The Coming Week's Daf Yomi by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz
This essay is based upon the insights and chidushim (original ideas) of Talmudic scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, as published in the Hebrew version of the Steinsaltz Edition of the Talmud.
Keritot 18a-b - Responding to concerns about sin
As we learned on yesterday's daf (=page) there is a disagreement regarding the question about when an asham taluy - a conditional guilt-offering - is brought. The Sages rule that this sacrifice is only brought when a person ate hatikhah ahat mi-shtei hatikhot - "a single piece out of two," where one was permitted and one was forbidden. If, however, there is doubt as to whether the piece was forbidden at all - it was a case of hatikhah ahat, "a single piece" - then an asham taluy would not be brought. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this analysis and rules that someone who ate a single piece whose status was questionable is obligated to bring an asham taluy.
An example of this disagreement is presented by the Gemara:
Said Rabbah bar Avuha in the name of Rav: The case where one ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was helev (forbidden fat) or permitted fat forms the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. But why present the case that he ate it? Even if he did not eat it he may offer such a guilt-offering according to Rabbi Eliezer, as we have learnt: Rabbi Eliezer says, A man may freely
offer a conditional guilt-offering every day!?
Said Rav Ashi: Rabbi Eliezer follows here the view of Baba ben Buta, of whom we have learnt: But they said unto him, Wait until you come into a state of doubt.
Rashi explains that the Gemara is referring to the Mishnah later on in Massekhet Keritot (daf 25a). In that Mishnah there are three approaches to the law of asham taluy.
1. According to Rabbi Eliezer, an asham taluy can be donated at any time, even if there is no reason to think that the person sinned.
2. Baba ben Buta suggests that an asham taluy cannot be donated unless there is a possibility that the person sinned.
3. The Sages rule that an asham taluy is brought only in the event that the person believes that he may have transgressed a sin for which he would be liable to receive the punishment of karet.
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Keritot 19a-b - Sinning without knowing what you did
We have been discussing the case of asham taluy - a conditional guilt-offering - that is brought when it is unclear to a person whether or not he performed a forbidden act. The Mishnah on today's daf (=page) presents a different kind of question. In the Mishnah's cases it is clear that a forbidden act had been performed, but it is unclear what that forbidden act may have been. Three examples appear in the Mishnah:
1. Someone ate one of two forbidden foods that were before him - helev (forbidden fats) and notar (sacrificial meat after the time that it was supposed to have been eaten)
2. A man engaged in sexual relations with a woman in his house and he knows that it was either his wife who was a niddah (menstruating) or it was his sister
3. Yom Kippur either preceded or followed Shabbat and a forbidden act of work was performed, but it is unclear on which day the work was done.
In cases like these Rabbi Eliezer requires that an ordinary sin-offering (a korban hatat) be brought, since it is clear that a sin was performed. Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees, since a korban hatat requires that the person know what he did (see Vayikra 4:23).
While it is clear to Rabbi Yehoshua that no korban hatat is required, might he be obligated to bring an asham taluy? An asham taluy is usually brought in situations where a sin-offering cannot be brought for reasons of doubt, and these cases seem to match that requirement.
The answer to this question depends on how to understand the passage in Sefer Vayikra (5:17) that describes the requirements for an asham taluy. The Torah commands "And if any one sin, and do any of the things which the LORD hath commanded not to be done, though he know it not, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity."
Rabbi Yehudah teaches that based on this passage Rabbi Yehoshua frees the sinner even from an asham taluy, since he only brings one "though he know it not," and in these cases he knows for certain that he sinned. Rabbi Shimon argues that in these cases we also consider him someone who falls into the category of "though he know it not," since he does not know what he did.
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Keritot 20a-b - Producing charcoal
Both kindling and extinguishing a fire on Shabbat are considered forbidden activities for which a sin-offering will be brought if it was done without realizing that it was Shabbat.
The Gemara on today's daf (=page) quotes the following baraita -
If one removed coals from a burning pile on the Sabbath, he is liable to bring a
sin-offering; Rabbi Shimon ben Eli'ezer says in the name of Rabbi Eli'ezer son of Rabbi Zadok: He is liable to bring two offerings, because he extinguished the upper coals and kindled the lower ones. How is this case to be understood? If he intended to extinguish as well as to kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him from the second offering? And if he did not intend to kindle, what is the reason of the
one who holds him liable to two? — Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Hanina both explained the case as follows: He intended to extinguish the upper coals knowing that this would set the lower ones ablaze. The first Tanna holds that one is exempt for any kindling which is to his disadvantage; while Rabbi Eli'ezer son of Rabbi Zadok holds him liable.
In explanation of this case, Rabbi Yohanan clarifies that we are discussing the case of a blacksmith, whose intention is to extinguish the upper coals even as he lights the lower ones.
Why is it to the blacksmith's advantage to extinguish the burning coals?
In order for the blacksmith to properly fire-up his forge to exceedingly high temperatures so that he will be able to soften the metal implements that he will hammer into shape. From ancient times, one of the popular fuels used to heat the forge was charcoal. Charcoal is obtained by heating wood until its complete pyrolysis (carbonization) occurs, leaving only carbon and inorganic ash. In many parts of the world, charcoal is still produced semi-industrially, by burning a pile of wood that has been mostly covered with mud or bricks. The heat generated by burning part of the wood and the volatile byproducts pyrolyzes the rest of the pile. The limited supply of oxygen prevents the charcoal from burning. The charcoal that is produced will burn at twice the heat of ordinary wood, with almost no smoke or smell.
In our case, apparently the larger pieces of wood were on the top and the blacksmith wanted to extinguish them to use as charcoal, while he had no interest in the smaller pieces at the bottom.
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Keritot 21a-b - The prohibition against consuming blood
Among the forbidden activities that were listed at the beginning of Massekhet Keritot as making one liable to receive karet was the consumption of blood. The fifth perek (=chapter) of this tractate is entitled Dam Shehitah, and it is devoted to clarifying this prohibition.
The Mishnah teaches that it is only for consuming the blood of birds or animals that come out at the time that the animal dies that would make someone liable for karet. The baraita teaches that although the passage in Sefer Vayikra (7:26) appears to forbid all types of blood, in fact, blood that is found in eggs, fish blood, kosher grasshopper blood and even human blood is not forbidden on a biblical level.
The Gemara differentiates between these different types of blood that are not forbidden by the Torah. There is no prohibition at all against consuming fish blood or grasshopper blood, although Rav rules that if the blood was collected in a cup it would be forbidden for reasons of mar'it ha-ayin - it has the appearance of forbidden blood. Thus, the Gemara explains, were one to leave fish scales in the blood so that it is clear that it is not animal blood, it would be permitted. Regarding human blood, once the blood has left the body, there is a rabbinic prohibition against consuming it. Therefore, someone whose gums are bleeding need not be concerned if he swallows some blood, as there is no prohibition whatsoever. If, however, someone is eating and realizes that he has bled on his food, he must remove the blood before completing his meal.
Rashi explains that a person can swallow blood in his mouth because no one sees him doing so. This is a difficult explanation since we have a general principle that when something is forbidden for reasons of mar'it ha-ayin, even if no one will see him it remains forbidden. Tosafot explain that this rule applies only when dealing with mar'it ha-ayin connected with a biblical prohibition, which is not the case we are dealing with regarding human blood.
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Keritot 22a-b - Blood loss leading to death
As we learned on yesterday's daf (=page) the only blood whose consumption would make the transgressor liable to receive the punishment of karet is that blood which comes out at the time of death. The Gemara on today's daf asks for clarification of this point and we learn that there is a disagreement on its definition. Rabbi Yohanan says "That blood which gushes forth" while Resh Lakish says "From the black drop onward."
Rashi explains that when the arteries are cut the escaping blood is at first dark and then red. In its second stage it begins after a while to gush forth with force and when the pressure ceases the stream weakens and the blood oozes gently. There is thus at the beginning as well as the end a period when the blood escapes in a gentle flow. According to Rabbi Yohanan, only the blood that escapes with force is considered the life blood; according to Resh Lakish it is all blood that escapes after the last black drop, even when flowing gently.
Although the Mishnah is clear that blood in the animal's inner organs is not the blood whose consumption would make someone liable to receive karet, nevertheless, Rabbi Zeira rules that blood found in the animal's heart does fall into that category. He explains that the heart absorbs the forbidden blood.
At the moment of slaughter - as in every situation where there is sudden blood loss - the animal enters a state of hypovolemic shock. At that time there is a physiological response where the blood vessels contract in order to direct as much blood as possible to the heart. This phenomenon is supported by the reaction of the heart's right cavity that creates a vacuum drawing in the blood in the veins, as well. In addition, a well-known response to the severing of blood vessels is their contraction in order to limit blood loss. This process explains Rabbi Zeira's contention that the blood found in the heart is the blood for which a person would be liable to receive karet.
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Keritot 23a-b - Introducing the conditional guilt-offering
The closing perek (=chapter) of Massekhet Keritot begins on today's daf (=page) and it begins with a discussion of the laws of asham taluy - a conditional guilt-offering.
Ordinarily, a sin-offering is brought when a person performs a forbidden act accidentally. There is another korban, an asham taluy, which is a sacrifice brought by someone who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering (see Vayikra 5:17-18). The Mishnah on today's daf discusses a case where someone set aside an animal to be brought as an asham taluy, but before it is offered, he learns definitively that he did not commit the sin. Three opinions appear in the baraita that is brought by our Gemara.
Rabbi Me'ir rules that once the owner has learned that he did not commit the sin, it is clear that the sacrifice was brought in error. He can, therefore, return the animal to the herd without redeeming it.
According to the Hakhamim, we treat it like any sacrifice that cannot be brought. That is, we leave it on its own until it becomes blemished in a manner that precludes it from being brought as a sacrifice. At that time it can be redeemed, and the money will be given to the Temple to use for another sacrifice.
Rabbi Eliezer says that the animal should nonetheless be offered as an asham taluy. His argument is that although he knows that he does not need to bring a sacrifice for this sin, it will serve as an atonement for some other sin that he no doubt did at some point in his life.
In the Gemara there is a debate regarding the precise definition of the doubt which requires bringing an asham taluy sacrifice. During the Second Temple period, it was commonly offered even by individuals who had no real doubt, but merely a slight suspicion that they had committed a sin. Therefore, it was also called the guilt-offering of the pious.
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Keritot 24a-b - When conditional guilt-offerings are found to be unnecessary
As we learned on yesterday's daf (=page), there is a disagreement about what to do in a case where someone set aside an animal to be brought as an asham taluy, but before it is offered, he learns definitively that he did not commit the sin.
Rabbi Me'ir rules that once the owner has learned that he did not commit the sin, it is clear that the sacrifice was brought in error. He can, therefore, return the animal to the herd without redeeming it.
According to the Hakhamim, we treat it like any sacrifice that cannot be brought. That is, we leave it on its own until it becomes blemished in a manner that precludes it from being brought as a sacrifice. At that time it can be redeemed, and the money will be given to the Temple to use for another sacrifice.
On today's daf we learn about cases where Rabbi Me'ir accepts the ruling of the Sages and the Sages accept Rabbi Me'ir's ruling.
According to Rav Sheshet, Rabbi Me'ir agrees that the sacrifice will retain its holiness in the event that the person set aside two animals to serve as asham taluy sacrifices.
According to Rav Yehudah quoting Rav, the Sages agree that the animal can be returned to the herd without redeeming it in the event that the asham taluy was deemed necessary because of the testimony of two witnesses, who were later found to be lying in their statement.
The Gemara explains these rulings by arguing that in the first case, setting aside two offerings is an indication of the level of guilt felt by the individual. This man was clearly concerned about his action and we understand that he truly meant to sanctify these animals. Therefore, in this case, even after we realize that the sacrifice was unnecessary, the sanctity remains. In the second case, where the individual was not aware of any transgression and relied solely on the testimony of others, we assume that his sanctification was not wholehearted, as he believed that their testimony may have been in error. Therefore, in this case, once we realize that the sacrifice was unnecessary we recognize that it was not truly sanctified to begin with.
In addition to his monumental translation and commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Steinsaltz has authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles on a variety of topics, both Jewish and secular. For more information about Rabbi Steinsaltz's groundbreaking work in Jewish education, visit www.steinsaltz.org or contact the Aleph Society at 212-840-1166.