this, Ravina quotes a baraita taught by Rabbi Hiyya that in such a case the residents of the courtyard can only eat the fruit on top of the wall, and they cannot bring it down to either courtyard at all. Rav Ashi reacts to this by saying that if Rabbi Yehudah ha-Nassi did not state this in the stam Mishnah, how would his student, Rabbi Hiyya derive such information?

We must limit Rav Ashi’s statement to very specific circumstances, because if we accepted it as a general principle there would be no reason to compare and contrast Mishnayot and baraitot, which is one of the most basic discussions upon which the Gemara is based. What we can say is that when the baraita contradicts the Mishnah or reaches a conclusion that runs counter to the conclusion of the Mishnah, we will reject the baraita as being Rabbi Hiyya’s personal opinion, rather than a reliable tradition.

In addition to his monumental translation and commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Steinsaltz has authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles on a variety of topics, both Jewish and secular. For more information about Rabbi Steinsaltz’s groundbreaking work in Jewish education, visit www.steinsaltz.org or contact the Aleph Society at 212-840-1166.

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