The Coming Week's Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.

Eruvin 58a-b

In the course of study of Masechet Eruvin, the Mishnah and Gemara have continuously referred to measurements of 2000 amot (=cubits) out of the city. How were those measurements done? The Mishnah (57b-58a) teaches that measurements were taken with ropes of 50 amot, which allowed for accurate measuring over most obstacles. The Gemara on our daf suggests that the passage (Shmot 27:18) describing the length and width of the Mishkan is the source for this idea.

Rabbi Asi teaches that the measuring had to be done with a specific type of rope. The Gemara struggles to understand his ruling that only an Afsakima rope should be used. Rabbi Aba taught that Afsakima is Nargila, but that definition was not clear. Finally Rabbi Yaakov defines it as a palm with a single fiber.

The palm that is referred to is, apparently, the Cocos nucifera, or coconut palm. This tree grows to a height of 30 meters and bears coconuts that can be as large as 20 centimeters in diameter. It is a tree that has been grown since ancient times. In the places where it grows – tropical areas in Asia, as well as islands in the Pacific Ocean – the coconut palm is used for a wide variety of things, including food and drink, cloth, firewood and building.

The ropes under discussion in the Gemara are one of a number of ropes that are produced from fibers of the coconut palm. The best ropes are made from the shell of the coconut that is covered with a fibrous layer, from which ropes are braided. These ropes are considered unique in their ability to retain their strength and size, even when they become wet, as they neither stretch nor shrink.

This quality is obviously essential for taking proper measurements, and it may explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananya in the baraita who says that the ideal measuring instrument would have been iron chains, were it not for the passage (Zechariah 2:5) “…and in his hand was a measuring rope,” which he understands to limit biblical measuring to ropes, rather than other instruments.

Eruvin 59a-b

The Mishnah on today’s daf returns us to the question of eruvei hatzeirot and teaches that a city which once belonged to an individual but became a public city can still have a single eruv to permit carrying in the city, as it is still perceived as a single hatzer (courtyard).  If, on the other hand, a city that once was public became a private city, a single eruv cannot be made unless an area is left outside the eruv, so that the rules of eruv will not be forgotten.

There are a number of explanations of what constitutes a private city. According to Rashi, it means that there are not 600,000 residents, so it is not a reshut ha-rabim, a public domain. (According to Rashi, in order to be considered a reshut ha-rabim the city needs to be similar in number to the encampment of the Israelites in the desert.) The Mishnah teaches that even when the number of residents reaches 600,000, the original eruv will still be valid. The Rashba and Ritva understand that the city was actually owned by a single individual who leased space to others. Even if it is sold later on to a number of people, its original status as a private city gives it a unique status.

The discussion of eruv hatzeirot in our Mishnah appears to be out of place in our chapter, whose focus is eruvei tehumim. This halakha really belongs in one of the earlier chapters of Masechet Eruvin. One suggestion is that this is a segue from the previous Mishnah (58b), which taught that we can trust the memory of local people – even a slave or maid-servant – to testify how far the tehum Shabbat was outside the city. In our case, as well, the power of memory plays a role in establishing the city as either public or private, and that memory carries weight in halakha, even if the situation has changed.

Eruvin 60a-b

The Mishnah on our daf teaches:

“If a man is to the east, and he asks his son to establish an eruv for him to the west (or vice versa), once Shabbat begins he is still limited to 2000 amot (=cubits) from his spot. So if he is within 2000 amot of his house, but the eruv is further away than 2000 amot, he can go to his house, but not to his eruv. Similarly, if he is within 2000 amot of his eruv, but his house is further away than 2000 amot, he can go to his eruv, but not to his house.” 

The Gemara opens with the assumption that the man, his house and his eruv are in a straight line, creating the situation where the man can walk to his house, but cannot continue past his house to the eruv. In effect, since he is not within 2000 amot of the eruv that was established on his behalf, the eruv cannot take effect at all. He is, therefore, limited to the 2000-amah radius around him. Since his house is within that radius, he can go there – but no further. 

The difficulty with this interpretation of the Mishnah is that the second case is hard to understand. If the man, his house and his eruv are on a straight line, how can he possibly be closer to his eruv than to his house?

Rava bar Rav Sheila suggests a different way to understand this case: If the man is to the east of his house and the eruv is placed to the west of the house, but rather than being on a straight line, they are at an angle from one another, we can have a situation where the man is actually closer to his eruv than to his house.  In such a case the eruv will take effect and the individual will be able to walk to his eruv, and, indeed, 2000 amot beyond his eruv, as well.

Eruvin 61a-b

Although we have been discussing the limitation of travel beyond 2000 amot (=cubits) throughout Masechet Eruvin, that applies only outside the city limits. If one resides in a large city, the entire city is considered to have the status of daled amot – four cubits – and one can walk wherever he wants in it. This is also true if two cities are within 2000 amot of one another. In such a case, were one to place his eruv in the neighboring city, he would be permitted to walk anywhere in that city – even if it is well beyond the normal 2000 amah limit. The Mishnah also brings the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who argues that movement within the larger city for people who are coming from a neighboring city would be limited to 2000 amot from their eruv, even within the precincts of the city.

Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is not accepted as the halakha. The Gemara tells of people who were arranging their eruv in a neighboring city so that they would be able to travel there on Shabbat. Mar Yehudah recommended to them that they place it further in the city, so that they would be able to walk a greater distance in the city. Rava rebuked him with the epithet “Palga'ah” and stated empathically that we do not follow Rabbi Akiva’s position. The Arukh defines Palga’ah as someone always looking for a fight who took up positions that were not generally accepted. Rashi explains the term to mean that he was known to argue with the sages, who, in this case, had already ruled that the halakha follows the lenient position.

The example of a large city that appears in the Gemara is Antioch, about which the baraita teaches that someone who establishes his Shabbat there can walk its full length and breadth, its size notwithstanding.

Antioch in Northern Syria was one of the largest cities in the world during the ancient period. Since it was built over a period of time – and, at its peak, was actually composed of four separate, joined cities – it was not well planned, part of the reason that it covered such a large area. During the Talmudic period, about 600,000 people lived there.  

Eruvin 62a-b

The sixth chapter of Masechet Eruvin returns to the discussion of eruvei hatzeirot – the laws that regulate how to arrange for the residents of a courtyard in order to permit one to carry within it. In particular, this chapter focuses on the residents themselves. All of the residents need to participate in the eruv, but if one of them did not participate, even on Shabbat he can rectify the matter by ceding his ownership to another resident who did participate.

One of the central questions dealt with is who is considered a resident of the courtyard for the purpose of creating the eruv, and what needs to be done if someone does not want to participate.

The Mishnah (61b) brings a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. Both agree that a non-Jew who lives in the courtyard will need to actually lease his part of the courtyard to the others in order to allow them to establish an eruv. Rabbi Meir feels that this is necessary, even if there is only one Jew living in the courtyard; Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov deems this necessary only if there are two or more Jewish residents. This disagreement does not really stem from the rules of eruv. They both agree, in principle, that the non-Jew’s presence in the courtyard does not require his participation in the eruv. Rather, this is a Rabbinic decree whose purpose is to discourage Jews from taking up residence in a courtyard with non-Jews. Rabbi Meir believes that this decree always applies, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov points to the fact that it would be unusual for a Jew to live alone with non-Jews in their courtyard, due to his fear of the non-Jews. Therefore there was no need to establish a Rabbinic decree for such an unusual situation.

The Gemara lists several Amoraim who rule like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, culminating in Abayye’s statement to Rav Yosef that the tradition is that the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov are kav v’naki – short, but clear and perfect – so we follow them in every area of halakha.

The principle that the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov are kav v’naki appears several times in the Gemara. There is some discussion about how broad a ruling it is. Does it apply only to his teachings that appear in the Mishnah, or in baraitot, as well? Is it only true against one adversary, or even against a group? The conclusion seems to be that we will always follow the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. Tradition has it that his teachings appear 102 times in the Talmud – matching the Gematria of the word “Kav,” and that his opinion is accepted in every one of those cases.

Eruvin 63a-b

On the previous daf, the Gemara set down a rule that we always follow the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. This rule leads to a discussion that focuses on whether a student is permitted to make a decision that follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov without deferring to his teacher. Generally speaking, a student was not permitted to issue rulings on issues of halakha in the presence – or place – of his teacher, a tradition that stemmed from a concern for the teacher’s honor. Some argue that ruling in the place of one’s teacher is tantamount to a rebellion again the king – mored be-malkhut – which would mean that even were the student to receive permission, it would be forbidden for him to rule.

An example of a tradition that exemplifies this concern is that the shohet, the ritual slaughterer, would give his knife to the Rabbi of the community to check, even if he himself was a learned and knowledgeable person. The Gemara tells of a group of Rabbis in Rav Aha bar Yaakov’s city who, while preparing a calf for slaughter, argued among themselves whether it was necessary to show the knife to Rav Aha bar Yaakov. Some quoted Rava, who taught that when slaughtering privately, a Talmid Hakham – a scholar – can check the knife himself. Others argued that once the issue had been raised, it would be an affront to Rav Aha bar Yaakov were they not to show the knife to him. Others pointed out that Rav Aha bar Yaakov was renowned for his age and wisdom, so he deserved even more than the usual honor.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov was a second generation Babylonian Amora who lived long enough to interact with Abayye and Rava, who were fourth century Amoraim. He was well known for his piety and for miracles that took place on his behalf. His students included Rav Papa and his nephew Rav Aha the son of Rav Ika.

Eruvin 64a-b

With regard to the question of how to establish an eruv for a courtyard where a non-Jew lives (one who is not interested in cooperating by leasing his part of the courtyard to the Jewish residents), Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel suggests that, if necessary, a legal fiction can be created. One of the Jews can ask his permission to use the courtyard for some other purpose – storage, for example – and then can act as an agent for the non-Jew to establish the eruv.

Upon hearing this suggestion, Rav Nahman commented that it was an excellent halakhic statement.

The Gemara quotes another unrelated statement of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel, which says that someone who drinks a revi'it of wine should not rule on issues of halakha, until he has recovered from its intoxicating effects.

Upon hearing this, Rav Nahman commented that it was a poor halakhic statement. Rav Nahman claimed that his personal experience was that until he drank a revi'it of wine he was not able to think clearly.

Upon hearing Rav Nahman’s reactions to the statements of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, Rava pointed out the homiletic teaching based on the passage in Mishlei (29:3) – “He who loves wisdom gladdens his father, but he who keeps company with harlots (zonot) will lose his fortune” – that someone who says “this teaching is beautiful, this one is not,” will lose a fortune of Torah. Rav Nahman accepts Rava’s rebuke and commits to refrain from passing such judgment on the future.

Rashi in Mishlei explains the homiletic teaching as being based on the fact that this is the only time in Tanakh that the word “Zonot” is written with full vowels. Thus the interpretation is to break the word in half – zo na’ot – “this is beautiful.” Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and what appears attractive to one person is seen otherwise by another, with regard to halakhot it is inappropriate to say that one statement is beautiful and another is not. The Meiri explains that even as choices need to be made in order to establish the halakha, it is inappropriate to state that one position is unpleasant; rather we accept one and reject the other based on objective criteria.

In addition to his monumental translation and commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Steinsaltz has authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles on a variety of topics, both Jewish and secular. For more information about Rabbi Steinsaltz’s groundbreaking work in Jewish education, visit www.steinsaltz.org or contact the Aleph Society at 212-840-1166.

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