The Orthodox Union and Young Israel thank the ADL for their kind permission to reprint the materials from their handbook.

This publication was made possible by a grant of the Harry and Jane Fischel Foundation, in honor of Harry Fischel and Jane Fischel of Blessed Memory.

See below for more information.

The best way to prevent a crime of incursion is to make its commission difficult.

An institutional security system can begin with a simple dead-bolt lock and strike plate and expand to sophisticated electronic intrusion and notification equipment. There is no security system that is infallible, but the more carefully chosen and designed the system is (for the particular institution's circumstances) the smaller chance there is that it will be defeated.

The following is recommended:

A. LIGHTING

The value of adequate lighting as a deterrent to crime cannot be overemphasized. Adequate lighting is a cost-effective line of defense in preventing crime. All sides and approaches to the facility should be illuminated. Lighting should be directed downward and away from the facility and away from personnel assigned to patrol the facility. The goal is to create as few shadows as possible. Perimeter lights should be installed so the cones of illumination overlap, eliminating areas of total darkness if any one fails to light. A weekly visual examination should be made of all exterior illumination to ensure proper function.

Lighting should be controlled by an automatic photoelectric cell allowing an extension of the daylight hours and providing protection against human error. This will ensure operation during inclement weather. All exterior lighting fixtures should be secured in vandal/ weather resistant housing. Interior lights should also be regulated by timers when the building is unoccupied.

B. FENCES

Take note of all local building and zoning codes regarding fences prior to planning or contracting for new fencing. Existing or new fencing should be strong and well maintained. Fence lines should be kept free of trash and debris. Clear away trees and vines that might aid a climber. Weeds and shrubs along fence lanes, sides of building, or near entrance points could hide the activities of a criminal. Keep shrubs low-under 36 inches-or clear them away completely. Cut back vines attached to buildings and trees next to buildings in order to prevent determined intruders from gaining access to upper windows or unprotected roof doors.

C. SKYLIGHTS

Skylights, ventilators and large door transoms can provide easy access to intruders unless properly protected. If permanent sealing is not possible, steel bars or screens of expanded metal may be required.

D. FIRE EXITS AND STAIRWAYS

Fire and emergency exits should be designed for quick exit but difficult entry from outside. Emergency stairways should be lighted, and doors leading to them kept in good repair. Unauthorized or illegal locking devices must be avoided, but safe locks with quick-release plates or bars are commercially available. Some locks come with built-in sound devices that announce an unauthorized entrance or exit.

E. WINDOWS

Windows should provide light, ventilation and visibility, but not easy access, Glass bricks can be used to seal a Window, allowing a continued light source while providing increased security, although visibility and ventilation will be lost. Gates and expanded steel screening, while often unattractive, will provide a high degree of security. Local building codes and fire safety regulations should be consulted prior to all such installations to avoid costly violations.

F. LOCKS

Door locks should be chosen and installed to provide proper security for the location involved. Locks with single cylinders and interior thumb turns, installed on doors with glass panels, should be placed more than 36 inches away from the nearest glass panel. The end-of-day locking procedure should include a visual examination of all areas of the building to prevent "stay-behind" burglars.

1. All exterior door lock cylinders should be protected with metal guard plates or armored rings to prevent cylinder removal. The guard plates should be secured with round-head carriage bolts. Some highly pick-resistant cylinders have a guard plate assembly built around them.

2. All exterior door locks should conform to the following:

a. Lock cylinders should be highly pick-resistant.

b. Dead-bolt locks should have a minimum bolt extension of one full inch.

c. Drop-bolt locks should be installed with the proper strike: wood frame, angle strike, metal frame, flat strike.

d. All cylinders should be protected with a guard plate or an armored ring.

3. Doors that have air, hydraulic, or spring returns should be periodically tested to insure that doors close fully.

G. DOORS

All external doors, main building doors, and lobby doors leading to common halls  should conform to the following guidelines:

1. Solid core wood or metal. (If found to be semi-solid, the doors should be  strengthened by applying a 1/2 inch sheet of plywood inside or cover with metal on both sides.)

2. Glass door panels or side panels should be secured with expanded metal or steel mesh secured to the inside of the door. An acceptable alternative is 1/2 inch thick polycarbonate secured to the inside of the door or frame.

3. If an alarm system is present, or planned for the location, the doors should be equipped with one or more of the following sensor devices: magnetic contact switch, shock sensor or laced panel board. "Glass bugs' which detect glass breakage should be attached to all glass panels and side panels.

4. Doors protected with sensors connected to an alarm system will transmit a signal when violated. If the system is local or proprietary, a sound device (bell or siren) will announce any intrusion at the location. If the system is connected to a central stations monitoring company, the signal will be received at the company office. When a signal is received, police and building offices are notified. In some cases a guard is dispatched to the protected premises.

5. The door frames should be sturdy and appropriate for the type of door hung. Weak frames should be replaced or rebuilt.

6. Exterior door locks should conform to the guidelines found in Section "F" (Locks). Interior or office doors should be equipped with heavy duty, mortised latch sets that have dead-bolt capability. Where needed, rim mounted, dead-bolt or drop-bolt locks can be installed to increase the security of important offices or rooms.

7. Doors that have external or exposed hinges may be vulnerable to pin removal. The hinge pins should be made non-removable by spot welding or other means, or the hinges should be pinned to prevent separation.

8. Doors to utility closets should be equipped with working deadbolt locks and kept locked at all times. Such closets, if unsecured, can become hiding places for "stay-behind" criminals.

9. All exterior doors which do not have glass vision panels should be equipped with wide-angle Interviewers (peepholes).

10. Check all local building and fire codes regarding elevators prior to installing locks or other security devices on doors or cars. If no restrictions exist, the floor doors can be equipped with locking devices to prevent unauthorized entry.

a. Elevator cabs should be programmed either by key or relay to bypass floors that are closed or unoccupied.

b. Elevator doors on each floor can be equipped with sets of magnetic contacts connected to the alarm system which signal any violation of the door.

c. All elevator cars should be equipped with corner-view mirrors to allow observation of the interior prior to entering.

11. Fire doors must conform to all local fire and building codes and should have an Underwriters Laboratory rating.

a. Fire doors should be secured with approved latching or locking hardware, a panic bar with a spring latch or safety lock.

b. If the fire door is solid core, the interior material must be fire resistant.

c. An adjustable spring or air return will ensure that the door is always closed.

d. As with all doors, sensor devices connected to a sound device or system will announce their opening.

A. Intrusion and fire-detection alarm systems are of obvious benefit, but are costly. The sophistication and coverage provided vary widely from system to system. The size, location and type of institution will dictate the type of system required. Special features such as emergency panic buttons and robbery signal circuits may be required at certain locations. In considering your security posture you may require professional assistance. Start by contacting your local law enforcement agency, and request help from the Crime Prevention, Crime Resistance, or Burglary Prevention Officers. These specially trained officers can offer expert guidance. Keep in mind that the officer is not selling a product or system but is there to help you. If further assistance of a particular type is needed, you may want to retain the services of a private security consultant.

B. The installation of an alarm system can materially upgrade the security at most locations. Closed circuit television coverage may also be useful, as such systems permit surveillance of exterior exits and interior halls by one trained security officer at a master console.

C. Post deterrent "warning" signs on the exterior of the building. In other words, advertise your crime prevention readiness.

D. A security desk should be set up in the main lobby of each building which has an open-access or open-door policy. A sign-in/out log book, supervised by an employee, who validates identification prior to allowing visitors to proceed into the building is highly advisable.

E. An emergency or silent robbery alarm transmitter device -button, treadle, ribbon switch or finger pull - should be located so that it can be activated without any unnatural or sudden movements. Such movements can be very dangerous when facing an armed intruder or an emotionally disturbed or angry person.

A. Whenever possible, all office machines and equipment should be bolted to counter or desk tops, or otherwise secured with locking hardware or cable and padlock devices commercially available.

B. All office machines and equipment should be included in an up-to-date inventory and marked with an owner-applied identification code. (Many municipalities have such marking programs. Check with your local law enforcement agency to determine if such a program exists locally and what form the code should take.)

C. Valuable portfolios and files should be stored in fire-resistant metal cabinets. The best type of cabinets will have fire ratings awarded by Underwriters Laboratories, and will be tagged for identification as fire-retardant chests or cabinets with a UL sticker. Most quality storage units have built-in locking devices. It should be noted that fire-resistant files and chests do not normally have a high rating for burglary resistance.

D. Key-control for all doors should be strictly maintained. Key possession should be limited to a "must have" basis or one of "demonstrated need." If a key-holder leaves the institution or changes position, and no longer requires a key, the cylinder should be changed and all keys reissued.

E. Ideally, high-value items should be stored in a safe. The safe should have a minimum tool and torch resistance rating of 30 minutes (signified by an Underwriters Laboratory tag of TR-TL-30). The safe should be secured to the floor with four bolts and a reinforced concrete base.

Incursions, vandalism, and other incidents have occurred even where apparently adequate security systems have been in operation. A few general principles for reporting and otherwise handling such occurrences can be suggested.

A. VANDALISM AND BURGLARY

1.    Immediately notify the police no matter how minor the incident. Watchful and knowledgeable persons will occasionally be able to notify the police in time for them to apprehend an offender in the act or shortly thereafter.

2.    An accurate inventory of any stolen or otherwise missing articles can materially aid the police in their investigation.

3.    If there is physical damage - defacing, spray-painting, etc. - take photographs. As soon as the police have viewed damage and photographs have been taken, have the damage repaired.

4.    Apprise the police as to anything out of the ordinary in the conditions of the premises no matter how insignificant.

B. MAIL BOMBS

Bombs and other incendiary devices have been employed against both individuals and institutions for purposes of revenge, extortion, terrorism, and the expression of racial or religious hatred. The physical appearance of such devices is limited only by the imagination of the senders; they have been letters, books, and parcels of various sizes and shapes. They have, however, exhibited unique characteristics in the majority of known instances. The first rule for security is to be thoroughly  knowledgeable concerning the types of mail normally received and to be on guard against the unusual - particularly mail (or deliveries) exhibiting these characteristics. The second is to take all possible precautions when suspicious mailings arrive.

1.    What to look for:

* Name and title of addressee are not accurate.

* No return address, or the sender is not known to the addressee

* Handwriting appears distorted or foreign.

* Mailing is unprofessionally wrapped, appears uneven, abnormally bulky or lopsided, contains bulges or soft spots.

* Poorly wrapped package is marked "Fragile-Handle With Care," "Rush-Do Not Delay," or has unusual restrictions such as "Personal" or "Private."

* Letters or packages show an excessive amount of postage stamps.

* Protruding wires or tinfoil.

* Package makes a buzzing or ticking noise, a sloshing sound, or emits a peculiar odor.

2. What to do:

* Don't open the article. Don't put it in water or in a confined space (such as a drawer or cabinet).

* Isolate the article and secure the immediate area, closing nearby doors. If possible, open windows in the immediate area to help in venting potential explosive gases.

* Contact your local Police Department and Postal Inspector for professional assistance.

C. BOMB THREATS

An extremely common form of harassment, particularly against religious and ethnic institutions (though also experienced by large business organizations, office buildings and schools), is the telephoned bomb threat.

In such incidents, of course, the Police should be notified immediately (emergency call) and all persons in the building or threatened area should be evacuated in accord with standard fire evacuation procedures.

In the case of bomb threats, any person in the building or institution (not necessarily a security officer) is a likely recipient of the phone call. The Denver, Colorado Police Department has developed two valuable forms for the use of the recipient of such a call. They are reproduced here, and it is recommended that they be reproduced by all organizations for their own use.

The first is a checklist to be filled out at the time of the telephoned threat as an immediate aid in the discovery of dangerous devices and the protection of lives and property.

The second, a checklist to be filled out as soon as possible after emergency procedures have been undertaken, can be an invaluable aid in subsequent police investigations.

Date: ______/______/______     Time Of Call: ________ am/pm

Call Received By: ____________ Office: ____________ Ext. _____

Exact Language Of The Threat: ________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Voice On Phone (Check as applicable):

Male Female Adult Child

Estimated Age _________ Race ________________________

Speech: Slow Rapid Normal Excited Loud Foul
Broken Sincere Accent Intoxicated Impediment
Soft/High Pitched Deep Calm Angry Rational

Background Noises: _____________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________

Music Talking Laughing Barroom Typing Machines
Traffic Airplanes Factory Trains Quiet Other

Notify: ___________________________________________________________
        Supervisory or Command Officer

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
* Make a bomb threat offense report and attach this checklist

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: ________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Denver Police Department


Ask:

1. When? (When will it go off) _______________________________________

2. Where? (Is it located) ___________________________________________

3. What? (Type of bomb is it) _______________________________________

4. What? (Type of explosive is it) ____________________________________

5. Why? (Are you doing this) _______________________________________

6. Who? (Are you) _______________________________________________




It is not generally advisable to call in the news media when an incident of vandalism or other criminal act has been carried out, or a threat made against a religious institution. The reason for generally avoiding such coverage is to reduce the likelihood of imitative behavior by other potential perpetrators, to prevent offenders from feeling that their "handiwork" is being glorified by publicity, and to maintain as much control as possible over the situation in conjunction with law enforcement authorities. Sensationalism hinders solutions.

If, however, the incident or threat generates unavoidable media coverage, one particular individual should be assigned to speak for the organization, in order to maintain an accurate source of reliable information, and to avoid contradictory, misleading, or irresponsible statements.



It is important for victims of crime to feel that they are not alone.

Particularly in the case of a religious or other community institution that has been vandalized or otherwise attacked, the leadership of that institution can alleviate the distress in their constituency and in the community at large, as well as send a message to those who carried out such a crime, by:

* Soliciting condemnation of such acts by elected officials, business leaders, editorial writers and other representatives of community opinion;

* Seeking expressions of support and sympathy in the form of sermons or public statements from religious and ethnic group leaders;

* Cooperating with law enforcement officials in investigation of such incidents (and maintaining this communication on a continuing basis) as well as working with other local resources. The Anti-Defamation League's office in your region stands ready to offer the assistance of experienced staff in confronting the problems and in planning an effective community response.

These steps will make it clear to the offenders and their potential imitators that the entire community repudiates such behavior, takes it most seriously, and considers a criminal attack upon one of its members as an attack upon all.





To discourage theft of Sifrei Torah, to protect a prospective purchaser as well as to recover stolen Sifrei Torah, Rabbinical leaders have approved a Halachically acceptable method of identifying a Sefer Torah, through the Universal Torah Registry system.

We suggest that all Sifrei Torah be registered with Universal Torah Registry, 14 Research Way, Setauket, NY 11733; 1/800/645-5404.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the only Torah Registry system available.



Many synagogues have constructed steel gates, similar to the gates protecting store fronts, around the Ark. These can be decoratively designed so as to be consistent with the aesthetic appearance and dignity of the synagogue. Some synagogues place the Paroches in a manner which completely covers the steel gates. Companies which specialize in iron work may be consulted.



Activating a security system when one leaves a building, and turning it off when one is about to enter normally require acts which are not permitted on the Sabbath and Holy Days. To meet this problem, Halachically acceptable methods and devices are available.

It is therefore imperative that the Rabbi be consulted and involved, from the start, with the design and choice of your security system.



For those synagogues with a limited number of persons present during week days, it is suggested that an inexpensive TV monitor system be installed at the entrance of the synagogue. This system, combined with a buzzer to release the lock on the front door, would discourage unwanted presence in the building.

Care should be taken in placing the camera, so that it cannot be either stolen or vandalized. It is suggested that it either be placed above the ground floor level and slanted downwards, or be recessed.



Security depends in part upon perception. A would-be intruder may be discouraged by visible deterrents in the form of gates and grills around windows and doors.

These devices, although protective, can be unsightly and diminish the dignity of the house of worship.

It is therefore suggested that windows and doors be protected by decorative iron work in the form of Menorahs, Stars of David and/or other religious symbols. An ornamental iron work contractor could be consulted.



The very useful recommendations in the ADL's material and in this Supplement can, in some cases, be nullified by human error or carelessness. It is therefore important to place responsible and dedicated individuals in charge of each of these matters.

A. KEYS

In synagogues which do not have a full-time custodian, keys are entrusted to various individuals, to open the door for Services and for other purposes. If they are given to some people, it is difficult to refuse them to others. Many things can happen in these circumstances, including their unauthorized use by relatives when the original holder passes on.

In such situations, it is important that the cylinders be changed periodically on all locks and new keys issued. It is difficult to objectively define "periodically" in this context. Few will go to the expense and bother of doing this unless there is a definite time scheduled. It is suggested that the time interval be the same as that for checking Tefillin, namely twice every seven years, i.e., once every three and a half years.

Whenever someone leaves the congregation's employ, the cylinders on all locks for which the person had a key should be changed, unless you have as much confidence in the person upon their leaving as you had when you first engaged the person. Surrender of the keys would give a false sense of security, as most keys can be readily duplicated.

B. "COMBINATION" LOCK

Where there is no eruv to permit carrying on Shabbos, use of a numerical "combination" to be dialed instead of keys is suggested. Some people may anticipate that those responsible would have difficulty in remembering the combination. If so, utilize the numerical value of the consonants in a common Hebrew word, e.g. TOV = 962. But this number should not be used, as it is now in this widely circulated Brochure and could be used by an unauthorized person. Of course, this combination should also be changed "periodically".



Safeguarding human lives is a major tenet of our faith.

Most local governments have codes for fire safety. They are designed to lessen the possibility of a fire starting, to delay its spread and to make it easy for people to escape. (Good and unobstructed exits are also vital in other cases of panic.)

Some congregations have also found it beneficial to consult their local Fire Department for advice and counsel, including a visit to the synagogue building by that agency.

The lives saved by complying with the fire code are likely to be, first, those of our own worshippers. Fire safety measures also help prevent the destruction, G-d forbid, of Sifrei Torah, as well as of Chumashim, Siddurim and other books which contain the Divine Name.



Government pressures and economic factors relevant to public utilities cause them to engage in active energy conservation work.

In the down state New York area, Con Edison, LILCO and Brooklyn Union Gas offer considerable advice on energy conservation without charge. In many cases, suppliers of oil, as well as public utilities in other parts of the country, do likewise.

Numerous Professional Engineers offer advice on conservation. Professional services can be very valuable.

The U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 offers much printed material regarding energy conservation at modest prices at no cost.

A postal card to them will bring a list of their publications on, the subject. The same may be true of your state government.

An investment in energy conservation improvements to a building and/or in equipment, produces - in some cases - annual cash savings of 40% or more of the cost.

If you cannot obtain interest-free loans for an energy-saving improvement (from your members, their friends and others in your community) and if the reduction in energy costs would be substantial in proportion to the investment, it is likely to be to your advantage to explore borrowing from commercial sources. There may well be a net cash saving after paying interest and principal during the period of the loan, plus a much larger saving thereafter - it is a matter of arithmetic.



We hope that this manual on Security for Synagogues will protect the sanctity and dignity of our synagogues as places of worship and study, protect their occupants, and safeguard our communities' investments in synagogue buildings and in their contents.

The Orthodox Union and Young Israel thank the ADL for their kind permission to reprint the materials from their handbook.

This publication was made possible by a grant of the Harry and Jane Fischel Foundation, in honor of Harry Fischel and Jane Fischel of Blessed Memory.

A) A portion of the handbook, "Security for Community lnstitutions," reprinted by permission of the publisher, the Anti-Defamation League of Bnai Brith

B) A Supplement, dealing with security matters of special concern to synagogues and other Orthodox Jewish institutions. It was prepared by a special joint committee of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and the National Council of Young Israel, composed of Rabbi Bertram Leff, National Director of Synagogue Services (retired), and Rabbi Ephraim Sturm, Director of International Council of Young Israel respectively (retired).

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