Parshat Vayigash - 7 Tevet 5766 / January 7-8, 2006

The Coming Week's Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz

This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.


This month’s Steinsaltz Daf Yomi is sponsored by:
Dr. and Mrs. Alan Harris
The Lewy Family Foundation
Marilyn and Edward Kaplan

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Eruvin 93a-b

Rav Hoshaya asks about a situation where the division between two courtyards collapsed on Shabbat, in effect adding new residents – the residents of the hatzer (=courtyard) next door – to each of the courtyards. In response, Rav Hisda quotes a baraita that seems to indicate that such a case would be forbidden, but both Rava and Abayye argue that the baraita's ruling would only apply if the dividing wall fell down before Shabbat began. If however, the wall was standing at the beginning of Shabbat, we apply the rule that we have learned before (Eruvin 17a) that once an area was declared permitted with regard to the rules of eruvin it remains so until after Shabbat.

Tosafot point out that this rule does not apply in every case of eruv, and it is important to distinguish between the case discussed in our Gemara, where the wall collapsed and we need to rule with regard to the relationship between the residents of each of the two courtyards, and a case where the wall between the courtyard and the reshut ha-rabim – the public domain – collapses. In that case we would rule differently, and the residents would not be allowed to carry in the hatzer.

This distinction stems from the fact that in our Gemara, when the dividing wall collapsed, the courtyards retain their basic designation as a reshut ha-yahid – a private domain – and all that has happened is that there are more residents than there were when the eruv was established at the beginning of Shabbat. In such a case, we can apply the rule that once an area was declared permitted with regard to the rules of eruvin it remains so until after Shabbat. In the second case, however, the collapse of the walls changes the courtyard from a reshut ha-yahid. It is no longer a simple hatzer. In such a case the entire situation with regard to the eruv needs to be reevaluated.


Eruvin 94a-b

On the previous daf (=page) we learned about a case where the dividing wall between two courtyards collapses on Shabbat, and how Rava and Abayye agree that we should apply the rule that has been taught before (Eruvin 17a) that once an area was declared permitted with regard to the rules of eruvin it remains so until after Shabbat.

On our daf we are introduced to a disagreement about this rule. Rav rejects the rule and says that the residents are no longer allowed to carry beyond the most basic four cubits around them. Shmuel argues that they can carry to where the wall originally stood.

The Gemara relates that this disagreement was derived from an actual event, when Rav was visiting Shmuel and they found themselves in a courtyard where the wall had fallen. Shmuel ordered a cloak be hung between the courtyards and that people could continue carrying as before. Rav did not comment, but he turned away, indicating that he disagreed with Shmuel's ruling.

The Gemara concludes that Shmuel did not really believe that even the cloak was necessary to allow the residents to continue carrying, and that he hung it simply to offer some privacy to each side. In way of explaining Rav's behavior, the Gemara argues that since it was Shmuel's hometown, Rav did not want to publicly disagree with Shmuel's ruling, but he did want people to understand that his opinion differed from the one that was being put into effect.

Tosafot point out that Rav was uncomfortable with Shmuel's ruling on two different planes. Aside from objecting to the people in each courtyard carrying, since he believed that reestablishing the wall by means of a cloak was a significant act, it should have been forbidden on Shabbat because of binyan – building. Shmuel did not feel that there was a real need for this division, so he had no reason to keep from putting up the cloak in order to offer a modicum of privacy to the residents.

The Meiri raises the question of how Rav could have avoided a public argument with Shmuel. Even if it was Shmuel's hometown, we rule that in situations where a transgression will take place, concern for wrongdoing is greater than issues of personal honor. He answers that this particular situation was a relatively minor Rabbinic issue, and in such cases concern for another sage's honor is more important than the potential transgression. The Ritva explains that in this case we are dealing with a question that had not yet been decided, so it would have been inappropriate for Rav to argue the ruling with Shmuel in Shmuel's hometown.

In fact, the halakha follows Shmuel's ruling.


Eruvin 95a-b

The rules and regulations of eruvin that have been discussed throughout this tractate, are but one aspect of a much larger set of halakhot, that are referred to as shvut – Rabbinic ordinances whose purpose is to keep the individual from committing a more serious transgression or to guarantee an atmosphere of Shabbaton – of rest and tranquility - on Shabbat.

The final chapter of Massechet Eruvin, which begins on our daf (=page), moves away from a discussion of eruvin and deals with broader issues of such Rabbinic ordinances, although most of the issues discussed are in some way connected with carrying on Shabbat.

The first Mishnah in this perek (=chapter) discusses someone who finds tefillin in a public domain on Shabbat and is interested in protecting them by bringing them into a protected area. How can they be carried on Shabbat? The agreed solution of the Mishnah is that transporting them by wearing them is permitted. The Tanna Kamma (=first) and Rabban Gamliel disagree as to whether only one pair can be worn at a time, or, perhaps, even two pair can be worn.

The Gemara suggests a number of reasons for the difference of opinion between Rabban Gamliel and the Tanna Kamma. One suggestion is that they differ on whether

the commandment of tefillin applies on Shabbat or not. According to the Tanna Kamma, the mitzvah does apply, so wearing two pairs of tefillin simultaneously would be forbidden because of bal tosif – the commandment that forbids adding to a mitzvah. According to Rabban Gamliel, who does not believe that the mitzvah of tefillin applies on Shabbat, there is no concern that you are adding to the mitzvah by wearing two pair.

It should be noted that according to the conclusion of the Gemara, tefillin should not be worn on Shabbat. Nevertheless, in our case, where we are concerned lest the holiness of the tefillin will be desecrated if they are left in the public domain, there is general agreement that we permit them to be worn for the purpose of moving them to a safer place.


Eruvin 96a-b

As noted in yesterday's daf (=page), one suggestion that appears in the Gemara to explain the disagreement between the Tanna Kamma (=first) and Rabban Gamliel is that the Tanna Kamma believes that there is an obligation to wear tefillin on Shabbat. On our daf the Gemara discusses why such an obligation does or does not exist.

The basic source to limit the commandment of tefillin to weekdays is quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva, who understands the passage about tefillin "…and they shall be a sign (ot) on your hand and a remembrance between your eyes…" (Shmot 13:9) to mean that tefillin are only necessary when there is a need for an ot – a sign. On days that are considered, in and of themselves an ot, there is no need to don tefillin. There are many different explanations as to what makes Shabbat and Yom Tov (=Jewish holiday) days that are considered an ot. Some explain that the commandments regarding the holiness of these days make them a sign for the Jewish people. Some say that it is the fact that work is forbidden that makes such days stand out on the calendar as a sign. Yet others argue that it is the unique commandments of each of the days – sukkah, matzah, refraining from eating hametz, etc.

In the course of the discussion, the Gemara relates a well-known midrash that Michal bat Cushi – King Shaul's daughter – wore tefillin, and the sages did not object. At first this is understood by the Gemara to indicate that the commandment of tefillin applies all the time, and should not be considered a positive, time-bound mitzvah, since women are not obligated in such mitzvot. Were this correct, we could reach the conclusion that there is an obligation to wear tefillin on Shabbat. This argument is rejected by the Gemara, since Michal may have been wearing tefillin not because she saw it as an obligation, but because she chose to do so voluntarily, following the opinion of Rabbi Yossi who rules that women can participate in mitzvot voluntarily, even if they are not obligated in them. Specifically, Rabbi Yossi permitted women to do semikha – to lean on a sacrifice that they are bringing to the Temple – even though they are not obligated to do so.

Our tradition follows the opinion of Rabbi Yossi, which allows women to perform mitzvot on a voluntary basis, even if they are not commanded in them. Rabbi Yossi permits this even in a case where there is potential for a transgression, as in the case of semikha, which can be seen as making use of an animal that has been consecrated as a sacrifice, which is ordinarily forbidden.

The story about Michal bat Cushi does not appear in Tanakh, but it was a well-established tradition handed down to the sages. It is interesting to note that when the story is recorded in the Jerusalem Talmud, it tells that the sages did object to her participation in this mitzvah, which is why women are discouraged from participating in the mitzvah of tefillin, as opposed to other mitzvot (shofar, lulav, etc.), which women are encouraged to fulfill.


Eruvin 97a-b

The Mishnah (95a-b) at the beginning of the perek (=chapter) discussed what to do if someone comes across a pile of tefillin that cannot be transported inside by wearing each pair. Rabbi Shimon's suggestion is to arrange a line of people, and have them hand the tefillin from one to another until they reach an enclosed place. Since each person is within four amot (=cubits) from the next one, no Biblical transgression takes place, and in consideration of the holiness of the tefillin, this arrangement would be permitted. Rabbi Shimon adds that the same rule would apply to someone who wants to bring his child into an enclosed place. He can arrange for a line of people to hand the child from one to another until it arrives at home.

The Gemara on our daf (=page) asks about the case of the child. What are the circumstances that would lead to such a situation? The explanation given is that the mother gave birth to this child outside and they want to bring the newborn baby home.

The Jerusalem Talmud understands that this case is when the baby is in danger and needs to be brought to the city because of its condition. Nevertheless, the sages preferred to suggest a method that would minimize hillul Shabbat - desecration of Shabbat - if at all possible. Our Gemara and its commentaries seem to approach the case differently. According to them, if there was a possible danger to the life of the baby, we would immediately instruct the parents to bring the child for treatment, even if it involved hillul Shabbat. The commentaries on our Gemara appear to understand the case to be one where it would be better or more convenient to have the baby in the city, but not that there is any danger at all had we left the baby with its mother where it was born.


Eruvin 98a-b

An extension that protrudes under a window is referred to by the Mishnah on our daf (=page) as a ziz. (A ziz and a gezuztra are similar projections from a window. According to the Geonim, a ziz has supports beneath it, while a gezuztra is, in effect, a balcony, with walls that extend from the building above it). The Mishnah teaches that a person can place objects on this ziz, or take things from the ziz into the house on Shabbat. The Gemara limits this rule in a number of ways. For example, according to the Gemara, the protrusion must be above ten tefahim (=handbreadths) from the ground. As we have learned before, the rules of reshut ha-rabim – of the public domain – only extend up until ten tefahim. Above that is a makom petur – a "free space" that is neither public nor private. If it is larger than four tefahim square, then it becomes a reshut ha-yahid (=private domain) that extends from the house.

The Gemara is concerned lest objects that are placed on the ziz will fall into the reshut ha-rabim below, and that someone who does not realize the difference between the ziz from where it is permitted to carry and the ground where it is not, may come to carry from the public domain into the private domain. Due to this concern, Abayye limits the case of the Mishnah only to breakable items. Rashi explains that if such items as plates or cups made of glass or earthenware fall down, they will break, so there is no concern that they will be carried back into the house.

Rabbenu Yehonatan gives another explanation for permitting breakable utensils to be placed on the ziz. He argues that people will be particularly careful with their breakable items and will make sure that they do not fall to the ground. Since they are so careful, the likelihood that someone will come to carry them becomes less of a concern.


Eruvin 99a-b

According to the Mishnah (98b) a person should not stand in a reshut ha-yahid (a private domain) and spit into a reshut ha-rabim (a public domain), or in a reshut ha-rabim and spit into a reshut ha-yahid, as you are transferring your saliva from one domain to another. Rabbi Yehudah teaches that even walking four cubits in the public domain with a collection of saliva in your mouth would be forbidden.

Rav Yosef on our daf (=page) comments that the rule in the Mishnah about spitting would be considered a Biblical transgression, deserving of a death penalty. The Ritva points out that this actually depends on the position that one takes with regard to a case that is a melakha she-ain tzrikha le-gufa – when a forbidden act is done on Shabbat with an intent other than that usually associated with that act. Since in the case of spitting, it is most likely that the intent was to get rid of the spittle and not specifically to have it reach the other reshut, those opinions that rule that one is not liable for such an act would disagree with Rav Yosef in this case.

This unusual discussion about spitting offers an opportunity for Resh Lakish to teach that a student who spits in front of his teacher is deserving of death, based on the passage kol misanai ahavu mavet (Mishlei 8:36), that "all who hate Me love death." According to Resh Lakish's homily, rather than reading the word misanai "who hate me," the passage should be read masni'ai "those who bring others to hate me." In other words, rather than understanding the passage to be describing those who hate God, it is referring to those whose actions and behaviors lead to a hillul ha-Shem – to a desecration of God's name that leads others to hate God. This rule is brought in a number of places by the Gemara with regard to Torah scholars whose conduct or manner of dress brings about an embarrassment to the honor of the Torah. In our case, Resh Lakish teaches that those students whose behavior angers their teachers and causes them to hate them are deserving of death, since "the awe of your teacher should be equivalent to the awe of Heaven." Unlike the case in the Mishnah, however, Resh Lakish certainly does not mean that such a person would be put to death for his crime, rather that such an act is so severe as to be deserving of death b'yedei Shamayim – by the Hand of God.

In addition to his monumental translation and commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Steinsaltz has authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles on a variety of topics, both Jewish and secular. For more information about Rabbi Steinsaltz’s groundbreaking work in Jewish education, visit www.steinsaltz.org or contact the Aleph Society at 212-840-1166.

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