Pesachim 24
 
While discussing hametz and its status on Pesach, the Gemara compares it to other situations where the Torah forbids eating certain foods, and to those sources in the Torah from which we learn those prohibitions. In several cases, when the Gemara finds a passage that seems repetitious, it tries to derive from it other halakhot regarding forbidden food.
 
Upon observing this methodology, Ravina asks Rav Ashi whether perhaps the Torah repeats the halakha in order to teach us that a person can be held liable several times for eating one forbidden food. To prove that such a thing is possible, he quotes Abayye who taught that someone who eats a Putita would receive four sets of malkot (=lashes) from the Bet Din, someone who eats a Nemalah (=an ant) receives five sets of lashes, and someone who eats a Tzirah (=a wasp) receives six sets of malkot – each set representing a further prohibition that attaches to that particular non-kosher creature.
 
Rav Ashi responds that the Gemara is only willing to apply a Biblical passage to the creation of an additional prohibition if it cannot find a more useful purpose for the pasuk (=verse).
 
We are not certain of the identity of the Putita, for which Abayye ruled that there are four prohibitions, since it is not very well described in the Gemara. From what we know, it is likely a water creature, perhaps a water beetle, or, as the Arukh explains, a non-kosher fish, like a small eel. Some point to a similar word in Latin, which is a general term for several types of flat fish – most of them non-kosher – that live on the bottom of rivers.
 
With regard to the idea that you can be held liable for several forbidden actions by eating one non-kosher creature, it is interesting to note that in his introduction to his Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Maimonides sets out a number of general principles that govern his decision as to whether something should be considered one of the 613 commandments. One of the basic principles that he puts forward is that even if a given law is repeated a number of times in the Torah it does not indicate that the thing is commanded or forbidden more than once. Due to this position, the Rambam is forced to explain the cases in our Gemara as referring to unique creatures whose physical makeup allows them to fall under separate categories – that it is a water insect, a winged insect, a crawling insect, etc. – all at the same time. Most other Rishonim, however, follow the opinion of the Geonim, who accept this Gemara at face value and understand that you can, on occasion, be held liable several times for one Biblical prohibition. 

Pesachim 25
 
As we have seen, not only is it forbidden to eat hametz during Pesach, deriving other benefit from it is prohibited as well. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between eating and deriving benefit from forbidden foods, the Gemara compares hametz to other things forbidden by the Torah, including basar be-halav (meat and milk) and kilei ha-kerem (wheat grown in a vineyard). One point the Gemara makes very clearly is that in a case of piku'ah nefesh – of danger to human life – we dispense with all of these rules. Ravin in the name of Rabbi Yohanan taught that anything – even things usually forbidden – can be used to save someone who is in danger, with the exception of three things: Avodah Zara (idol worship), Gilui Arayot (forbidden sexual relations) and Shefikhut Damim (murder).
 
The Gemara presents Biblical passages as the source for this rule regarding Avodah Zara and Gilui Arayot. When it comes to Shefikhut Damim the Gemara argues that no proof-text is necessary, as it is a sevara – a logical argument – that murder cannot be permitted to save a life. To illustrate the sevara, the Gemara tells of a person who approached Rava with the following question:
 
"The ruler of my village came to me and said 'kill that person, and if you do not then I will kill you.' Can I follow his order so that I will be able to save myself?"
 
Rava responded:
"Allow yourself to be killed, but you may not kill another. Who says that your blood is redder than his? Perhaps his blood is redder than yours."
 
On a simple level, Rava's argument is that we cannot tell whose life is more valuable, so we will not allow you to save your life at the expense of another.
 
Rabbenu Yehonatan explains Rava's answer by arguing that really the laws of the Torah are so important that we would not allow them to be "pushed aside" even at the expense of human life. The reason the halakha permits someone to transgress a serious prohibition – like Shabbat – in order to save a life is because we weigh that single hillul Shabbat (=desecration of Shabbat) against the potential Shabbatot that the person will observe in the course of his lifetime. In our case the argument is that we cannot possibly know "whose blood is redder" i.e. who will live longer and perform more mitzvot.

Pesachim 26
 
One of the examples that the Gemara discusses of things that are assur behana'ah – that one cannot derive pleasure or benefit from – is kodashim – things consecrated for use in the Temple. The technical term for deriving such pleasure is me'ilah – making inappropriate use of sacred property.
 
A baraita is brought by the Gemara quoting Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who teaches that not all types of benefit are considered me'ilah. Specifically, sound (e.g. hearing the singing of the Levites), sight (e.g. viewing the beauty of the Temple itself or even making use of the light from the Temple for mundane activities) and smell (e.g. enjoying the smell of the ketoret – the Temple incense) are not considered making inappropriate use of the Temple's property.
 
The Gemara questions this ruling by pointing out that the Torah prohibits one from making ketoret for his own use (Shemot 30:37), and that someone who smells the ketoret that was made for use in the Temple may not be held liable for it, but nevertheless is considered to have committed me'ilah.
 
Rav Papa answers this by distinguishing between sight and sound on the one hand and smell on the other hand. Sight and sound have no substance to them at all (ein bahem mamash) and would not be forbidden at all, as opposed to smell which does have substance. Therefore, smelling the ketoret would be considered me'ilah until after it had been lit, that is to say, until after the mitzvah had been fulfilled.
 
The distinction that Rav Papa makes is based on the fact that the properties of both smell and taste are carried by tiny bits of the substance itself that act upon receptors in the person's nose and mouth. Thus, the senses of smelling and tasting derive benefit from the object itself. In order to see and hear, however, the body has receptors that react to light waves or sound waves that come from an object, but are not part of the object itself.

Pesachim 27
 
In yesterday's daf (=page) we learned of the unique status of kodashim – things consecrated for use in the Temple, and the rule of me'ilah – making inappropriate use of sacred property.  The source for the laws of me'ilah appears in Vayikra 5:14-16, and an entire tractate of the Talmud – Masechet Me'ilah – is devoted to the study and analysis of this rule.  Here is a brief synopsis of me'ilah:
 
When someone derives benefit or pleasure by accident from something that has been consecrated to the Temple (i.e. he does not realize that the thing was kodesh), he is considered to have committed me'ilah, and he will be obligated to bring an appropriate sacrifice, and to pay back the value of his benefit to the Temple, together with an additional fifth (20%) as a penalty. Generally speaking, after the object has been used for some mundane purpose and the person has fulfilled the requirements as mentioned above, the object then loses its status as kodashim and can now be used for normal purposes (hullin). In effect, the holiness has transferred from the object to the money that has been paid to the Temple in its place.
 
As noted above, the rules of me'ilah only apply when the object was used by accident. If someone makes use of kodesh – of an object that belongs to the Temple - for his own use on purpose, the rules of me'ilah do not apply.  The Torah does not say what should be done to the transgressor in such a case. What is clear is that the atonement offered by the sacrifice and monetary payment will not apply.
 
Another halakha about kodashim discussed on our daf is the rule that it cannot become batel – it cannot become nullified when combined with other things. The background to this rule is that most things can become nullified when they are in a mixture in such a small quantity that they can no longer be noticed. For most food, for example, the ratio is 60:1; therefore, when there is sixty times more kosher meat than non-kosher meat, we view the non-kosher meat as having been nullified and the mixture is permitted.
 
There are a number of explanations as to why this rule is not applied to kodashim. The Meiri suggests that it is because in this case, aside from the question of issur ve-heter – of permissibility on a ritual level – there are also questions of money and ownership involved, since the kodashim is perceived as being the property of the Mikdash. Those types of questions are not governed by the same rules of bittul (=nullification).

Pesachim 28
 
The Torah tells us the story of the first Passover holiday that was celebrated at the time that the Jewish people were leaving Egypt (Shemot 12) and specifically commands to continue celebrating the anniversary of this event when they arrive in the Promised Land (12:25). Furthermore, the Torah emphasizes that this commemoration is an obligation for all time (12:24). Yet we know that the rules and regulations that applied to the Children of Israel at the time that they were leaving Egypt are different than those that future generations were obligated to follow. Some of the differences are clearly stated in the Torah itself. For example, the Jewish people in Egypt were told to prepare the korban Pesach – the Passover sacrifice – beginning on the tenth day of the month of Nissan (12:3), and that the blood of the sacrifice was to be saved in order to use it for painting the doorposts of their houses (12:7; 22-23). These mitzvot applied only that first year, and not in subsequent celebrations of the holiday.
 
Clearly, many of the rules apply whenever Jews celebrate Pesach, whether in Egypt, Israel or in the Diaspora. Yet, the pesukim (=verses) in Sefer Shemot (= the book of Shemot) are not clear with regard to establishing which rules were meant to apply for all generations and which only for the first Passover.
 
As basic a rule as the law forbidding eating hametz is subject to a disagreement in the Gemara. Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili is quoted in a baraita as saying that during the Exodus the prohibition to eat hametz lasted only one day. While this does not have practical ramifications for us today, when it is clear that the prohibition is in place for the entire seven day holiday, it points to the different possible interpretations of the passages in Sefer Shemot.  Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili interprets the juxtaposition of the statement "…and you shall not eat hametz" to "today you are leaving" (see Shemot 13:3-4) as indicating that the prohibition of hametz during yetziat mitzra'im (= the exodus from Egypt) was limited to that day only.

Pesachim 29
 
In an earlier discussion we presented the law of me'ilah – of making inappropriate use of sacred property. What if, on Pesach, a person ate hametz that belonged to the Temple? Two opinions are brought in the baraita:
According to the Tanna Kamma (=the first Tanna), the person is liable for me'ilah and will have to bring a sacrifice and pay restitution plus penalty to the Temple.
Another opinion, quoted in the name of Yesh Omerim (=some say) argues that no me'ilah has taken place.
 
The Yesh Omerim is identified by the Gemara as Rabbi Nehunia ben Hakanah, who rules that someone whose transgression is deserving of karet (=excision from the Jewish people) - which he considers equivalent to the death penalty – will not be held liable for "lesser crimes" that took place at the same time.  On one level, this concept is based on a general principle of kim lei be-d'raba mi-nei – that the greater of the punishments will suffice for him - which teaches us that a person cannot be punished twice for the same incident, and that the more severe punishment is the one that is executed.  Our case demands a Biblical source beyond this (which different sages learn from a variety of sources) from which we can learn that someone who commits a prohibited act that is deserving of a severe penalty will be free from any other punishments associated with that act, even if the more severe punishment is not meted out. Moreover, the payment of damages – as opposed to other types of punishments - that stems from that act would not ordinarily be erased were it not for the Sages’ interpretation of these Biblical passages.
 
Tosafot point out that identifying the mysterious Yesh Omrim as Rabbi Nehunia ben Hakanah appears to run counter to the Gemara in Horayot. The Gemara there teaches that following a disagreement in the bet midrash, Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Meir were expelled, and when they were allowed to reenter it was on the condition that their future teachings would be quoted without their names – Rabbi Meir's statements would be quoted as Aheirim Omrim (=others say) and Rabbi Natan's would be cited as Yesh Omrim. Tosafot explains that the Sages knew that certain statements were not made by Rabbi Natan, which leads them to try and identify the true author of the statement.

Pesachim 30
 
How do you prepare your kitchen for Pesach? Do you "kasher" your silverware or do you have a separate set for the holiday?
 
This is the conversation that is quoted by the Gemara between Ravina and Rav Ashi on this topic:
 
Ravina: "What do you do with knives in preparation for Pesach?"
Rav Ashi: "I arrange to have new ones made." 
Ravina: "How about people who cannot afford to purchase new utensils? What should they do?"
Rav Ashi: "I didn't mean that I actually make new ones. What I meant was that I refurbish my knives every year. I put clay around the wooden handle so that it should not be ruined, and I put the metal part of the knife into fire. Then I remove the clay and put the handle into boiling water."
 
The Gemara concludes that utensils can be made kosher for Passover by means of putting them in boiling water of a keli rishon – a pot that is directly on a flame – based on the principle ke-bolo kakh polto – something that absorbs taste will expel it when subjected to the same situation. Since kitchen utensils are often used in a boiling pot over a flame, that is the level of heat necessary to remove whatever had been absorbed.
 
One type of material from which hametz cannot be removed is earthenware. According to the Gemara, once an earthenware pot is used for cooking, what had been absorbed can never be fully removed.
 
One of the issues raised by the Gemara is whether glazed earthenware pots will have the same rule as simple ones. In this photograph of an earthenware jar that was found in Dura Europos in Babylonia, the difference between glazed and simple earthenware finishes is apparent. From the discussion in the Gemara it is clear that glazing was done with different materials that gave different color finishes, each of which allowed for a different amount of absorption by the pot.
 
All of this is only if the utensil had been used for hametz in a situation where heat was applied. If, however, something was only used for cold food, then we do not assume that anything had been absorbed and it can be used on Pesach.