Pesachim 17a-b

We noted earlier (16a) that there is a difference of opinion regarding the status of liquids vis-à-vis the laws of tumah v'taharah (=ritual purity). On our daf (=page), Rav Papa argues that even according to the opinion that liquids can become ritually defiled on a Biblical level, nevertheless the liquids found in the slaughterhouse in the Temple are not tameh, and hilkhita gemiri lah - we are taught it by way of an oral tradition handed down from Moshe at Mount Sinai (halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai).

The Gemara brings a number of questions on Rav Papa's position. In the first one, Rav Huna brei d'Rav Natan asks Rav Papa how he explains the baraita that appeared on the previous daf in the Gemara. In it, Rabbi Elazar argues that he learned the rule that liquids in general do not become tameh (=ritually defiled) from Yossi ben Yoezer ish Tzraida‘s testimony that the liquids in the slaughterhouse of the Beit ha-Mikdash are considered tahor (=ritually pure). If that rule is halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai, then how are we able to learn other rules from it?

In general, a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai carries the same weight as laws written in the Torah or derived in more conventional ways. Such a tradition is strong enough for us to reinterpret passages in the Torah or even uproot them totally from their simple meaning. One of the basic differences between a law that is written in the Torah and one that is based on such a tradition is whether we can derive other laws from this one. A halakha that is written in the Torah can act as an archetype from which we can extrapolate to other, similar cases. A law that we follow based on halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai is limited just to that specific case.

Following the questions posed on Rav Papa's position, the Gemara concludes with the word kashya - "it is difficult." Nevertheless, Maimonides, in his Mishneh Torah, rules like Rav Papa.  Apparently, even if some of the opinions in the baraita cannot be reconciled with Rav Papa, other Tanna'im are understood to agree with him. Since the Gemara did not conclude with the expression tyuvta - "it is refuted" - Rav Papa's position is not entirely rejected.

Pesachim 18a-b

In the course of its discussion of ritual purity (tumah v'taharah), the Gemara quotes a Mishnah in which Rabbi Akiva brings the passage (Vayikra 11:33) "Any earthen vessel into which they fall, everything in the vessel will become ritually defiled (‘yitmah’) and it must be broken." According to him, the expression yitmah teaches that food that is tameh on a secondary level (a sheni le-tumah) can, in turn, defile other food, making them tameh on a third-level (shlishi le-tumah). The Mishnah says that this law was taught bo ba-yom - on "that day."

It appears that the expression bo ba-yom throughout the Mishnah refers to the day that the sages decided to remove Rabban Gamliel from his position as Nasi and replaced him with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. On that occasion quite a few changes took place in the Beit Midrash and its organization. The Gemara in Berachot (28a) records that new benches needed to be added to the study hall - some say 400; some say 700 - because Rabbi Elazar's "open admissions" policy brought many new people who had been turned away under Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara reports that every issue in halakha that had been left in doubt was debated and resolved on that day, leaving a collection of statements throughout the Talmud that were recorded bo ba-yom.

According to the Gemara in Berachot, although Rabban Gamliel lost his position because of the sages’ reaction to his treatment of his colleague Rabbi Yehoshua, he did not absent himself from the discussion while the debates took place, and the Gemara even records that he argued as an equal with Rabbi Yehoshua on that occasion. His conclusion from the episode was to recognize that he owed Rabbi Yehoshua an apology. In the end, the sages decided to divide the position of Nasi between him and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

It appears that the change in leadership also led to greater openness in discussions, and opinions that had not been considered before were presented for debate. Similarly, new interpretations of Biblical passages were suggested and discussed. This is clearly shown in Masechet Eduyot, which is made up of a series of Mishnayot that are a collection of testimonies about halakhic positions that had not been studied before, all of which were taught bo ba-yom - on "that day."

Pesachim 19a-b

In the course of its continuing discussion of ritual purity (tumah v'taharah), the Gemara discusses the question of a pin that is found in the flesh of one of the sacrifices in the Temple. Rav explains that the case is when the pin may have been in direct contact with a dead body, giving it the unique status of the dead body itself, based on the rule of herev harei hu ke-halal - that a sword is considered to be like a corpse. This rule is learned from the passage in Bamidbar (19:16), which teaches that someone who comes in contact be-halal herev - with someone killed by a sword - becomes ritually defiled.

There are a number of opinions regarding this rule. Rabbenu Tam understands that an earthenware vessel that touches a corpse becomes a rishon le-tumah; other utensils (e.g. wooden ones) would become an av ha-tumah; metal utensils are unique and become an avi avot ha-tumah (see Pesachim 14 for an explanation of these terms). Rabbenu Hananel quotes Geonim as saying that the unique status of a metal object as an avi avot ha-tumah only applies if that object was the murder weapon that killed the person.

With regard to our case of the pin found in a Temple sacrifice, Rav Ashi introduces a well-known rule about safek tumah (a situation of questionable ritual defilement) - in a reshut ha-rabim (a public domain) it is considered tahor; in a reshut ha-yahid (a private domain) it is considered tameh. Rav Ashi concludes that as a public domain, questionable issues of tumah ve-tahara will be ruled to be tahor.

These rules of safek tumah are derived by the sages from the case of Sotah (see Bamidbar 5) - a woman who is suspected of committing adultery. In the words of the Torah we are not sure whether she has become tameh (defiled). The Torah takes the questionable situation of Sotah very seriously, and the sages learn from this that every case of tumah that is similar to such a case, that is to say, all cases that are similar to Sotah in that they take place out of the sight of the general public, should be treated stringently. At the same time, we also conclude from this that situations that are not similar - specifically cases that take place in a public forum - should be judged leniently unless proven otherwise.

Pesachim 20a-b

As on the previous daf (=page), our Gemara discusses the case of a pin that is found in the flesh of a sacrifice in the Temple, which renders the meat of the korban to be tameh (=ritually defiled). Although people or utensils (kelim) can become tameh at any time that they come into contact with something that gives off tumah, generally speaking, in order for food to become tameh, it must first be hukhshar - "prepared" by becoming wet (see Vayikra 11:38). The halakha is that any of seven liquids will give food that status: water, wine, honey, olive oil, milk, dew and blood. Our Gemara asks how the meat of the korban became "prepared" so that it was in a position to become defiled by the pin.

The first two possibilities raised - that either blood or water in the Mikdash prepared the meat of the sacrifice - are rejected by the Gemara:

1. The blood of the sacrifice itself cannot "prepare" food to become tameh
2. Liquids in the slaughterhouse in the Temple neither become tameh themselves, nor do they "prepare" foods to become tameh.

The Gemara concludes that sacrifices have an inherent quality about them, referred to as hibat ha-kodesh (literally, "love" or "fondness" for the sacrifice), that gives them the status of being "prepared" to become tameh.

The rule of hibat ha-kodesh is that, because of their holiness and elevated status, they become more susceptible to defilement. There is general agreement that the higher level of kedushah (=holiness) that an object has, the more possibilities there are for ritual defilement (regular hullin will only become tameh if it is one step removed from the source of the tumah, so it can only become a sheni, a second level defilement. Terumah (tithes), which are on a higher level of holiness, can become tameh from a sheni and become a shelishi, a third level defilement. Kodashim, consecrated items, like sacrifices, can even become a revi'i, a fourth level defilement).

The perception of things connected to the Temple as having a higher-level holiness that increases the possibility of defilement is applied by the sages also to non-food items that ordinarily would not be subject to the rules of tumah v'taharah at all, like the incense and coals that were used in the Temple service.

Pesachim 21a-b

The second chapter of Masechet Pesachim opens with a discussion of the completion of the process of bi'ur hametz; after having searched for the hametz, one must destroy it.  The main issue in this perek (=chapter), however, is the definition of the prohibition of hametz itself. The Torah clearly forbids eating hametz, and even prohibits having hametz in one’s house. What is less clear is whether someone can derive benefit from hametz in other ways. Does the ban on eating hametz imply that there is a larger prohibition attached that will forbid all benefit from it, or, perhaps, an issur hana'ah (a prohibition against deriving benefit) is a separate matter?

Our Mishnah teaches that one is permitted to derive benefit from hametz - one can sell it to a non-Jew, feed it to his animals, etc. - as long as it can be eaten. Once the time comes when hametz is forbidden, no benefit can be derived from it, not even using it as fuel. Hizkiya is quoted in the Gemara as teaching that the source for the halakha that one cannot derive benefit from hametz on Pesach is the passage in Shemot (13:3) which commands that "hametz should not be eaten." According to the Rasha"sh, had the passage said "Do not eat hametz" we would have understood it as prohibiting people from simply eating hametz. The more general command, which forbids hametz from being consumed, appears to include all eating - even eating by someone's animals, which, in effect, describes an issur hana'ah.

The Mishnah specifically says that neither a behemah (domesticated animal) nor a hayyah (wild animal) can be fed once the issur hana'ah begins, but either of them can be fed until that time. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah needs to teach both, as each case has a uniqueness that would not be covered by the other. For example, had the Mishnah only taught us the case of hayyah, we would have thought that a wild animal can be fed just before Pesach because such an animal will hide anything left over. A domesticated animal, however, may leave over food that will not be noticed until Pesach begins. The Mikhtam explains this distinction by pointing out that someone who gives food to a wild animal knows that such an animal will hide leftover food, so at the time that he feeds the animal he already makes a conscious decision to rid himself of this hametz. Someone who feeds a domesticated animal, however, assumes that he will see if there is any leftover food and will destroy it, leaving open the possibility that hametz will be left in his possession when Pesach begins.

Pesachim 22a-b

In order to investigate whether the Torah forbids deriving benefit from things that cannot be eaten in general, our Gemara considers a number of cases of forbidden foods in an attempt to clarify whether an issur hana'ah (prohibition against deriving benefit) is an inherent part of this proscription.  Among the cases examined are gid ha-nashe (see Bereshit 32:33), blood (see Vayikra 17:12), ever min ha-hai (see Devarim 12:23) and shor ha-niskal (see Shemot 21:28).

The case of shor ha-niskal is one where someone's ox gores and kills another person. In that case, the Torah teaches that the ox is stoned and its meat cannot be eaten. The passage that says that its meat cannot be eaten - v'lo ye'akhel et besaro - is understood by the Gemara to teach us prohibitions against eating its meat, as well as deriving benefit from its meat. According to some opinions in the Gemara, the word et is understood to teach that the animal's skin also cannot be used; according to others we must learn this from elsewhere in the passage, since they do not believe that the word et can be used to teach halakhot.

These positions are found in a baraita that brings the teachings of Shimon (some say Nehemia) ha-Amasoni, who was known to learn halakhot from every et that appeared in the Torah.  When he reached the passage of et ha-Shem Elokekha tira (Devarim 10:20), which teaches that you should be in awe of God, he could not think of an appropriate thing to learn from the word et, and he stopped making such derashot. In reply to his students' question of "What will happen to our earlier teachings?" he responded that he would now receive reward for distancing himself from this methodology, just as he did when he made use of it. Finally Rabbi Akiva made use of that et to teach that Torah scholars should be included in the list of those who the students should hold in awe.

One of the popular questions asked by the rishonim about this baraita is, why did Shimon ha-Amasoni encounter difficulties only when he reached this passage? Shouldn't the passage in Devarim 6:5 – v'ahavta et ha-Shem Elokekha, that you should love Hashem your God - have presented the same type of problem? The Maharsha suggests that Shimon ha-Amasoni had no doubt that there was an obligation to love Torah scholars that could be derived from that pasuk (=verse). His only question was whether the same rule could apply to awe, as well, a question that Rabbi Akiva eventually related to.

Pesachim 23a-b

As noted on yesterday's daf (=page), the Gemara considers a number of cases of forbidden foods in an attempt to clarify whether an issur hana'ah - a prohibition against deriving benefit - is an inherent part of the issur akhila - the prohibition against eating something. One of the cases where we find a disagreement on this matter is gid ha-nashe (the sciatic nerve - see Bereshit 32:33), where Rabbi Shimon rules that we cannot derive benefit from it and Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili rules that we can.

The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Yossi ha-Galili learns this from a kal va-homer (an a fortiori argument) as follows: We know that the punishment for eating helev (forbidden fats) is very severe (karet), and that the punishment for eating gid ha-nashe is less severe (malkot). Since one is allowed to derive benefit from helev (this is clearly indicated in the Torah - see Vayikra 7:24), then certainly in the less severe case of gid ha-nashe one would be permitted to do the same.

The Gemara records the response of Rabbi Shimon, who forbids deriving benefit from gid ha-nashe, as arguing that we cannot see helev as being more severe, since there are certain rules where gid ha-nashe is more stringent. For example, gid ha-nashe applies to all animals, whereas helev is limited to domesticated animals (behemot) and does not apply to wild animals (hayyot).

The expression used by the Gemara to argue against a kal va-homer is ikka lemifrakh – literally, "you can break the argument." The idea is that a kal va-homer is predicated on the assumption that one law is more severe than another and will remain so in all of its characteristics. If we can find even one instance where that assumption does not hold up, that is to say, if we can find even one case where the assumed hamur (severe case) is kal (lighter) or the assumed kal case is hamur, the kal va-homer relationship is broken. In that case we can no longer extrapolate from one case to the other.